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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM: SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The fundamental importance of ethnic nationalism is
attested by the recent resurgence of separatist movements
in some European countries and throughout Asia and Africa.
1
The optimism that accompanied the end of colonialism, with
the subsequent independence of the new states, has been
deflated by the growing antagonism between ethnic groups and
the existing multiethnic states. Biafra and Bangladesh
*For a discussion of separatist movements throughout
the globe see, Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New
Phase," World Politics . XX (October, 1967), pp. 30-35.
For more detailed case studies of separatist movements in
Southeast Asia, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Quebec and Africa,
see: Walker Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South
Asia," World Politics . XXII (October, 1969), pp. 51-56;
E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," Political Quarterly .
XXXIX (July-September, 1968), pp. 322-332; John E. Schwartz,
"The Scottish National Party: Non-Violent Separatism and
Theories of Violence," World Politics . XXII (July, 1970),
pp. 496-517; J. E. S. Hayward, "From Functional Regionalism
to Functional Representation in France: The Battle of
Brittany," Political Studies . XVII (March 1969), pp. 48-75;
Frank L. Wilson, "French Canadian Separatism," Western
Political Quarterly . XX (March, 1967), pp. 116-132; Erwin C.
Hargrove, "Nationality, Values, and Change: Young Elites
in French Canada," Comparative Politics . 2 (April, 1970),
pp. 473-499; All A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the
Politics of Retrlbalization in Africa," Journal of Internationa l
Affairs . 23 (1969); and William John Hanna, Judith Lynne
Hanna, "Influence and Influential in Two Urban-Centered
African Communities," Comparative Politics . 2 (October, 1969),
pp. 17-40. For a more theoretical discussion on the
question of ethnicity and ethnic conflict see: Robert
Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of
Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," The American
Political Science Review . LXIV (December, 1970), pp. 1112-1130;
Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States:
Toward a Theory of Conflict," unpublished paper.
exemplify the moat recent dramatic caaea. Ethnic natlonaliam
seems to be on the riae deaplte the fact that much of the
early literature on political development and nation-building
had emphaaized the centripetal, proceaa of "homogenization." 2
In view of the fact that "of the total 132 contemporary
states, only 12 (9.1%) can be aptly deacribed as essentially
homogeneous from an ethnic point of view," 3 it becomes
imperative that acholars re-examine and reconsider some of
the earlier assumptions and explanations regarding the
nature of political development and national integration.^
While much of the attention on national integration
ha8 focused on the "developing" countries, thi3 problem,
however, is not limited to Africa or Aaia, as witnesaed by
the recent nationalistic manifeatations of the Welsh, the
Scots, the Bretona, some Black Americans,5 French Canadians,
2Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modern-
ization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics .
3 (April, 1971). This article is an incisive discussion
of the literature on modernization and political development,
^Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?",
World Politics , 24 (April, 1972).
^Since the concept of integration has been used in a
variety of ways, throughout this study the concept of
political or national integration will be used in the following
sense: "The process of bringing together culturally and
socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and
the establishment of national identity...." Myron Weiner,
"Pblitical Integration and Political Development,* in Jason
L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development
and Social Change . New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966,
p. 551.
5por a discussion of the question of ethnicity in an
urban setting see: Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Bevond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
19*0).
3some Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union. 6
In this study of the Basques, 1 shall proceed to discuss
Basque nationalism by using some of the literature on
political development and nation-building as my point of
departure. While the Basques may not be considered unique
in so far as ethnic nationalism is concerned, their socio-
economic situation exhibits marked differences from other
minority groups which have also made demands for some type
of political autonomy or independence. Thus, they make an
appropriate case study which may suggest some theoretical
insight into the question of ethnic natxonalism. And, more
Importantly, there has been no comprehensive study of
Basque nationalism.
The case of the Basques is one to which one cannot
attribute demands for autonomy to a lack of economic
development, economic neglect- , or economic exploitation.
In fact, within the Spanish society, they may be considered
a privileged group. Within Spain, the Basque region is one
of the more economically developed areas. Moreover, in
comparison with ethnic groups in Africa and Asia, the Basques
have been incorporated into two states--the Spanish and
6Brzezinski, for example, argues that "a very special
and particularly perplexing kind of dissent (within the
Soviet Union) is posed by Increasing restlessness among the
Soviet Union's non-Russian nations." He further not*** that
"the political significance of this phenomenon has largely
been ignored by American scholars of Soviet affairs."
Zblgniew Brzezinaki, Between Two Ages: America's Role in
the Technetronlc Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p.
French states—for centuries, and the cultural differences
between them and the surrounding populations are not as
sharp as the differences that one might find between groups
In some of the Afro-Asian states. For centuries, there has
been contact between the Basques and the surrounding
populations. As will be discussed below, according to some
Indices one would tend to think that the Basques had become
assimilated Into their respective states - France and Spain.
The emergence of the states of Africa and Asia as
independent political units gave rise to a vast and variegated
body of literature on what has come to be known as political
development, nation-building, and/or political integration.
7
7See» Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The
Politics of the Developing Areas . (Princeton, 1960; Gabriel
A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A
Developmental Approach, (Boston, 1966): David E. Apter. The
PoUfocs of Modernization, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press,
1967); David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A
Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism . (Princeton. 1961)* Wlllard
A. Belling and orge O. Totten (eds.), Developing Nations:
Quest fsp a Model
,
(New York, 1970); James S. Coleman and
Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds.), Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa , (Berkeley. 1964); C.E. Black.
The Dynamics of Modernization . (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1966); Karl tf. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and
Political Development," The American Political Science Review .
55 (September 1961), pp. 493-514; Karl W. Deutsch and >/ lliam
J. Foltz (eds.), Natlon-Bulldlng . (New York: Atherton i-ress,
1966); Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation . (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1960); Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, (eds.),
Political Development and Social Change . (New York: John
Wiley and Sons. Inc., 1966); Philip E. Jacobs and James V.
Toscano, (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities.
(Philadelphia, 1966) Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner,
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development.
( P^t^t-™^ IQfifiT; MurHn Sovmntir Lip«»t
T
The First New
Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative
Perspective . (New York. 1963); Luclan Pye, (ed.),
5Collectively, these concepts are at times used under the
rubric of modernization. There occurred a renewed interest
among political scientists in problems of political
integration. Since, in the words of Lucian Pye, "political
scientists were intellectually ill-prepared for the collapse
of empires and the formation of new states, "8 scholars,
particularly American scholars, felt compelled to devise
models and postulate hypotheses which would help to explain
the process of national integration. Many of these studies
were both of a descriptive and prescriptive nature. In
devising models of the integrated political system, and
drawing from the European experience, students of political
development thus hoped that political leaders of the
"developing 11 societies would be able to abstract some guide
lines which would help them to implement policies to bring
about national unity or political integration.
^
Communications and Political Development , (Princeton, 1963):
Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development . (Boston, 1966);
Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), The Political
Modernization of Japan and Turkey . (Princeton, 1964);
Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies . 5 (December, 1967)
pp. 449-467.
8Lucian Pye, "The Formation of New States," in Ithiel
de Sola Pool (ed.), Contemporary Political Science: Toward
Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 183.
9As Walker Connor has pointed out, much of the literature
in this area assumes that a high degree of social engineering
is possible. Both Lucian Pye and Ithiel de Sola Pool take
this view. The following quotation from Lucian Pye
illustrates the point: "...the widely recognized problem
of creating political consensus in most of the new states
is in part one of building new and more universal means of
While the author realizes the difficulty of classifying
all the literature on political development and nation-
bulldlng In one capsule, he believes, however, that underlying
much of this literature are certain broad assumptions,
sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, regarding the
nature of political development. It is assumed, for example,
that economic and technological changes will ultimately
eliminate sectional and ethnic differences, within a political
unit, with the attendant result of bringing about a more
politically cohesive society. Secondly, there is the
assumption that political integration (integration of various
ethnic groups into a larger political whole) is a desirable
goal, and conversely, the assumption that cultural self-
assertion is somehow "backward" or, to use Aristide Zolberg's
words, to view the "persistence of distinct sub-national
identities.
. .as quaint sports. . .or pathological cases if
they appear to be a source of recurrent confllct."^
national communications and transportation so that all
segments of the society can become more closely involved
with each other.", Pye, op. clt. . p. 10. Also, Ithlel de
Sola Pool, "The Role of Communications in the Process of
Modernization and Technological Change," UNESCO Document .
SS/KAC/1960/18. Karl W. Deutsch also expresses the
possibility for social engineering: "Too often men have
viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident,
or accepted them submissively as fate. In fact they are
neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discernible
process; as soon as we begin to make the process visible,
we are beginning to change it." Nationalism and Social
Communications; An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Rationality.
(Cambridge, 1966), p. 164.
10Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration",
The Journal of Modern African Studies . 5 (December, 1967),
P. 451.
7Consquently, in studies ostensibly dealing with political
development and national integration, the phenomenon of
ethnic nationalism has been in some cases completely
overlooked and in other cases has been given only peripheral
consideration or looked at as a negative variable to be
eventually overcome. Instead much attention is paid to such
social processes as urbanization, industrial development,
the rate of literacy growth and the role of groups such as
the military, political parties or the bureaucracy.il The
reason for this lack of concern with the ethnic issue stems
from the assumption—seemingly taken fP¥* granted—that the
process of modernization moves progressively and uni linearly
"toward an interdependence among politically organized
societies and toward an ultimate integration of societies."
It is even assumed that at some point societies will become
"so homogeneous as to be capable of forming a world state. "12
For some writers the key obstacle to national integration
is essentially one stemming from a lack of communications. 13
Hconnor, op, cfrt,
l 2 Black, op. cit. . p. 155. Also, A.F.K. Organski, The
Stages of Political Development (New Yorkj Knopf, 1965).
^Communications will be defined here in a very broad
sense, that is, anything that promotes contact, direct or
indirect, between the different groups of a given plural
society. These contacts may take the form of trade between
different regions, the movement of populations from a rural
setting to an urban setting and improved methods of trans-
portation which may facilitate greater geographical mobility
for a given population. For a discussion of the concept of
"plural society" see: Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.),
Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, 1960).
8In Pye*s words:
*
,M5h€ ,widely rec<>8nized problem of creatinepolitical consensus in most of the new states!
il-iU «5
rt
2?
e
°f buildin« new more universalmeans of national communications, of establishing
more effective channels of communications andtransportation so that all segments of the societycan become more closely involved with each other.l*
Another writer, James Coleman, also emphasizes the crucial
role of communications in the process of national
integrations "the problem of integration and building
consensus in African territorial political systems is
largely a problem of developing patterns of communications." 15
The most systematic treatment of the role of
communications in the process of nation-building has been
given by Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social
Communications l 6 In this work he conceptualizes the political
A*Pye, op. cit.. p. 10.
l-\james s. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan
Africa," The Politics of the Developing Areas , p. 345.
Before proceeding any further, I should indicate
that the question of national integration is not a new one
within the social sciences. Both anthropologists and
sociologists have theorized on this question, but under a
different name, i.e., assimilation. But in contrast to
earlier works by anthropologists and sociologists, the more
recent works of political scientists have put greater stress
on the process of integration, as opposed to the mere
description of plural societies. In other words, it seems
that political scientists have been more concerned with the
dynamic processes of change. For works on assimilation and
plural societies sees Ronald Cohen and John Middieton (eds.),
From Trj.be to Nation (Scranton, Pa.s Chandler Publishing Co.,
1970); J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (London,
1948); Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New
Yorks Oxford University Preas T 1964)* M.G. Smith. The Plural
Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley, 1965JT
Deutsch, op. cit .
community in terms of a network of communications. In
Deutsche functional definition of nationalism, what counts
"is not the presence or absence of any particular variables,
but the presence of sufficient communications facilities. "17
In this work Professor Deutsch also devises an elaborate
model by which a series of quantitative tests would indicate
(if possible predict) the direction that a plural society
might take. Are the peoples of a given political unit moving
further apart or are they coming closer together? Is
assimilation or differentiation taking place? 18 According
to Profe ssor D^iftsch's model, we may be able to answer
these questions by observing the pattern of communications
and more economic activity," he says, "then people begin to
think of themselves as a country." 19
The process by which communications will be set in
motion has been defined by Deutsch as "social mobilization."
Social mobilization is the process by which "major clusters
17ibid., p. 99.
l^Deutsch uses the concept of assimilation to denote
the process by which the members of a minority group
learn and accept the language of the dominant group of a
plural society. As used by Deutsch, the concept means more
than the mere process of learning a new language. It also
means that the population being assimilated is accepting a
new culture* "Assimilation in language and culture involves
the learning of many new habits, and the unlearning of many
old ones*" Nationalism and Social Communications , p. 125.
1 9Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 6.
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of old social, economic and psychological committments are
eroded or broken and people become available for new
patterns of socialization and behavior. "20 communications
then, is the by-product of socio-economic processes.
Economic growth, and the corresponding social changes that
go along with it, become very significant in this process.
"Within any geographical setting, and any population," he
says, "economic and social and technological developments
mobilize individuals for relatively more intense communications.'
It is assumed that political community will follow economic
development and the development of the communications
network. "The rise of industrialism and the modern market
economy," offers "economic and psychological rewards for
successful group alignments to tense and insecure indi-
viduals.
.
.taught to hunger for success." 22 Once this process
is initiated, "the stage is set for the rise of the political
movement of modern nationalism— that is, for the effort to
convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for masses
of individuals to social and economic advancement.
"
2^ in
view of these statements one conjures up the image of the
20 Deutsch "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," The American Political Science Review
T 55
(September, 1961), pp. 493-514.
2 ljSationalism and Social Communications , p. 126.
22lMJ»i p. ioi.
2hmt, p. 103.
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nationalist as that of the rational economic man. Among
other things, this leaves completely out of the picture the
nationalist fanatic who may be willing to Put up with all
kinds of economic hardship in order to achieve his goals.
While one may not be able to deny the impact of
economic variables on the rise of nationalism, Professor
Deutsch's functional definition of nationality, and consequently
nationalism, in terms of communications, does not seem to be
adequate in order to distinguish the modern nation-state
from other communities. Nationality, in Professor Deutsch's
view, is "an alignment of large members of individuals from
the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and
leading social groups by channels of social communication
and economic intercourse." 24 According to this definition,
one cannot make a distinction between the political
organization of the feudal period and the modern nation* state.
This definition is applicable to both.
The stress on communications facilities and the lack
of concern for the "presence or absence of any particular
variables" prevents one from making qualitative distinctions
on the communications content which may tell us more about
the nature of social relationships than simply the amount of
communications
•
Deutsch, along with the other students of political
development who make use of the tradition-modernity model,
Ibid. , p. 101.
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also seems to assume that the process of national Integration
is unilinear and irreversible. It is presumed that once
the process of "social mobilization" gets under way, one
should witness the continual growth of modernity and the
conccomitant decline of the traditional sector of society.
It is also assumed that the end result will be approximately
the same for all states. Faced with the forces of modernity,
the traditional sectors will disintegrate or shrink. "Ihe
changes associated with social mobilization," he says,
"tend to weaken custom and tradition." 25 Consequently, the
decline of the traditional societies will force people to
express the "need for new patterns of group affiliation and
the new images of personal identity. "26 the logic of
Deutsche argument seems to indicate that individuals whose
loyalty, and identification, had been linked to traditional
society would switch their loyalty to the new emerging
state. Thus in his study of Africa, Coleman also makes the
assertion that "the processes of urbanization, commercialization
and Western education have furthered the widening of
perspectives, accelerated social mobility, created new
reference groups, as well as a nationally-minded educated
25Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development", p. 493.
26Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and political
Development" 9 p. 494.
13
cla 8 s»27 Reference will be made again to this point below.
In a later work by Deutsch, Nationally and It*
Alternatives, 28 it was indicated that there is a critical
balance between the process of assimilation and the rate of
"social mobilisation," Since "social mobilisation" is a
faster process than assimilation, it is probable that
assimilation might not take place, but instead ethnic conflict
and further differentiation might occur. In order for
assimilation to occur, that is, the growth of political
community, "the ability to communicate over wide-ranges of
subject ^should beJ spreading faster among men than is
necessitated by their working together directly." 29 In
other words, assimilation occurs if the ability to communicate
grows faster than the need to communicate. Differentiation
will occur "if the need outruns the ability,"30 This
suggests then, that assimilation into a new language or
culture may be taking place for reasons other than social
mobilization. But in the context of Deutsch 1 s work this
seems to raise a problem. We saw earlier that the process
of assimilation seemed to be inextricably linked to the
process of social mobilization. It is as a result of the
2
^Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas , p. 367.
28See note 17.
Nationalism and Social Communications , p. 125.
3°Ibld.
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process of social mobilization that different peoples are
thrown into contacts with each other and exposed to the
values of the market economy. This seems to suggest that
the process of social mobilization occurs prior to the process
of assimilation, for without some degree of communications,
there can be no assimilation, and without social mobilization
it would seem that social communications would be minimal.
But then to say that assimilation must stay ahead of social
mobilization, is in essence to admit that "social mobilization"
is not too much of an explanatory concept in so far as
assimilation is concerned. Moreover, "social mobilization"
does not seem to explain differentiation either because
differentiation is the condition of plural societies. Yet,
in Deutsch's view, "social mobilization" remains a
"fundamental process" underlying assimilation or differentiation.
A further ambiguity in Deutsche scheme, is the
relationship between communications and what he calls
"complementarity." 31 At times the latter concept is equated
with "communicative efficiency," 32 and at other times it is
implied to be a quality or predisposition in individuals which
permits them to communicate more efficiently. "Peoples are
held together •from within 1 M
, he says, "by this communicative
efficiency, the complementarity of facilities acquired by
their members."33 Later, the concept of "ethnic complementarity"
31 Ibld .. p. 96.
32Ibld .
33fratlonalism and Its Alternatives , p. 98.
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is Introduced. This, he says, "is the complementarity that
makes a people. "3* This does not seem to be very much
different from the old concept of ethnicity. At any rate,
it seems that the communications model is unable to explain
the concept of "ethnic complementarity".
The assertion that 'complementarity is greater if it
permits individuals to communicate efficiently no matter how
often they change their residence or occupations," 35 seems
to make "complementarity" a precondition before communications
can take place. Finally, making reference to Herman Finer,
Deutsch indicates that "complementarity may be that elusive
property of individuals which. .. •makes society cohere 1
,
or
which in our terminology makes it a community. "36 This
statement introduces great complications into Deutsch 1 s
model. If it be admitted that "complementarity" is a quality
which permits people to communicate more efficiently, then
one is no longer explaining the existence of the community,
or the growth of community, in terms of communications,
but, on the contrary, explaining communications in terras of
"ethnic complementarity".
In order to distinguish the communications that take
place among a people who possess "ethnic complementarity"
34Ibid .
33lbld .. p. 100.
36
r<jationallsm and Social Communications , p. 100.
16
from those communications that take place among people of
the same profession, Deutsch Introduces the concept of
"vocational complementarity"
, that is, the ability to
communicate that exists among people of a given profession.
But if it is maintained, as Deutsch3^ says, that an
individual belonging to a particular profession can communicate
more efficiently over a wide range of subjects with an
individual who possesses the same "ethnic complementarity"
than with his fellow specialists, then, once again, the
logic of the argument seems to lead one to conclude that
communications per se may not be that relevant in eradicating
ethnic boundaries.
The theoretical problems discussed above cast serious
doubt on the tendency to refer to the Western-educated elite
(within the developing countries) as a nationally-minded
class as if it were a monolith. That an intellectual gap
exists between the Western-educated elites and their
villagers seems obvious enough. But what is not so obvious
is that this gap is the principal obstacle on the path of
political integration, as it is sometimes maintained. 3&
To this writer, research in this area has not really
established this point. Further analyses of this question
37Ibld .. p. 98.
38Rlchard R. Fagen, Politics and Communications
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Luclan Pve. Politics.
Persona llty
t
and Kation-Bullding (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962).
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seem to reveal instead that those most exposed to
communications and "universe 11 stM values do not seem to be
as nationally-minded as previously assumed. 39 They seem to
continue to view political activity through "tribal" or
ethnic glasses* As All Mazrui has pointed out in making
reference to Africa, students of political development and
national integration have not "adequately differentiated
between tribalism as a way of life and tribalism as loyalty
to his ethnic group. A person could adopt almost an
entirely Western way of life, yet retain great love and
loyalty to his ethnic group ."40 it seems, however, that in
studies of Afro-Asian societies the existence of a Western-
educated elite as a nationally-minded class has been
assumed rather than demonstrated. As one study**! has cogently
argued, the dichotomous tradition-modernity model, which
has often guided research in this area, has dismissed other
theoretical possibilities.
While the present writer does not wish to denigrate
the role of communications in the growth of cultural
diffusion and political change, it would seem, however, that
communications alone are not enough in order to bring about
national integration. As we shall see in this case study,
^Donald l. Horowitz, see note 1.
40Ali A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the Politics
of Retribalization in Africa," Journal of International
Affair
s
» 23 (1969), p. 93.
^Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, see note 1.
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Basque nationalism has persisted—In fact, it has become
more intensive—despite linguistic assimilation, the growth
of communications, and economic development. In the case
of the 3asques, it has been precisely those people most
exposed to modernity and cultural interchange who have
become the most articulate spokesmen of Basque nationalism.
The Plan of the Study
With the theoretical literature described above as
our point of departure, in the chapters that follow, 1 will
discuss the origins and the development of Basque nationalism
from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present.
The materials for this study have come primarily from primary
and secondary documentary sources. Although this writer
has been in the Basque region and has talked to people from
various social circles of the Basque population, due to
political reasons a systematic opinion survey of the present
Basque population on the subject of nationalism is impossible
at this time. Nevertheless, my travels in the Basque region
in the summer of 1971 were still valuable for the purposes
of this study since it enabled this writer to observe
closely the sentiment of Basque identity which seemed to be
very much alive throughout the region.
Even though there is no systematic study of Basque
nationalism, this writer was able to find a wealth of
information on this subject consisting of books, pamphlets
and general histories of the Basque region. From these
19
sources I have extracted the information for this study.
All translations from Spanish and French into English have
been made by this writer.
In the discussion that follows, 1 will discuss the
emergence of Basque nationalism in a chronological sense
and in the process make reference to the socio-economic
and cultural conditions underlying the emergence of Basque
nationalism. In the last two chapters the various components
of Basque nationalism will be analyzed and then an effort
will be made to relate the Basque case to the theoretical
issues raised in the first chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE BASQUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THESPANISH AND FRENCH STATES J AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Basque country (known to the Basques as euskal-
erria or Basque nation)*2 consists of seven small provinces,
the larger four of which are located in northeastern Spain
(Vizcaya, Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Navarra), and the other
three (Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule) lie along south-
western France on the Spanish- French border. The total
population of this area is over 2,000,000 people, most of
whom live within the Spanish State .43 with respect to
physical size this is a relatively small area. It consists
of approximately 20,000 Km2, with approximately 17,000 Km2
within the Spanish State.
TABLE 1
POPULATION OF THE SPANISH BASQUE REGION
Province Population
No. of
Kn»2
Persons
per Km2
Alava 182,916 3,047 46
Guipuzcoa 598,224 1,997 240
Navarra 432,439 10,421 39
Vizcaya 971,029 2,217 340
Total 2,184,608 17,682 665
Source: Banco de Bilbao, Renta Nacional de Espana y su
Dlstribucion Provincial . (Bilbao. 1967).
^2The modern name of the Basque country, coined by Sabino
de Arana, the founder of the Basque nationalist movement, is
Euzcadl .
4 3There are many non- Basque people included in these
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Of the whole population it has been estimated that
probably only one third can be considered culturally Basque,
if one takes the ability to speak the Basque language (known
to the Basques as euskera) as an index of Basque culture.
It is estimated that on the French side approximately 90,000
speak euskera and 600,000 on the Spanish side;** and in Spain,
the eusjcera-speaking population is further reduced to the
provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In the provinces of
Alava and Navarra, particularly in the southern fringes,
it seems that the language has just about disappeared as a
normal means of communication.45
The Spanish provinces have become much more assimilated
into Spanish culture than have the French provinces into
French culture. To the superficial observer it might look
as though the Spanish provinces are no longer Basque. But
population figures, particularly on the Spanish side. It is
difficult to get an accurate account of the Basques for
neither the Spanish or French governments make any ethnic
distinctions in their population census. Because of the
industry of the area, throughout this century, the provinces
of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa have attracted labor migrants from
other areas of Spain. See: J. Domingo Arana, Hombre. Raza.
Naclonalidad. Universalldad. presente v futuro del Pueblo
Vas£0 (Bilbao: Editorial Ercil la-Li bras) p. 13; A.G.
Barbancho, "Los movimientos migratorlos en Espana," Revista
de Estudios Agro-Sociales . No. 43 (1963); E. Goyheneche,
Notre Terre Basque ( Bayonne: Editions Ikas, 1961) p. 1/;
J. Nadal, La Poblacion Espanola (Barcelona: Ediciones
Ariel, 1966), p. 194.
^Manuel de Lecuona, Literatura Oral Vasca (San
Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi, 1964), p. 8.
^Geografla Hlstorica de la lengua Vasca . (several
authors but no editor), (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi,
1960), p. 10.
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paradoxically enough, it has been in the Spanish provinces
that the most serious and militant attempts have been made
at reviving Basque culture and the Basque language. And
today, the Spanish Basque provinces still remain the center
of Basque nationalist activities. A perusal of the
publications on the Basques will reveal the predominance of
Spanish-Basque writers and Spanish-Basque publishing houses.
Economically speaking, there are vast differences be-
tween the Basques north of the Pyrenees and those south of
the Pyrenees. The French Basque region is considered an
economically depressed area without any significant modern
industries.46 By contrast, the Spanish Basque provinces
make up one of the most heavily industrialized regions of
Spain, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa
which have a long tradition of mining industry.47 There
are large deposits of iron-ore in this area. Bilbao, the
46Barzanti, Sergio, The Underdeveloped Areas Within
the Common Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1965).
4
^In 1966, for example, the three Basque provinces of
Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa, along with the four provinces
of Catalonia whose population is approximately 14.4% of the
total Spanish population, produced 24.9% of the Spanish
national income. See: Juan Linz, "Wlthin-Nation Differences
and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt
and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations: The Use of
Quantitative Date in Cross-National Research (frew Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), p. 200, Writing about Spain
in 1943, Gerald Brennan refers to the Basque provinces as
"the satisfied areas of Spain--the only ones, apart from a
few irrigated districts in the southwest, where one can say
that there is no social problems." The Spanish Labyrinth
(Cambridge, England, 1943), p. 97.
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capital city of Vizcaya, is considered as one of the major
financial and shipping centers of Spain. Both Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa are among the highest per capita income provinces
of Spain.4^
Because the Basque region did not experience the
feudal system of organization, this area has been devoid of
a large class of large landowners. Land has been fairly
evenly distributed in this area and the pattern of land
distribution has also been fairly stable. One of the reasons
for this stability in land distribution lies in the old
Basque custom which stipulates that the Basque baserrlak
(farmsteads) must pass intact to an offspring selected by
the parents.4^ xt may not necessarily be the eldest.
Consequently, there has been no parcelling out of land into
miniature farms such as in other areas of Spain.
Although it is assumed that the Basques have inhabited
the hills of the Pyrenees since time immemorial, to this day
the Basques as a people and as a cultural group have
remained an enigma to both anthropologists and ethnologists.50
48Stanley F. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 85.
49William A. Douglass, "Rural Exodus in Two Spanish
Basque Villages: A Cultural Explanation," (December 15,
1969), p. 11, unpublished paper.
^Morton Levine refers to them as "the most distinctive
linguistic-ethnic enclave in Furope." "The Basques," Natural
History . LXXVI, (April, 1967), p. 45. Another writer indicates
that the Basques have been considered by anthropologists as
the 'bldest people of Europe." "It is believed that the
Basque people are the only living representatives of
24
Philologists, anthropologists, and thenologists have long
studied the Basques as a distinct cultural group but have
remained puzzled, as well as fascinated, as to their orgins,
the orgin of their language and their relationships to other
European peoples. 5 * The Basques themselves seem to have
taken pride in the notion that they are a mystery. This is
expressed in an old Basque saying: "The Basques are like
an honest woman, they have no history."
It seems that with the exception of a few vague re-
ferences by some Roman Writers, particularly Strabo and Livy
who mention a people by the name of Vascones and whose
prehistoric European man." Herbert Pierrepont Houghton
An Introduction to the Basque Language; Labourdin Dialect
< Leideni E.J. Brill, 1961), p. 1. "There are few races on
the face of the earth," says another writer, "whose origin
so little is known." Rodney Gallop, A Book of the Basques(London: Macmillan and Co., 1930), p. 2, hereafter quoted
as A Book o t the Basques
. For a study of the achievement
motive among the Basques, see Leonard Kasdan, "Family
Structure, Migration and the Entrepreneur," Comparative
Studies in Society and History . 7 (October, 1964 /July, 1965).
See also: Julio Caro Baroja, Los Vascos (Madrid: Ediciones
Minotauro, 1958). Baroja treats in great detail the communal
organization of the Basques, their customs and system of
agriculture. Another work by the same author, but more of
a historical nature, which discusses the violent relations
among the Basques at the beginnings of the Middle Ages, is
Vasconiana (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1957). For a
detailed study of a Basque village, see William A. Douglass,
Death in Murelaga (Seattle, Washington: The University of
Washington Press, 1969). William Douglass indicates that
the Basques considered other Spaniards living in that
particular village as "foreigners", and that they were quite
conscious of the differences between themselves and other
Spaniards.
^*For a review of the hypotheses regarding the origin
of the Basques and their language, see A Book of the Basques ,
pp. 3-13.
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language they considered "barbarous and not to be borne,
"
5 2
"There Is no historical documentation which deals directly
with the Basques prior to the Middle Ages. "53
According to Rodney Gallop, the Vascones originally
inhabited the banks of the Ebro River around the Calahorra
region. And in his opinion, "there is reason to believe
that the Vascones were reduced to submission £by the
Romans^ In the second century B. C,"54 But on the other
hand, Gallop argues that it is very difficult to identify
the old Vascones with the modern Basques because in the
twelfth century the word Vascones was broken into two forms:
Bascll or Basculi and Gasconl . These two forms later
became known as the Basques and the Gascons .->5
What seems most striking about the Basques and what
distinguishes them most apparently from the surrounding
populations is not the mystery regarding their origin or
their physical characteristics—although they are supposedly
taller and have a fairer complexion than that of the
59
•^Rodney A. Gallop, "The Problem of the Basques."
Nineteenth Century . 108 (July/December, 1930), p. 493,
hereafter as "The Problem of the Basques".
^Morton Levine, "Basque Isolations Fact or Problem?"
Sumposlurp on Community Studies in Anthropology . Proceedings
of the 1963 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological
Society (University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 21.
54" The Problem of the Basques," p. 493.
55The name that the Basques give themselves is
eskua ldunak or euskualriunak . It hardly resembles the
Spanish word by which they are known - Vascos.
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surrounding population-but their language.56 Despite the
fact that it has borrowed from other languages such as
French and Spanish, its structure is such that scholars
have come to the conclusion that it is not an Indo-European
language. It is not a unified language and is characterized
as being highly agglutinative. There is no uniform system
of writing throughout the Basque region. The first
linguistic map of the area was devised by Prince Lucien
Bonaparte in the nineteenth century, who divided the
language into eight major dialects. 57 But it seems that
even the major dialects can be subdivided into subdialects.
The fact that students of the Basque language still use
Bonaparte* s classification, indicates that the structure
56studies on the Basque language abound. But for the
English readers and non-philologists, I would recommend
Antonio Tovar, The Basque Language (Philadelphia: Unniversity
of Philadelphia Press, 1957). This is one of the more
concise studies that I found. For those interested in
learning some Basque, there are two short English manuals
which might be of interest: J. Eiguren, How to Learn to
Speak Basoue (Homedale, Idaho, 1969), and Herbert Pierrepont
Houghton^ book, cited above. For the more scholarly
inclined individual with philological interests, the
following books might be helpful: Louis Lucien Bonaparte,
Le verbe basque . (London, 1869); Julio Caro Baroja,
Materlales para una historia de la lengua vasca en su
relaclon con la latlna (Salamance: University of Salamanca
,
1945): A. Campion. Grama tica de los quatro dlalectos
llterarlos de la lengua euskera (Tolosa: lee4ji Henri
Gavel. Grammalre Basque (Bavonne: 1929); V/ilhelm Humboldt,
Los Primitives Habltantes de Espana (Madrid: Libreria de
Jose Anllo, 1879, translated from the German by D. Ramon
Ortega y Frias); Bernardo Estomes Lasa, Sobre historla y
orlgenes de la lengua vasca (San Sebastian: Editorial
Aunamendi, 1967); 1. Lopez Mendizabal,, La Lengua Vasca
(2nd., ed.), (Buenos Aires, 1949).
57see note 56.
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of the language has not changed significantly. "Even in
the most recent books, " says Tovar, "there is repeated the
...diagram of dialects set forth by /~Bonaparte_7."58
As a written language, Basque is of recent origin.
The first example of written Basque is dated to 1530, and
the first work entirely printed in Basque appeared in 1545.59
Until the end of the eighteenth century, there was
little written in Basque except for some religious works
and some biblical translations. 60 Tovar indicates that
it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century
with the publication of Manuel de Larramendi's El Impossible
Vepc?.do (The Impossible Vanquished )
T considered the first
Basque grammar, that a greater interest was shown in the
study of the Basque language. 6 *
While we may witness a great interest in the study
of the Basque language, particularly from the latter part
of the eighteenth century to the present, Basque as a spoken
language seems to have continued its decline. In the words
CO
-
,
°Tovar, op. cit. . p. 106. Tovar further points out
that the "personality of the dialects / is not known_7
sufficiently so as to determine to what degree they are the
consequences of a differentiation of a possible * common
Basque" .", p. 108.
^Thls was a book of verse by Bernard Detchepare,
Lingua Vascorum Primltlae (Bordeaux, 1545). Reference to
this work is made in A Book of the 3asques . p. 74,
60Luis Michelena, Hlstoria de la Literature Vasca
(Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1960).
61 Tovar, op. clt .. p. 25.
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of Antonio Tovar, "A present-day literary history of the
Basque people has apparently not yet come alive."62 Despite
the efforts of some Basque academicians and nationalists,
one is left with the feeling that euskera is destined to
suffer the same fate that has befallen such languages as
Gaelic and Welsh. According to one study, the instances in
which one may find a person that speaks only Basque are
extremely rare. 63
Before the emergence of the political kingdoms of the
Iberian Peninsula and the monarchies of France and England,
knowledge about the Basques and their political form of
organization is rather meager. There is evidence, however,
that the Basques did come into contact with the invaders of
this area, such as the Romans, the Visigoths, and later the
Arabs.^ Their historical isolation has not been complete.
In each case, however, Basque resistance—which later
became legendary--to external political forces seems to have
been successful. Further evidence of their semi-isolated
situation is borne out by the fact that it was not until the
twelfth century that they were finally converted to
62Ibid .. p. 33.
63Geografla hlstorica de la leng.ua vasca . p. 17.
6^A Book of the Basques ; Joaquin Arbeloa, Los orlsenes
del Reino de Navarra (San Sebastian! Editorial Aunamendi,
1969); P.S. Ormond, The basques and Their Country (London:
Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1925).
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Christianity. But before their conversion was achieved,
they provided the, Church with a few martyrs. The reputation
for ferocity against the Christians acquired by the people
of the Pyrenees seems to have motivated some pious
missionaries to go to this area with the expectation that
they would acquire the status of martyrdom. In 1179, for
example, the Basque region was supposedly excommunicated
for cruelty practiced against the Christians.65 Earlier,
In 778, the Basques had made a name for themselves by
supposedly eliminating the rear guard of Charlemagne's
army. This gave rise to the famous Chanson de Roland
„
While some historical studies Indicate that usually the
Basques joined forces to expel invaders of the region,
it seems that the whole Basque region was never under the
complete control of one monarch. It is difficult to refer
to a historical Basque state—notwithstanding the assertions
of the nationalists—for historical evidence does not seem
to allow such a conclusion. In so far as historical
documentation is correct, from the ninth to the sixteenth
centuries, the Basques were dispersed under several
political units. 66 It was only under Sancho El Mayor (999-1035)
65
"The Problem of the Basques," p. 494.
66,1 The Basques," says a Basque writer, "just like the
Greeks in their golden age, formed various independent states
and conducted separate international agreements. Although
united by blood, culture and language, they preserved for
several centuries their mutual political independence." See:
Luis de Ibarra Enziondo, El nacionalismo vasco en la paz v
en la guerra . Ediciones Alderdi, (n.d.), note 6, p. 14.
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that a political kingdom encompassing nearly all the Basques
came into existence. 67 Aside from this short-lived kingdom,
the political organization of the Basques, by and large, has
consisted of "small counties and republics which supposedly
engaged in frequent "sanguinary warfare amongst themselves. "68
With the partition of the kingdom of Navarra by Sancho £1
Mayor amongst his four sons, the nearest thing to a political
unit encompassing all the Basques came to an end. After
1035, political consolidation of the area became increasingly
difficult because Sancho 1 s sons became actively involved
with the dynastic struggles of the region. 69
By the twelfth century the old Kingdom of Navarra had
been reduced in size to an area approximating present-day
Navarra and the French Basse-Navarre. The present day
Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Gulpuzcoa
came gradually under the influence of the Crown of Castile
which they recognized as their seigneur by the fourteenth
century. The French provinces of Labourd in the west and
Soule in the east passed gradually under the influence of
the French Crown. Their submission to France was finally
6?see: Anacleto Ortueta, Sancho El Mayor . Rev de los
Vascos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1963); Na_barra
v la unldad polltlca vasca (Barcelona: J. Horta, 1931);
Bernardo Estornes Lasa, HJLstorla del Pals Basko (Zarauz:
Editorial vasca, 1933); Justo Perez de Urbel, Sancho El
Mayor de Navarra (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1950).
68The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.
69 Philippe Veyrin, Les Basques (Paris: B. Arthaud, 1947).
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achieved by 1450. Finally the kingdom of Navarra went out
of political existence when Ferdinand of Aragon conquered
it in 1512. The remaining part of that kingdom, Basse-
Navarre, was eventually annexed to the French Crown via
the person of Henry IV (of Navarre) who became the French
King, thus bringing to an end the political sovereignty of
the Basques, For all intents and purposes, the Basques
were not living under two different political orbits—
the French and Castilian Crowns.
The loss of political sovereignty, however, did not
mean the end of all political autonomy. 70 in b0th Spain and
France, the Basques retained considerable autonomy with
respect to their local affairs and even external relationships.
Both the Castilian and the French Crowns were viewed by the
Basques more as allies than political overlords. The
Spanish-French border, in so far as the Basques were
concerned, was non-existent. The Basques continued their
relationships; and it seems that as late as early twentieth
century they continued to make pacts amongst themselves,
known as facerles .?! regulating the usage of water and
^In a work published in 1963, Maria Puy Huicl Goni
argues that despite the fact that Navarra lost its king,
nevertheless, it continued to have an independent existence,
under the Crown of Castile, regarding its internal life;
"Nsda camblo, pues, en la Constituc ion del pequeno relno,
aunque abunde la creencia falsa de que el Estado Navarro
desaparecio en 1512." Las Cortes de Navarra durante la
Edad Moderna (Madrldt Ediciones Rlalp, 1963).
71Jaime Vives Vicens, An Economic History of Spain
(Princeton! Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 151.
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pastures in the region.
The local autonomy of the Basques was recognized by
the central governments in the form of fo£s in France and
fueros in Spain. 72 It was these charters which regulated
the relationships between the Basques and their respective
monarchs. It seems that political suzerainty of the monarchs
over the Basques was purely nominal. Making reference to
the relationship between the Spanish Basques and the
Castilian Crown, Gallop says that "beneath the famous tree
of Guernica the kings of Spain swore to observe the fueros
of Vizcaya."73 The recognition of autonomy by the Castilian
72
'^-During the nineteenth century, the origins of the
fueros became a point of contention between the central
government and the Basque provinces. The central government
and the advocates of centralization advanced the thesis
that the fueros were privi ledges granted by the Monarchy,
while the Basques claimed that they were rights inherent
in the Basque communities and consequently could not be
modified without their consent: Jose de Aralar, Los Adver-
sarios de la libertad vasca desde 1794 a 1829 (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1944;; Gregorio de Ba lparda.
Historla Critlca de Vlzcaya v de sus Fueros (Madrid, 1922);
Jaime Ignacio del Burgo, Origen v Fundamento del Regimen
foral de Mavarra (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1968);
Salvador de Madariaga, Memorlas de un Federallsta (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Sudamericana
,
1967); Rafael de Navascues,
Observaciones sobre los Fueros de Vlzcaya (Madrid:
Imprenta de Espinosa y Compania, 1850); J. M. Orense,
Los Fueros (Madrid: 1859); N. Vicario de la Pena, Derecho
Consuetudinario de Vlzcaya (Madrid: Imprenta del Asilo de
Hurefanos del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, 1901); Ramon
Menendez Pidal, The Spaniards and Their History (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950); Liborio de Ramery
Zuzuarregui, El Libera lismo v los Fueros Bascongados
(Madrid: Imprenta de San Francisco de Sales, 1869).
73The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.
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Crown is further evinced by the fact that Navarra was
given a vice-roy~the only vice-roy outside the American
Empire—which was recognized as a quazi-constitutional
monarch. Navarra, for example, up to 1841, allowed no
judicial appeal beyond the borders of the province. "To
the foral provinces," says Carr, "their attachment to
Spain was a contract dependent on the maintenance of their
liberties and economic advantages. "74
In Spain the internal affairs of the provinces were
governed by broadly chosen juntas genera les which in turn
chose diputaciones forales. In France these were known
as etats. The point of contact between the Crown and the
Basques consisted in a representative of the King sent to
attend the meetings of the local assemblies; in Spain the
corrigedor and in France the intendant . Although the
representative of the King could summon the assemblies
into session, no order of the King, however, was valid
without the assent of the local assemblies. In Spain
this practice, which lasted up to 1841, was known as the
pase foral .
At a time when Western Europe was governed by feudal
relationships, the Basques were ostensibly practicing some
type of agrarian democracy. In both Spain and France they
7^Carr, pp. cit. . p. 63. This book gives a very
extensive chronological discussion of nineteenth century
Spanish history and contains a very valuable bibliographic
index.
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were considered free men. Ormond, for example, in discussing
the democratic character of Basque society points out that
the Basque dialects have no words for kings, vassals, counts,
serfs, and barons. 75 The aristocracy which eventually
emerged in this area did not seem to enjoy the privileges
that were enjoyed by other aristocratic classes in other
parts of the Peninsula and in France. In contrast to
other parts of France, Labourd and Sould had no system of
servitude. Making reference to the French Basques before
the French Revolution of 1789 took place, Gallop observes
that "in comparison with the rest of France, the Basques
were well off. They were free men in the midst of a nation
of serfs, and their financial burdens were as nothing compared
with the load that crushed the life out of the French
peasant. "76
In the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, every in-
habitant was considered a nobleman. In the fuero of Vizcaya,
a section is found proclaiming the nobility of all the
Inhabitants of the province: "All the natives and
inhabitants of this segnory are notoriously noble, not
75ormond, op. cit. . p. 132. Travelling through the
Basque region in early nineteenth century, George Borrow
makes the observation that "no people on earth are prouder
than the Basques, but theirs is a kind of republican pride.
They have no nobility amongst them, and no one will
acknowledge a superior. The poorest car man is as proud
as the governor of Tolosa." The Bible in Spain (London:
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1906), pp. 341-342.
76a Book of the Basques , p. 18.
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only in Vizcaya, but outside, on the solitary condition of
proving that they are sons of Vizcayan parents. "77 Nobility
was granted allegedly on the grounds that these areas had
not been conquered by the Arabs. The belief that the
Basques were noble eventually spread throughout the Basque
region.
7
8
As a result of the rights conferred by the fueros,
the Basques controlled their budgets, were exempted from
taxation by the Crown and from conscription into the army
to fight in areas outside of the Basque region. The Spanish
army could not enter the region without consulting first
with the diputaciones forales . Persons from outside of the
region were not allowed to hold public office. In some
instances the Basques were treated by the Castilian Crown
as a foreign power. The Spanish Basque provinces were
included in the embargo which denied foreign powers commercial
access to the Spanish-American Empire. The Basque
provinces had custom houses along the Ebro River (this river
separates the Basque region from Castile) which taxed in-coming
Spanish goods. In the area of foreign affairs, they
maintained consuls in the Low Countries and conducted
treaties with foreign governments. 79
77QUoted in Ormond, op. clt. . p. 132.
7^Americo Castro, Los Espanoles: como llegaran a
serlo (Madrid: Taurus, 1965), p. 15.
79nanuel de Irujo, In^laterra v los Vascos (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1945).
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Needless to say, this arrangement was not completely
satisfactory to both the Castiltan and French Crowns bent
on pursuing a policy of aggrandizement and consolidation of
their power. The existence of Basque autonomy became
increasingly viewed with suspicion by both the French and
Castilian Crowns, each suspecting that the other might
seduce the Basques into secession. 80 It seems that this
suspicion continued throughout the nineteenth century.
Neither government felt that it could take the political
loyalty of the Basques for granted. Nevertheless, despite
gradual attempts to curb the fueros . they continued to be
practiced in France up to the revolution of 1789, and in
Spain up to the middle of the nineteenth century.
The last vestiges of Basque autonomy under the French
Crown were swept away by the administrative reforms brought
about by the French Revolution. 81 Although the French
Basques protested in the form of sporadic armed resistance
and in the form of petitions to the National Assembly, they
were too weak to stop the avalanche set in motion by the
revolution. Their fors were abrogated and the Pays Basque
80In the Franco-Spanish War of 1793-95, the deputation
of Guipuzcoa declared itself neutral and it seems that some
circles were thinking in terms of secession. In the Peace
of Basilea (July 22, 1795), the French supposedly insisted
on a promise from the Spaniards indicating that the
Basques would not participate in a war against France,
Aralar, op
ff
clt .. p. 15.
81Joseph Nogaret, Petit Histojre du Pays Basque
Francais (Bayonne, France! A. Foltzer, 19
T"
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was incorporated into the department of Basse-Pyrenees
with the government seat located in Pau. Besides the
abrogation of the fors, the French Revolution had other
social side effects in the French Basque region. The arm
of the central government could now reach into the Basque
community and reform some of the old Basque customs which
the Paris government considered antiquated. For example,
the law prescribing the equal division of a father's land
among all his children did away with the Basque custom of
passing the farmstead intact to one of the offspring.
Basque place names were changed and replaced with French
names
•
Initially, however, it seems that the Basques reacted
favorably to the French Revolution. The National Assembly
gave the Basque language official status in the Basque
region, a calendar was published in Basque, and there was
the rumor that the Paris government was planning to create
a Basque state across the Pyrenees under the protectorate
of France. 62 3Ut Basque expectations were soon deflated
when the more extreme aspects of the revolution became
manifest, particularly toward Catholicism, and when it
became apparent that the revolution did not bring them
greater liberty, but instead brought about greater
centra lization
.
Veyrin, op. clt ., p. 186,
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The historical relationship between the Basques of
Spain and the Spanish State is far more complicated than
that of the French Basques and the French State. Because
of their size and their relative economic importance, the
Basques of Spain have played a far more significant role in
Spanish history.83 In French history, however, one has to
make quite an effort in order to find the contribution of
Basque figures. But a perusal of Spanish history will soon
reveal the extent to which the Spanish Basques have been
actively involved in great historical Spanish events, such
as the Reconoulsta and the expansion of the Spanish-
American Empire, thus leading one to conclude that the
Basques have long identified with the Spanish State. Yet,
it has been in Spain that the question of Basque autonomy
has been a prolonged bone of contention between the central
83juan Sebastian Elcano, who circumnavigated the globe,
was a Basque; Francisco de Vitoria, a Jesuit and a
theoretician of international law, was also a Basque;
Churrua, another Basque, faced Kelson at Trafalgar. The
Jesuit Order owes its founding to the Basques, particularly
St. Ignatius Loyola who founded the order. During Phillip
ll'l attempt to conquer England, the Basques contributed
more galleons than the Castilians. Equally significant was
the Basque contribution in the colonization of the Spanish-
American Empire, The territory forming the colony of
Rio de la Plata was given the name of Nueva Vizcaya, named
after the Basque province of Vizcaya. See Antonio Ramos
Oliverla, Politics. Economics and Men of Modern Spain.
1808-1946 (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946). p. 405;
See also Diario de Areitio, Los vascos en la histcria de
Espana (Bilbao, 1959. When Spanish historians discuss
Basque nationalism, they keep referring to the Basque
contribution to Spanish history in order to deny their
separatist claims.
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government and the Basque provinces. This controversy
lasted throughout the nineteenth century reaching its
climax during the second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) when
the three Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa
were given a statute of autonomy by the government of the
Republic.
Although historical writings indicate that some
Spanish Basques had long lamented the gradual erosion of
Basque culture and the growing influence of the Castilian
language, it was with the advent of the liberal constitution
of 1812 (the Cadiz Constitution) and after the death of
Ferdinand VII in 1833, that vasouismo8^ began to grow as a
political movement. From 1812 onwards, the question of
Basque autonomy became a salient issue in Spanish politics.
For some students of Spanish politics, Basque autonomy
"remained as the main political challenge to nineteenth
century liberalism,"®^ particularly in view of the Basque
willingness to take up arms against the Madrid government
whenever the occasion seemed propitious. Basque autonomy
became further complicated partly due to the fact that it
became highly entwined with Spanish dynastic politics
during the first half of the nineteenth century.
04 This term is sometimes used to refer to Basque
sentiment for Home Rule.
85Carr, op. cfrt,, p. 67.
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From 1820 to 1876, the classical era of pronunciation*
,
86
the government in Madrid never remained stable enough to
carry out a consistent policy regarding the reform of the
Basque fuerps. As we shall see below, the issue of Basque
autonomy was kept alive not only by the desire of the Basques
to keep their fueros f but also by the vicissitudes of
Spanish politics. To use a modern cliche, the question of
Basque autonomy became a political football, exploited by
both the Basques and the Madrid government. Political
factions, in power and out of power, frequently used the
issue of Basque autonomy as bait in order to get Basque
support. This was particularly evident during the Carlist
wars and again during the second Spanish Republic; in return
for their support of the Republic, the Basques were
rewarded with a statute of autonomy in 1936.
Before proceeding to discuss in greater detail the
issue of Basque autonomy between 1812 and 1876, a brief
review of the question of Spanish political integration is
in order, so as to place the issue of Basque autonomy
within the larger context of Spanish political centralization.
One cannot be discussed without the other.
Although some Spanish historiansS7 are never tired of
reminding us that Spain was the first European nation-state
8
^Between 1814 and 1923, there were reported 43
pronunciamentos in Spain. Oliveira, op p clt .. p. 40.
8?Madariaga, Oliveira, and Pidel.
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to arise out of the medieval order, further analysis leads
one to qualify such assertion.88 one m&y granf. ^
Spain was the first European state to emerge out of the
medieval order, the social solidarity of this state is
questionable. Although Spain was formally unified through
the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabela in the fifteenth
century, the traditional kingdoms of the Peninsula retained
their separate legal and administrative systems.89 xt seems
that unification of the area did not go very much beyond the
demands of religious uniformity. As later became evident,
the Church and not the monarchy "was the unifying
institution of Spain.
"
90 Even when Phillip 11 inherited
the Portuguese Crown, it seems that no serious attempt was
made to incorporate Portugal into the Castilian Crown. The
Portuguese administration remained intact and in Portuguese
hands, a fact later deplored by some Spanish historians. 9 !
Despite the efforts of Phillip II to unify Spain, he was
later castigated by Spanish historians for not having
brought about the unification of the Peninsula when he had
88For an interesting essay on Spanish nationalism
see: Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Nationalism in the Twentieth
Century," Review of Politics . 26 (July, 1964), pp. 403-
422 1 hereafter quoted as "Spanish Nationalism".
89Rafael Altamira, A History of Spain (New York: D.
Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1949).
90
"Spanish Nationalism," p. 404.
9lMadariaga, Spain .
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the power and the opportunity to do so. Thus, one
historian comments that Phillip 11 created the modern
Castilian State, but not the modern Spanish State:
Neither in their minds nor in that of their
collaborators occured the idea to instill in allSpaniards the notion of state unity, of whateverkind. Charles and Phillip, it must be granted,
organized the modern Castilian State, but not the
modern Spanish State. But in so doing, however,
they accentuated the obstacles that arose in
the making of Spain. Because they placed Castile
as the central political axis of the monarchy and
the fiscal basis of it, and transformed the
other peninsular states into mere satellites of
no more significance than the other European statesinserted into the general framework of their large
empire... It is enormous the responsibility of
Charles V and Phillip 11 in their negligence to
unite Spain. 92
It seems that the feeling of nationhood under the
Spanish monarchy remained rather fragile. According to
Payne, "the country never became fully integrated, economically,
socially or politically"93 As a consequence, nationalism
in Spain has never manifested itself with the same degree
of passion and devotion that it has in Germany or France.
Payne even goes so far as to suggest that we cannot speak
of Spanish nationalism until the twentieth century. It
might not be too far fetched to say that one could refer
to Spain as a nation during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries--and in some instances during the nineteenth
century—in the same way that we refer to Nigeria or the
9ZClaudio Sanchez Albornoz, Espana: un enigma historlco
(2nd., ed.) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericans , 1962),
pp, 479-480.
93
"Spanish Nationalism ." p. 404.
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Congo today as a nation. It existed in a formal sense.94
For peripheral Spain, however, the Spanish nation became
identified with Castile. Even today it is not uncommon to
hear Valencianos and Galicians say that the Castilians
control everything. This is amusing because franco is
not Castilian but Gelician.
* .
94
Mi5
Vel
f
a refers to th*s lack of social solidaritythus: "The nineteenth century.
-which still continues inSpain-- has been unjustly severe to the classical SpanishMonarchy, ihi. severity is due to the false assumptionthat fifteenth century Spain was a nation which had developed
iSI ly » so to 8Peak » no ontaward accident.",
p. 357. Olivelra, as well as other Spanish historians,
while acknowledging the particularisms of Spain, at the
same time refuse to give any ligitimacy to Basque orCatalan nationalism. Making reference to Catalonia, he
says, "Catalonia had to continue to be Spanish becausehistory ordained so.", p. 361. Madariaga, too, refuses togive Basque nationalism any legitimacy by persistently
maintaining that Basque nationalist sentiment is nothing
more than an extreme manifestation of the particularism of
the Spanish "character": "We have no right to be surprised.
We know that this dispersive and disruptive tendency is a
typical feature of the Spanish character, and we have
found the Basque to be the quintessence of the Spaniard."
Spain., p. 179. Madariaga even goes so far as to deny the
legitimacy for the political existence of the Portuguese
nation.state: "A double wall of pride..., on the Portuguese
side, ...
,
prevents a clear understanding of a reality
which in its essentials is simple enough. So simple,
indeed, as to amount to a repetition of the Catalan reality:
The Portuguese is a Spaniard with his back to Castile and
his eyes on the Atlantic Sea." Spain , p. 185. Pidal also
tries to get around Basque nationalism by attributing it
to the "character" of the Iberians: "The greater localism
in Spain does not depend upon a multitude of ethnic-
geographical reasons, but on the contrary, on a uniform
psychological condition; it depends upon the original
exclusive character of the Iberians already noted by the
authors of antiquity." The Spaniards and Their History.
p. 77. Rather than acknowledging Basque or Catalan
nationalism, Pidal placed the source of the problem
elsewhere: "The provincialist or federalist movement is
upheld and encouraged by some foreign countries that are
interested in keeping Spain weak." Ibid. . pp. 89-90.
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The weak political centralization of Spain is further
evidenced by the fact that as late as 1812 (when the Cadiz
Constitution was promulgated) the country was divided into
nine kingdoms, two pr^nclpadpg, one senorio
,
sixteen
provinces, and two Basque provinces (Alava and Guipuzcoa)
known as the "exempted provinces ."95
The famous liberal constitution of 1812, written and
promulgated when the Spaniards were trying to expel the
French from the Iberian Peninsula, tried to bring an end
to most aspects of the anclen regime through a series of
far-reaching political and social reforms which envisioned
the centralization of Spain along the lines of the French
model. The Spanish liberals were trying to do in 1812 what
the French had done after the Revolution of 1789. In the
first place the traditional administrative division of
Spain along with the privileges of particular regions
would be abolished and replaced with a uniform legal and
administrative system. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly,
95The kingdoms were: Andalucia, Aragon, Cordoba,
Galicia, Granada, Jaen, Murcia, Valencia, y Navarra. The
princlpado8 t Asturias, and Catalonia. The senorio:
Vizcaya. The sixteen provinces: Avila, Burgos, Zamora,
Cludad Real, Cuenca, Extremadura, Guadalajara, Leon,
Madrid, Palencia, Salamanca, Segovia. Sorla, Toledo, Toro
y Valladolid. The two exempted provinces were: Alava
and Guipuzcoa. Although the Navarre se are also Basques,
due to the traditional status of Navarra as a kingdom,
whenever official documents refer to the Basque region,
Navarra is always mentioned separately: Las Provincias
Vascongadas y Navarra. Pio Zabala, Historla de Espana
(1), (Barcelona: Sucesores de Juan Gill, 1930), p. 177.
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Spain would be governed under a constitutional monarchy in
the person of Ferdinand VII.
The constitution of 181296 and the ideas expressed in
it set the stage for the political conflicts—sometimes
violent—that were to plague Spanish politics throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century—until 1876,
Initially the constitution of 1812 was accepted by the
djputaclones forales of the Basque region, although not
without some protestations. At first sight this seems
puzzling particularly in view of the fact that this
constitution called for greater centralization, thus
eventually doing away with the foral liberties of the Basques.
On the other hand, the behavior of the Basque diputaciones
does not seem totally contradictory if one considers it in
terms of strategy. First of all the French were occupying
the Basque region. Although it seems that in 1808 they had
promised to respect the Basque fueros . 9? by 1810, however,
they reduced the region into one administrative unit and
placed it under military rule. The Basques acted swiftly
in the form of armed resistance. In light of these conditions
9o For a collection of Spanish constitutions sees
Arnald R. Verduin, Manual of Spanish Constitutions 1808-1931
(Ypsilandi, Michigan: Union of Lithoprinters, 1941).
9?There we**e some French politicians who suggested to
Napoleon to annex the Spanish Basque provinces to the
French Basque region and make a protectorate of it with
the name of La Nouvelle Phenlcle . M, Sacx, Bavonne et le
Pays Basque (Bayonne, France: Collection Ikas, 1968),
p. 151.
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continued French occupation seemed a greater threat to
Basque autonomy than the newly drafted constitution, and a
return of the Spanish monarchy in the person of Ferdinand
VII who, on his way to France in 1808, had promised the
Basques that he would respect their fueros .98 Moreover,
while the 1812 constitution called for political
centralization, at the same time, it allowed for a certain
degree of administrative autonomy. For example, mayors
would be popularly elected, the municipality would control
the police, the primary schools, collect taxes, and have
responsibility for road maintenance and construction. For
Basque liberals the constitution of 1812 simply made
uniform throughout Spain what the Basques had been practicing
for centuries. yy In fact, some Basque diputaclones
expressed the belief that the constitution of 1812 embodied
the spirit of the Basque fueros .
The reforms envisioned by this constitution were
never fully implemented. As soon as Ferdinand returned to
Spain (1814), he abolished the constitution along with the
major legislation that the Cortes of Cadiz had enacted, and
subsequently, attempted to re-institute the old regime. On
^^Maximiano Garcia Venero, Historia del Nationalism
Vasco 1793-1936 (Madrid; Editora Nacional, 1945). This is
a valuable work on Basque nationalism for it contains
reprints of most of the royal decrees regarding the Basque
region. The book is marred, however, by its polemical nature.
9^Balparda took this view. Gregorio de Balparda,
Federallsmo? Feudallsmol (Bilbao: 1931.)
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his return Ferdinand also announced that he would observe
and respect the Basque fueros .100
By 1815, however, Ferdinand's ministers were showing
dissatisfaction with the existing Basque fueros and
complaining that the Basques were not complying with the
Crown on some policies, particularly in the area of
contraband. 101 The possibility of moving the Spanish custom
houses to the French-Spanish border and to the Basque ports
100For av copy of the decree see, Venero, p. 143.
l°lThe report of a Junta of Madrid assembled toinvestigate "the abuses of the royal revenues in the BasqueProvinces," made the following comments: "The adoration in
which the privileges and Fueros of the Basque Provinces areheld by the inhabitants is well known, by which for manyyears the royal authority, as well as the high tribunals ofthe kingdom, have experienced great disrespect. It would
appear as if the permanent deputations of these provinceshad been established to oppose the measures of the government.
There is nothing in common with the rest of the provinces
in Spain. The laws are distinct; the commerce free; the
contributions almost nothing; the custom-houses profitless;
the officers opposed in the execution of their duty—are
maintained at great expense, and almost useless; the nobility
has become universal and self-created; and in fact they
have taken the government into their own hands.
The Peninsula appears open to all their commerce,
and negotiations; and without doubt they enjoy greater
advantages than the rest of the kingdom, being exempt from
the contributions of Castil, and the general tax of the
Crown of Aragon, from ordinary services, from general
contributions, from provincial rents, and from contributions
and donations which have been so heavy since the French
Revolution. And even in the tithes and ecclesiastical
contributions, they have paid almost nothing to the State
from which they receive protection. They have been free
from conscription, militia, from providing military stores,
barracks, baggage, enlistment for the marine service, and
in fact from every other tax or service for war." Quoted
in Francis Duncan, The English in Spain (London: John
Murray, 1877), p. 167-170.
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was already being discussed. There were further complaints
that illicit commerce was damaging Castilian trade.
Subsequently, in a royal decree of 1818 addressed to the
Basque provinces, there appeared a clause which was used
later as a tool to Justify the central government's power
in clipping some of the Basque fueros . Making reference to
the jfueros, this clause implicitly expressed the view that
the fueros were not rights but privileges given by the
Crown: "The fueros that were abolished by the /""Cadiz 7
Cortes, obeyed and respected by that Province /""Vizcaya_7,
and later reinstituted by His Majexty, always carry the
implicit clause of without prejudice to the general interests
of the nation, the national unity, and the roval prlvilegea
of the supreme sovereign authority . "102
Later, in 1818, the Crown demanded that the Basque
provinces make a greater contribution to the military needs
of the country, beyond that allowed by the fueros . The
dlputaclones forales reacted negatively to this suggestion
and instead asked for a four-year delaying period.
As a result of a coup d'etat led by General Riego
(1820), and supported by the liberals, the constitution of
1812 was imposed on Ferdinand. The victors of 1820 did
not waste any time in carrying out some of the reforms
anticipated in 1812, and proceeded to abolish some of the
Quoted in Venero, op. cit. . p. 146,
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Basque fjjeros.. The dlputacion** fn~?,-
f were changed lntQ
djputaclones constr^
f and the CU8tom hou8es were
moved to the Spanish-French border. In addition, the Basques
would also be subject to military conscription in the same
manner that other Spaniards were. However, the regime
brought to power by General Riego was short-lived. By 1823,
with the help of French forces (the 100,000 Sons of St.
Louis) under the command of General Angouleme, Ferdinand and
the coalition supporting him was to defeat the liberals
and once again establish his rule. During the struggle
between the liberals and the traditional forces, the
conservatives supporting Ferdinand presented themselves as
the protectors of the Basque fueros . In the Basque region
an attempt was made to connect the fueros with the altar
and the throne, an association which lasted throughout
the nineteenth century. 103
Once Ferdinand had consolidated his power, he annulled
many of the reforms instituted by the previous regime,
including the reforms regarding the Basque fueros . In order
103as a result of this association, the Basques have
been labelled as reactionary: "Pero nadie ignora que el
meollo, cogollo, raiz de la intolerancia espanola es el
vasco. El clero vasco ha sido siempre el inspirador de la
tendencia dura." Madariaga, Memorias de un federalists ,
p. 172. Basque nationalism is but the extreme form of this
solicitude of the Basque priests to keep unpolluted by
liberalism, socialism. • .and the rest, by far the most
reactionary region of Spain. "Madariaga, Spain , p. 179.
"The Carlists were not fighting for their local liberties,
or political privileges, but in order to deprive other
Spaniards of liberty, to impose absolutism on the whole
of Spain," says Olivelra, p. 407.
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to elicit the continued support of the Basques, he removed
the custom houses once again from the Spanish-French border
to the Castilian border. Despite this action, however, the
Crown continued to insist that the fueros were privileges
given by the Crown and, consequently, could also be taken
away or modified by the Crown: "The Fueros as well as the
privileges are mere royal concessions, and are subject,
consequently, to modifications."! 0*
The most intense confrontation between the Basques and
the Spanish state occurred after the death of Ferdinand
in 1833. For six years the Basque region along with portions
of Aragon and Catalonia confronted the Madrid government
in a war that left the region nearly devastated. Initially
the war, known as the first Carlist War, began as a
dynastic struggle between the supporters of Don Carlos VI,
brother of Ferdinand, and the supporters of Isabela II,
daughter of Ferdinand, under the regency of Maria Cristina,
wife of Ferdinand and mother of Isabela. 105 Although it
AWQuoted in Venero, op. cit .. p. 152.
105por a general discussion of Carlismo . the name by
which the movement to place Don Carlos VI and his successors
on the Spanish throne became known, see Carr, pp. 155-196.
For a discussion of the ideological basis of Carlismo see:
Santiago Galindo Herrero, Breve hlstorla del tradiclonalismo
espanol (Madrid: Publicaciones Espanolas, 1954). R,
Oyarzun, Historia del Carlismo (Madrid: Ediclones Minotauro,
1930); John N. Schumacher, "Integrism: A Study In
Nineteenth-Century Spanish Politico-Religious Thought,"
Catholic Historical Review . 48 (October, 1962), pp. 343-64.
For a discussion of the Carlist Wars see: Edgar Holt,
The Carlist Wars in Spain . (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour
Editions, 1967; Antonio Pirala y Criado, Hlstorla de la
guerra civil y de los partldos liberal v carlista . Madrid: 1868
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seems that at the outbreak of the war the fueros were not
mentioned, as the war progressed, it became evident that
Basque participation in the war was based on the fear that
the regime of Maria Cristina intended to abolish the fueros .
This fear had some justification for on November 30
,
1833,
General Federico Castanon, in charge of an army base in
the north, in Tolosa, gave an order abolishing the fueros
of Vizcaya and Alava in retaliation for their participation
in the insurrection against the Madrid government.
Another incident reinforced the suspicions of the Basques.
It seems that in 1834 a cristino commander stationed in
the north sent a message to the Madrid government suggesting,
as a tactical move, that in order to bring the war to an
immediate end, the government should declare its intention
to uphold the fueros . and thus deprive Don Carlos of the
support in the northern provinces. Allegedly this
message fell into Car list hands "which made a firebrand
out of it by pointing out to the troops that the officials
of the queen were planning to abolish the foral institutions,
although they might respect the fueros temporarily. But
the fueros would be destroyed once the enthusiasm of the
Basques for Don Carlos subsided." 106 Don Carlos tried to
increase his popularity among the Basques by exploiting
their sensitivity regarding the fueros . "In September
106quoted in Venero, op. cit. . p. 164.
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/-1834j he went to Guernica, where In 1476 Ferdinand and
Isabel had taken the oath to preserve the fueros under
the historic oak-tree. "107 ^ there he algo ^ an
oath to uphold the fueros .
In order to allay the Basque suspicions, and to
separate the cause of Don Carlos from that of the fueros .
General Baldomero Espartero, commander of the crlstlno
forces in the northern provinces, sent a message to the
Basques, on May 19, 1837, declaring that the government had
no intention of abolishing the fueros , "Basques, those
who do not cease to deceive you, tell you that you are
fighting for the defense of your fueros . but do not believe
it. As the general in command of the armed forces of the
Queen and in the name of the Government, I promise that
these fueros that you feared to lose will be conserved and
there never was any thought to abolish them. "I 08
Notwithstanding the promise of Espartero, the con-
stitution of 1837, the byproduct of the 1836 revolution
led by the radical liberals, anticipated the abolition of
all local privileges and fueros .
By 1839, however, it had become evident that the Madrid
government had acquired enough strength to crush the Car list
insurrection. This, plus the political bickerings**^ in
10?Quoted in Venero, op. cit. . p. 164.
* 08 Holt, op. cit .. p. 69.
l°9carr, op. cit .. pp. 191-192; Duncan, op. cit .. p. 244.
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the Carlist camp and a desire for peace, coupled with a
promise by Espartero to respect the fueros
,
induced the
Basque contingents to lay down their arms. The Peace of
Vergara of August, 1839, finally brought the war to a
formal conclusion. Espartero' s promise to the Basques
was expressed, in a qualified manner, in Article 1 of
the Pact of Vergara? "General don Baldomero Espartero
will recommend with great interest to the Government his
offer to formally submit before the Cortes the concession
or modification of the fueros ."HO
Subsequently, in September of 1839, the subject of
the fueros was discussed in the Cortes in which the
Progressives had a majority. HI It seems that they were
ready to abolish the fueros once and for all. But the
cabinet, taking into consideration Espartero 1 s promise to
the Basques, and his growing political influence, finally
settled for a compromise which recognized the fueros in
so far as they were not prejudicial to the constitutional
unity of the monarchy. A later date was set for specific
reforms regarding the fueros , A royal decree of November
16, 1839, allowed the Basques to reconvene their local
assemblies in the manner consistent with their fueros .
This decree presented Maria Cristina as the protector of
the Basque fueros .
HOQuoted in Venero, op. clt .. p. 180.
Hlzabala, op. cit ,. p. 377.
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The regime of Maria Cristina which had indicated
sympathy for the Basque jueros, did not remain in power
long enough to work out a final settlement with the Basques.
Political fortunes in Madrid changed once again, thus
bringing some radical Progressives into power who were
convinced that "a liberal constitution for all Spaniards
left the foral liberties as an archaic and unnecessary
conservative vestige. "112 A revolution initiated in the
provinces in 1840, and led by the Progressives with the
support of Espartero, forced Maria Cristina to abdicate
as the Queen Regent and left Espartero as head of the new
government, From her place of exile in France, Maria
Cristina sent a telegram to the Basque dloutacionea in
which she praised the Basques, who not too long ago had
supported a war against her, portrayed herself as the
protector of the fueros and asked for their support in her
112Carr, op. clt. . p. 220.
l^xhe immediate cause for this pronunciamento stemmed
from the political differences between the Progressives and
the Moderates over a proposal of the Moderates to reform
the local governments. Because of the patronage available
through the local governments, and thus control of elections,
each party in power wished to control local government,
or reform to its own political advantage. In early 1840,
the Moderates found themselves in power and decided to
reorganize the local governments in order to undercut the
power of the Progressives, particularly in the large
towns. The Progressives, normally advocates of
centralization, now found themselves in a position in
which they had to defend the autonomy of the municipality.
In order to stop the reform proposed by the Moderates,
they staged a revolution supported by Espartero. Carr,
op. cit .. pp 210-218.
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struggle against Espartero.
In the meantime, the local notables of the Basque
provinces were becoming suspicious about the Espartero
government which included representatives of the anti-
foralist tradition. At a meeting of the Cortes in June,
1841, the subject of the fueros had been brought up for
discussion, particularly the share of the Basque contribution
to national revenue. A law passed by the Cortes dn
August 16, 1841, stripping Navarra of her fueros reinforced
the suspicions of the other three provinces that the days
of the fueros were numbered, 114 Subsequently, in
September, 1841, the Basque provinces supported an attempted
insurrection against the Madrid government, led by General
O^Donnell, an opponent of Espartero. Once again, the
Basques lost. As a punishment for their support of the
insurrection, Espartero issued a decree abolishing the most
important aspects of the fueros ; each province would have
a 1efe politico, appointed by the central government, who
would be the superior political authority within the province
The custom houses would be removed from the interior and
placed at Basque ports and at the Spanish-French border,
and the Basques would be subject to military conscription. 1^
For the advocates of centralization, this was a victory.
114 For a copy of the text of this law see Venero
(1st ed.), p. 101.
115See Venero, pp. cit. . pp. 196-197.
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from 1843 to 1876, despite the turnover of governments
and constitutions, no significant modifications were made
regarding the fueros. The coalition which overthrew
Espartero in July, 1843, and brought back Maria Cristina
as the Queen Regent, by and large accepted the modifications
which the Espartero government had instituted, although it
seems that the Basques were expecting some radical
modifications. Instead the new government gave the
juntas genera les some autonomy regarding economic matters
and abolished the office of iefe politicos .
In a manifesto drafted in 1850 by local Basque notables,
again under the famous tree of Guernica, they expressed
disappointment with the policies of the central government
regarding the modification of the fueros :
We believe that a great number of the
policies introduced since the revolution of
1840 are another example of the violations of
the law of October 25, and consequently, many
examples of illegitimate acts, as a result of
which, in justice, we should be given immediate
reparations .116
Among other things, this document suggested that the
Basques should present a unified front to the central
government and follow, under the existing circumstances,
the only rational course open to them:
To negotiate, and negotiate with dexterity
and foresight is the only rational approach
that the Basques must follow in order to
salvage from ruin the sacred objects of their
* 16Quoted in Venero, op. cit .. p. 199.
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cult. It was in this manner that our fore-fathers, whose government consisted in a
constant negotiation with the central Power
worked on critical issues. Because our
*
position is more critical, and the interest,
whose fate shall be decided shortly, is far
more transcendental and grave, it is incumbent
upon us, their sons, to work with a double
effort.
Unity, and we shall be strong. 117
Although this document also expresses a conciliatory attitude
and the realization that things had changed, and, consequently,
the acceptance that the pre- 1839 foral liberties could not
be reinstituted, nevertheless the Basques continued an
intense protest in the form of petitions to the central
government and the presentation of amendments in the Cortes
by Basque deputies, which sometimes caused acrimonious
debates, and sometimes by the obstruction of government
policies. For example, during the 1859-1860 African War, the
Basque provincial assemblies and the central government
struggled for several months over the contribution, in men
and money, that the Basques should make to this war.
General Leopoldo 0» Donne 11, at the time head of the governmnt,
retaliated by issuing a decree (July 7, 1860) forbidding the
juntas genera les from meeting without the permission of the
governor of the respective province.
During the debate of the Lev de Presupuestos . in the
Cortes of 1864, the Basque senators introduced an amendment
which, if adopted, would have the effect of restoring the
117Ibid .. p. 201.
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pre-1839 foral liberties. The introduction of this
amendment stimulated a heated debate between Sanchez Silva,
a senator from Seville, and two Basque senators, Pedro de
Egana and Joaquin de Barroeta-Aldamar. Both sides appealed
to extensive historical documentation to support or refute
the source of the ftaerps. The debate seemed to have reached
its most heated point, however, when Egana, the senator
from Alava, referred to the Basques as a nationality:
That / foralJ7 structure which has lasted
undisturbed for a thousand years, has withstood
the violent political storms which have
demolished empires, overthrown monarchies and
even destroyed nationalities of great strength;
meanwhile that poor remote place has pre-
served intact that nationality which in the
eyes of Mr. Sanchez Silva does not deserve
respect nor worthy of retaining the unfortunate
fueros . Ho
Egana* s use of the word nationality elicited a response
from the President of the Council of Ministers, Alejandro
Mon, who argued that the Spanish government did not
"recognize any nationality other than the Spanish
nationality," and that any other nationality, whatever its
form, the Government would reject,
The chaotic state of Spanish politics between 1868 and
1876^0 presented the Basques once again with the opportunity
Quoted in Venero, op clt .. p, 212,
119ibid.
120There was a revolution On September 19, 1868, which
overthrew Isabela II from the Spanish throne. This was
followed by an indecisive government which reinstituted the
monarchy in October 30, 1870 in the person of Amadeo I
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of placing someone in the Madrid government sympathetic
towards their fueros. When the Carlists made their last
major effort to place their candidate, Don Carlos VII, on
the Spanish throne, the Basques again took up arms for the
Carlist cause. This war, known as the second Car list War
(1872-1876), brought defeat to the Basques and the Carlists
whose candidate left Spain never to return again.
Although the war ended in defeat for the Basques, the
fuerlsta sentiment continued unabated. In the national
elections for the Cortes (January 20, 1876), the Basque
candidates supporting the fueros emerged triumphant . *^1 It
seems that they were determined to salvage in the Cortes
what they had lost on the battlefield. When the subject
of the fueros was introduced in the Cortes for discussion,
a Basque deputy from Alava, Mateo Benigno de Maraza, made
a last appeal to the Congress Imploring it to spare the
Basque fueros . Their abolition, he said, would mean the
ruin "and the desolation of the unfortunate Basque country,
so eminently Spanish and so eminently monarchic
... ; you
are going to ruin and destroy the country designated by
of Savoy. But Amadeo abdicated in 1873, and the Republic was
proclaimed. In the following year, December 29, 1874, the
Republic was overthrown, and the Bourbon Monarchy was called
back in the person of Alfonso XII, son of Isabela. From
1876 to 1923, there was a period of relative stability in
Spanish politics.
121Javier de Ybarra Berge, Polltica. Nacional en
Vizcaya (Madrid! Instituto de Estudios Pollticos, 1948),
P. 25.
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Providence to be the impregnable bulwark of the motherland
and the progressive sentry of its independence which, in
the fulfillment of these sacrosanct duties, has always
been the model of pure loyalty to its kings. "122
Another Basque deputy, Martin Garmendia, from Tolosa,
tried to persuade his fellow deputies to preserve the
fue£os, for the Basques viewed them as if they were "a
truly idolatrous cult." Instead other deputies replied
that the Basques were "traitors to the Motherland. "123
On July 21, 1876, a law was finally promulgated by the
Crown stipulating the relationship between the Basque
provinces and the central government. As indicated by
Article I of this law, 124 the general laws of Spain would
also be applicable to the Basque provinces. Article IV
seemingly made a concession to the Basques—thus leading
some to believe that the pase foral might be established—
by authorizing the government "to resolve with the consent
of the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya, whenever
appropriate, all the reforms that their traditional foral
organizations required, so that the welfare of the Basques,
good government, and the security of the nation would be
ensured."*^
*^Quoted in venero, op. clt. . p. 227.
l^Berge, pp. cit. . p. 37.
124For text see venero, op. clt .. p. 228.
125
*bJLd f
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The Basque dlputacion^ reacted negatively to this
legislation. At a meeting in San Sebastian (the capital
city of Guipuzcoa) on September 11, 1876, the junta of
Guipuzcoa agreed to appeal to "His Majesty and the high
officers of the State, now and whenever required, to petition
for the revocation of the law." Insofar as they were
concerned, their "sacred rights remained intact as ever."
In a secret meeting, the djputaclon of Vizcaya agreed not
to cooperate "directly nor indirectly with the Government
in the execution of the law."126 AUva followed the behavior
of the other two provinces. On September 17 and 18, the
diputaclonea of the three provinces met privately in order
to discuss the adoption of a common strategy to resist the
law. "The meeting of Vitoria /~the capital of Alava_7",
says Venero, "was the first precedent of a systematic
concerted action which had never been realized until that
127time." 1 *' After this meeting, the dlputaciones sent delegates
to Madrid to persuade Canovas del Castillo, head of the
government, to have the law repealed. After some heated
argumentation, Canovas allegedly threatened to declare the
provinces under martial law, if the dlputaciones persisted
with their obstructionist tactics. Because of their
continued resistance, and their refusal to share the costs
126Quoted in Venero, op. cit .. pp. 230-231.
127Venero # op, c^t., p. 231.
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of maintaining a military force left in the area after the
end of the Carllst War, Canovas dissolved the dlputaeior,^
and selected a provisional body of judges to take their
place. On May 5 f 1877, Vizcaya was put under the complete
control of Madrid. This was later changed by the royal
decree of February 28, 1878. 1 28
The royal decree finally settled and spelled out in
detail the rules which would govern the relationship between
the Basques and the Spanish State. The ideas expressed in
this decree gave rise to what became known as the conclerto
economlco
. This was an arrangement by which the Basques
would contribute to the Spanish national treasury a fixed
amount of revenue, to be negotiated from time to time
between each individual province and the central government,
but would leave each province free to apportion its taxes
among its inhabitants in any way it wished. Under this
arrangement, the Basque provinces were given some form of
administrative autonomy. For years the province of Vizcaya
did not have direct taxes on property and industry. This
arrangement lasted up to the 1930' s.
The conflict discussed above between the Basques and
the Madrid government sets the stage for the later emergence
of the Basque nationalist movement. Although there was
persistent conflict between the Basques and the central
government finally ending with the abolition of the fueros
128 For a copy of the text, see Venero, op. clt .. p. 633.
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in 1876, it would be premature to characterise the activitie
of the Basques during this period as full-fledged nationalism.
With very few and isolated exceptions does one find
evidence that the Basque provinces considered outright
separation from Spain. While it is undeniable that the
Basques considered themselves distinct from the rest of the
surrounding populations, nevertheless, they struggled to
preserve their fueros within the structure of the Spanish
State. They tried to accomplish this by supporting the
traditional view of the Spanish monarchy. As articulated
by the ideologue of Spanish traditionalism, this would
mean a Catholic Spain with
•••a king who both rules and governs; a true
Cortes in the Spanish tradition, decentralization,
and a real life of the municipality and of the
province; and above all, the Catholic spirit
living in the institutions, in the laws, in the
customs.
. .
.
J
29
This view "looked to the medievel Spanish monarchy,
limited by the fueros and the people." 130 gy refusing to
accept the legitimacy of the new order, the Basques in a
sense were reacting negatively to the forces of modernization.
Between 1812 and 1876, they fought the forces of political
integration.
The process of political integration had the paradoxical
effect of introducing disintegrating forces of a new
129Antonio Aparisi y Guijarro, Obras (Madrid, 1873),
III, p. 341.
13°Schumacher, pp. clt .. p. 344,
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dimension into Spanish politics. The centralizing policies
of the Madrid government, along with Carlist Wars, had the
effect of popularizing the Basque fueros which might have
been taken for granted up to that time
-with the simultaneous
effect of making the Basques further conscious of their
perceived uniqueness. Thus, modernization, in this
particular case, had the paradoxical effect of bringing
about greater political integration and at the same time
reviving and reinvigorating tradition, aspects of which
had been nearly forgotten. It is from this period onwards
that a plethora of works began to appear romanticizing and
defending the historical roots of the Basque fueros.
CHAPTER HI
THE EMERGENCE OF SPANISH BASQUE NATIONALISM
Although fuerismo had remained alive after the
abolition of the fueros in 1876, it seems that by the end
of the nineteenth century many segments of the Basque
population had reconciled themselves to the idea of the
COhclerto econoalco. While lip service was paid to the
fueros, none of the major political groupings of the Basque
region, with the exception of the Integra list Party,
advocated a return to the pre-1839 political relationship
between the Basques and the Spanish State.
The erosion of the Basque culture and language had
continued its relentless course. Consequently, by the end
of the century, Spanish Basques were confronted with the
fact that with stunning rapidity they had lost the fueros ;
and their culture was under attack in their very homeland.
The attraction of large numbers of labor migrants to the
Basque region, particularly Vlzcaya and Guipuzcoa, due to
the rapid industrialization of this area, had given rise to
a situation in which the Basques found themselves a minority
in their own urban centers; and the Basque language was
rarely heard in the streets of Bilbao and San Sebastian.
It has been estimated that by 1899 approximately 70 per cent
of the population of Bilbao was non-Basque. 131 One writer
131 Pedro de Basaldua, El Libertador Vasco (Buenos Aires:
on
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makes the observation that by the end of the nineteenth
century the upper classes of the Basque region had become
"fastened to their esrpanolissimo." "The educated and
cultural circle, of the area," says the same writer, "had
become alienated from Basque patriotism," and this alienati
was reinforced by the existing political parties of the
region. "132
By the end of the century, the speaking of Basque
had been reduced to coastal fishing villages and to rural
districts. Famous Basque intellectuals, such as Unamuno
and Maeztu, well-known figures of the generation of 1898,
wrote their works in Castilian and not in Basque.
It was out of this background that Sabino de Arena
Goiri, a young lawyer, son of an industrialist family from
Bilbao, launched the Basque nationalist movement with his
publication of Biskava por su lndependencla in 1893, the
object of which was, to use his words, to teach the
Blzkalnos "the history of their motherland," and to awaken
his "compatriots who disgracefully ignored the language
of their race. "133
Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1953), p. 127. This work, written
by a nationalist, is a biography of Arana but contains much
general information on the politics of the Basque region at
the end of the nineteenth century.
132sabino de Arana Goiri, Obras Completes (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1965), p. 16. This work edited
by a nationalist whose name is not divulged, has an extensive
introductory essay discussing the formation of the PMV and
the subsequent development of Basque nationalism.
133 Blzkaya por su independencia
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ftrior to this publication, Arana had spent some years
in Barcelona where he studied at the University of that city,
and had come into contact with the Catalan cultural revival
'
which was flourishing at that time. It seems that it was
during his stay in Catalonia that he became fully converted
to the idea of organizing a Basque nationalist movement.
Subsequently, Arana submerged himself in the study of Basque
history and the Basque language, which he could not speak.
Starting with 1877, he published several works in philologyl34
in which he expressed his ambition to unify the Basque
language and purify it by dropping the borrowed "foreign"
words! Spanish and French. Arana set himself the task of
arousing the interest of the Basques in their language and
culture which, as he realized, was fast disappearing. "I
was born to witness your death. "135
Between 1890 and 1903, Arana devoted his life and his
energy to the cause of Euzkadl l36 a term Which he coined to
refer to an Independent Basque nation; and laid the ground
work for the political organization of Basque nationalism
with the founding of the Partido Naclonalista Vasco (PNV)
(Bilbao: Editorial Verdes Achirica, 1932), p. 45.
134Arana Goiri, op. clt .. p. 82.
135Arana Goiri, pp. clt .. p. 26.
136jhe exact date as to when this term was first used
is not clear. But it seems that it came into regular usage
after 1904 when a periodical entitled Euzkadi appeared
that year.
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in 1894. As discussed previously, the question of Basque
autonomy was not new in the Basque region. What was new
in Arana «s writings was his nationalistic point of view.
He carried the juerlsta position to its logical conclusion.
Arena's writings are tinged with what appears to be a
»racist»137 vlew whlch deplore8 the marriagG of Basques wlth
non-Basques. The preservation of the Basques as a "race"
appeared as one of the main tenents of his ideology.
Contempt for other Spaniards, whom he pejoratively referred
to as "maketos", is interspersed throughout his writings.
Frequent use of the phrase "invasion of maketos" was made by
Arana and his cohorts to describe the migration of other
Spaniards to the Basque region. It was on ethnic grounds
that Arana, as well as later nationalists, made his case for
Basque nationalism. Later Unamuno described this pre-
occupation with "racial" purity as "absurd racial virginity. "138
For this and for his general views on Basque nationalism,
he was castigated by the nationalists.
Although Arana evoked a responsive chord among some
segments of the urban sectors, students and members of the
clergy, his following remained small. 139 He faced apathy
137xhe concept of "race" as used by the nationalists
is not clear. It is sometimes used to denote something
cultural and at other times something "racial".
138QUOted in Carr, op. cit .. p. 556.
13°Right after he published Blzkaya por su independencja .
a group of people from Bilbao gave him a dinner in a place
known as Caserio Larrazabal where they asked him to explain
69
in the rural areas and hostility from Basque Industrialists
who, with very few exceptions, never associated with Basque
nationalism.
Initially Basque nationalism was limited to the
province of Vizcaya, Arena's home province. When he
published fiizfcaya por 8U lndependencia
r
he concentrated on
defending what he conceived to be the historical rights of
that province, although reference was also made to the
Basque region as a whole. But because initially he
addressed himself mainly to the Independence of Vizcaya,
early Basque nationalism was also referred to as
blzkaltarrlsmo. It was not until after his death that his
ideas began to find support in the other three provinces.
It is interesting to note that in the following thirteen
articles elucidating the ideological basis of the (PNV)
the Basque localism that was expressed during the Car list
wars is maintained, although Arana tried to discredit and
disassociate himself from Carlism1^0 for, in his opinion,
Carllsm had been responsible for the loss of the fueros .
The government of a future Euzkadl would consist of a
confederation in which each province would retain its
traditional autonomy. The two main tenets of the party's
his ideas. For the nationalists, this event became known as
el Juramento Larrazabal and is given as the date that marks
the beginning of Basque nationalism.
14°Sabino de Arana Goiri, El Partldo Car lis ta y los
Fueros Vasco-Navarros (Bilbao, 1897)
•
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ideology were "God and the Old Laws" ( Jaunsoikua ^
Zarra )i
^nf^Lii:B15Caya » Up°n enteri«8 * Republican
of lit 117aI^°VJ° accordinS to the acceptancethe political doctrine expounded by AranaGoiri* tar Sabino (Sabino Arana Goiri) in the8lo
f
an Jaun^oikua eta La
ff
l wh±ch ls
explained m the following articles.
Article 2—Juan-Goikua—Bizcaya will be Catholic.Apostolic, and Roman in all aspects of itsinternal affairs and its relations with otherpeoples.
Article 3—Lagi-Zarra
-Bizcaya will be freely
reconstituted. It will reestablish, with completeintegrity, the essence of its traditional laws,
called Fueroq. It will restore the good
practices and customs of its predecessors. It
will be constituted, if not exclusively, then
principally, of families of the Basque race.
It will establish Basque as its official language.
Article 4—Eta-Bizcaya will be established upon
perfect harmony and accord between the religious
and the political orders, between the divine and
the human.
Article 5—Distinction between Juan-Goikua and
Lagi Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a
clear and marked distinction between the
religious and political orders, between ecclesi-
astical and civil.
Article 6—Precedence of Juan-Goikua over Lagi
Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a complete
and unconditional subordination of the political
to the religious, of the State to the Church.
Article 7—Confederation--Since Bizcaya is by
race, language, faith, character, and custom a
sister of Aiava, Benabarra (Basse -Navarre).
Guipuzcoa, Labourdi, fJavarra, and Zuberoa (soule),
it will become allied or confederated with these
six peoples to form a whole called Euskalerria,
but without surrendering its particular autonomy.
This doctrine will be expressed in the following
principle: Bizcaya llbre en Euskalerria libre
(Free Bizcaya in a Free Basque country).
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Article 8—The Basque confederation will be
5n^5Lby ?}}«° f , the B* 8«ue 8tates with each
fiun5atUnJ!!
e f°rmatton of lts
<
the confederation)
Article 9—The necessary basis for a solid anddurable national unity are: unity of race asfar as is possible, and Catholic unity.
Article 10—The essential basis to insure thatthe Basque states entering the union will retain
equal autonomy and Identical faculties arej
freedom to secede, and equality of obligations
and rights within the confederation.
Article 11—Once the confederation is established,
each member state will have the same rights and
identical obligations.
Article 12—The Confederation will unite its
members solely in the terms of the social order
and international relations; in all other
aspects each will maintain its traditional
absolute independence.
Article 13—All of the articles in this document
and political doctrine are irrevocable. 141
Judging from this text, an independent Euzkadi would be
a loose Confederation in which the provinces would retain
considerable autonomy.
The fact that the Spanish political regime at this
time allowed a considerable amount of political freedom,
universal male suffrage had been established in 1890, the
nationalists were free to propagate their ideas and to
organize. To this fact one might attribute the low incidence
of violence associated with Basque nationalism during these
years. Between 1890 and 1930 Basque nationalism was devoid
^Reproduced in Venero (1945 edition), pp. 244-245.
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of the use of violence either in the form of assassinations
or riots. Of course this fact could also have been due
to the lack of intense nationalist sentiment among the
Basque population.
During the 1890»s Spain was having difficulties with
the remnants of her overseas empire; and Arana, in his
writings, delighted in this fact. His support for the
overseas rebellion coupled with his views on Basque
nationalism, plus his virulent attacks on public figures,
led to his arrest in 1895. His arrest was. not so much due
to his views on nationalism as to his verbal attacks on the
mayor of Bilbao. While he stayed in incarceration for the
period of one month, the government brought action against
the Basque Center, the headquarters of the Party, and
demanded its closure. It seems that the immediate reason
for the closure of the Basque Center by the government was
the publication of an article in the Party 1 s paper, the
Bizkaltarra . entitled, "La invasion maketa en Guipuzcoa. M 142
This article so offended the military officers of the area
that they planned to seize the headquarters of the Party.
This was the first confrontation between the government and
Basque nationalism. Arana took responsibility for the
article and was given another four months in prison.
Initially Arana addressed himself to the people of
l*2yenero> pp. clt .. p. 290. Unless otherwise indicated,
references to Venero*s work are made to the 1968 edition.
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the Basque urban centers. But apparently he was not
getting very much reaction from them, for in 1896, he
decided to concentrate on the Basque peasants instead. To
this end he began to write calendars and religious songs in
eusjcesa. In August of 1897 he started another paper,
B*gerrltarr«> directed primarily at the peasants. 1*3 ln
this paper he exhorted Basque workers not to support
socialism gaining adherents among the workers of the mines
of Bilbao, for in his view, it was a Spanish organization.
For Arana the "foreign domination" was more odious than
the "bourgeois domination" 1*4
In 1897 Arana, with the members of the governing
committee of the Basque Center, decided to dissolve the
organization, which had been closed by the government
since 1895, and adopt instead a more low-keyed approach in
their propaganda . 1*5 This was done in order to avoid
government persecution, which had become more sensitive to
the propaganda of the nationalists largely due to the
overseas rebellion. In his writings Arana praised both the
Cubans and the Philippinos. Consequently, he and his
followers decided to form cultural and Catholic organization
under the cover of which nationalist objectives would be
pursued.
l*3 i bld .. p. 293.
l^Quoted in Ibid ., p. 294.
^^Basaldua, op. cit .. p. 110.
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The results of the elections of August 1898, for the
provincial deputation, indicated that popular support for
the ideas of Arana was more widespread than had been apparent
This was the year in which Spain had been defeated by the
United States and lost the last vestiges of her empire.
Passions were running high in Spain; and some groups made
ready to take up arms against the government, including the
Car lists whom Arana dissuaded from taking such action.
Despite Arana* s support for the overseas rebels, he was
elected to the dlputaclon provincial in 1898.1*6 This
was the first time that Basque nationalism had competed
for public office. In the following year five nationalists
were elected to the municipal government of Bilbao. 1*7
Nationalists were also elected in other municipalities.
The electoral success of the nationalists in Bilbao,
plus a new government in Madrid headed by Francisco Silvela
which included members favorable to the idea of regionalism,
produced optimism among the nationalists who decided to form
another Batzoki (Basque Center). This time it was decided
that the Party 1 s propaganda should take a moderate tone:
"The designation of nationalism should be concealed; but the
14fe lbld .. p. 117.
1*7Javier de Ybarra y Berge, Po litlea Kaclonal en
Vlzcava (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1948),
p. 199. This book contains a wealth of information on the
local politics of Vizcaya and the relationship between the
industrialists of the region and the central government.
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Center should function a. a propaganda instrument. Thi.
would be carried out by a choral group known a. Euskerrla
•nd folkloric dancing group.. "148 The Center v.. inaugurated
on April 23, 1899. On June 4, 1899, the fir.t issue of a
nationalist daily, ^ Correo Vapco, was published. Thi.
paper was not very
.ucce.sful. It only .old 134 copies.!*0
Thi. was followed in 1901 with the publication of a weekly,
£li£l£SiSit of which four copie. were .old. In October of 1901
another weekly appeared, La Patrie , which continued to be
publi.hed up to the 1930»«. Although thi. paper disclaimed
any association with Basque nationalism in order to avoid
government harassment, it was actually maintained by Arena
and his brother, Luis Arena. 150
In March of 1902 Arena once again confronted the Madrid
government and was arrested, tried, and Imprisoned for
sending a telegram to President Roosevelt congratulating
him for granting independence to Cubaj
Roosevelt, President of the United States.
Washington. The Basque Nationalist Party
congratulates the noble federation over which
you preside for having granted independence to
Cuba which had previously been liberated from
slavery. This magnanimous and just example
given by your powerful states is unknown end
unheard of in the history of European powers,
particularly Latin powers. If Europe followed
this example, the Basque nation, the oldest
148Venero, op. clt .. p. 302.
**Q lbld.
* 50lbld .. p. 304.
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people of Europe who have enjoyed centuries ofliberty, and whose constitution has beenpraised in the United States, would also befree.—Arana Goiri.151
In view of the lack of enthusiasm that Arana seemed
to be encountering for his nationalist doctrine, by 1902
he was beginning to have second doubts about the development
of Basque nationalism. He seemed to have accepted the
conclusion that the Basques had become too far assimilated
into Spanish culture. It was his opinion that before long
the Basques, as a distinct group, would disappear . 152
His health was also deteriorating. Consequently, he argued
that under the circumstances the best course for the Basques
would be to acquire some degree of autonomy within the
Spanish State. According to an article published in
La Fatrla
. he had decided to form a "new Basque party
which would work for the well being of /"the Basque country_7
within the Spanish State, and within the existing legal
system, but which would offer general guide lines for the
reorganization of the Spanish State and particular ones
for the /"Basque country_7." 153
The object of the new Party would be to work for
"greatest autonomy possible within the Spanish State and at
the same time the most appropriate to the Basque character
blueprinted in Venero, op. clt .. p. 304.
bZgaga^dua, op. clt .. p. 139.
153La Patrla . July 22, 1902.
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and to modern times. "154 Following the footsteps of the
movement for Home Rule In Catalonia, which at this time had
acquired great momentum, he would name the new organization
the Usa de vascos eepanollstas
- On August 24, 1902,
IfS Patrla, with an exhortation to all Basques to gather
around the "Sacred Tree /"the tree of Guernica_7» , a
symbol of their "glorious and happy past" 155 announced the
formation of the new organization. There were some
indications that Arena's change was purely tacticall56 in
order to avoid government persecution and to get the support
of those groups which desired some degree of autonomy, such
as the Carlists, but were unwilling to go as far as Arana.
In view of the fact that the Lllsa Reglonallsta of Catalonia
seemed to be getting some concessions through parliamentary
means, presumably, Arana believed that a similar strategy
by the Basques would be far more effective.
For the provincial elections of 1903, the nationalists
presented six candidates; but only two were elected. But
for the Cortes elections of April, 1903, they did not
present any candidates. In Guernica the millionaire Sota
y Llano, a supporter of Basque nationalism, ran for office
but was defeated. 157 ^he results of these elections once
154lbJLd.
155xbld .. August 24, 1902.
156See Engracio de Aranzadi, Erelntza (Zarauz, 1935).
157venero, op. clt .. p. 310.
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again led Arana to believe that Basque nationally was in
the throes of extinction. Even though he had established
the ideological foundations of the movement and had acquired
some followers, Basque nationalism had not spread to any
significant degree beyond the confines of Vizcaya. On
November 25, 1903, after having dedicated his life to the
cause of Basque nationalism, Arana died from Adlsson's
disease. He provided Basque nationalism with its first
martyr. After his death, Angel de Zarabala Azumis assumed
political leadership of the movement.
From the year of Arena's death to the 1930* s, the Party
gradually grew in numbers, spread to the other three
provinces, and eventually acquired respectability as
evidenced by its subsequent gradual successes in electoral
politics.
Under the ideological leadership of Engracio de
Aranzadi, the Party began to develop a cult of personality
around Arana, later described by nationalists as El
Libert
a
dor Vasco . An Intensive propaganda campaign was
also launched. In 1904 the Basque Youth Movement was
founded in Vizcaya under the leadership of Luis Urrengoeche.
In the following year, on April 29, 1905, the new leader
of the Party, Angel de Zambala Azumis, issued a Party
directive discussing the ideological position of the Party
vis-a-vis other political parties and exhorting Party
followers not to confuse the political objectives of the
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(PWV) with the objectives of the other political parties.
In their efforts to spread beyond the province of Vizcaya,
the nationalists began to make contacts with the other
three provinces in order to establish Basque Centers there.
In 1904 the first Basque Center was opened in the province
of Guipuzcoa. This was followed three years later with the
inauguration of another center in Alava and another one,
two years later, in Navarra. By 1910, the Party had branches
in all of the four Basque provinces. Despite strong
opposition from the tycoons of the region and the recently
created nobility, 158 between 1903 and 1923 the Party became
a serious political force in the Basque region, particularly
in the province of Vizcaya where, in 1918, it had acquired
enough of a following enabling it to get control of the
provincial deputation. Vizcaya remained, down to the
^SO^s, the bastion of Basque nationalism and continued to
provide the leading personalities of the Party starting with
Arena.
In their efforts to revive Basque culture, the
nationalists began to address themselves to a group which,
particularly in the rural areas, had been regarded as the
protector of whatever was left of Basque culture, that is,
l^The Basque industrialists seemed to have fruitful
relations with the Madrid governments which they, along with
the textile interests of Catalonia and the agrarian Interests
of Castile, successfully pressured for a policy of
protectionism. See Puges, M. , Como triunfo el protecionismo
en Esoana (Barcelona: Editorial Juvenal, 1931).
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the clergy. Along with this approach the Party also
concentrated on building an electoral base in the rural
areas. Although the Party had support in the provincial
capitals, from which the leadership of the Party came,
its electoral success in these area, specifically Bilbao
and San Sebastion, would be limited by the fact that these
two capitals contained large numbers of people who were non-
Basques, and consequently, hostile to the movement. It
seems that right after the death of Arana some segments of
the clergy, either in overt or covert fashion, began to
give support to the Party, a support which was destined to
increase in subsequent years. 159 it was a member of the
clergy, Reverend Ibero, who in 1906 published the following
pamphlet in order to explain and popularize the ideology of
It seems that the connection between the fueros,
God, and the clergy had always been close. During the
course of a sermon in Guernica, on July 21, 1895, to
commemorate the loss of the fueros, Rev. Resurrecion Maria
de Azkue admonished the Basqes never to forget their
fueros : Cuales son las armas de nuestro pueblo? Mo
penseis que vais a encontrar nuestro Roble en imagens de
piedra. Mo existe en estas. Aparece muerto. Nosotros lo
queremos con vlda. Sabeis donde esta, muy vivo, mas que en
parte alguna, el Roble de Guernica? Es en los corazones de
los autenticos euskaldunes donde tiene raices mas hondas
que en su tierra natal..
Escudrinad, vascongados amantes del Arbol, vuestro
corazon; mirad bien ese Roble; lo teneis ahi mismo. Esta
en brazos de una cruz; la Cruz de Jesus tiene abrazada, con
grande carino nuestro Arbol. Con razon le llamamos Arbol
santo. En la Cruz esta representado Dios; en el Arbol,
la ley vieja, y en este senal de patriotismo que tenenmos
dentro del corazon, Dios y el Fuero.
Vascongados I Amad sin medida vuestro Roble; amad sin
medida vuestra ley. Pues amando el Arbol conseguis intro-
ducir la Cruz en el Cor-azon y amando la ley amais al mismo
Dios. Quoted in Venero, op. cit .. p. 287.
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nationalism. This pamphlet, entitled Ami V fl8Co . deserves
to be quoted at length for it became one of the chief
ideological statements of Basque nationalism:
49—What is Basque nationalism? It is thepolitical system which defends the right of theBasque race to live independent from any other
race.
50—What is the basis for this system? Thedistinction that exists between the Basque
race and the other races of the world.
51—Is that distinction certain? Indeed it is;
so much so that no man of a sound mind and
median culture would dare to deny it.
52—How can you prove it? With a sound and
irrefutable argument which is possible for
anyone to reach. In effect, I said previously
that differences between races is proved by
the differences between languages. Since the
Basque language differs radically from all
the other languages, therefore, the race is
also different from all the others.
57—Does one infer from what you said that the
Basque is not genetically Spanish? Yes sir.
Just as one can equally infer that he is not
French, nor English, nor German, nor Russian,
nor Hungarian, nor Turk, nor Greek, etc. To
assert that the Basque is Spanish is to commit
a triple error: ethnic, geographic, and political.
59—Has the Basque race, distinct from all the
others, maintained up to the present its
integrity and purity? Yes sir. If it had
mixed with others, and in view of the fact that
it is so small, it most certainly would have
been absorbed by the others and at this time
there would not even exist a memory of the
Basque language. Likewise, the mixture of
races should easily be seen in the Basque
language. But one does not find any traces of
French, Spanish, Celt, German, nor from any
of the other European languages. One must
conclude, consequently, that the Basque race
has maintained its purity up to the present.
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61—Is the right of the Basques to live
iSf
e
S?53*
nt from °ther Peoples based solely onthe difference that exists between their raceand the others? No. It is also based on the
exercise of that right which the Basques enjoyedfor centuries until it was taken away from them.
66—When did the Basque states lose their
independence? Those on the other side of the
Pyrenees in 1789 during the French Revolution.
P10?™ 11 this side of the Pyrenees, much later,in 1839. •
89—What are the objectives of nationalism? To
re-establish the state of affairs in which the
Basque states found themselves prior to 1839 and,
without reducing the liberty of any one of them,
to form amongst themselves a federation to
protect the Basque race and its rights.
93—Is the Basque Nationalist Party a party
fundamentally Catholic? Yes sir. The Party
wants for Euzkadi Catholic unity with all its
consequences,^foremost and above all, the
Jaun-Golkua £ God_7, an Euzkadi devoted to
God such as it was before its fall in 1839.
There is no doubt on this point. If the
Basque Nationalist Party had a choice between
an Euzkadi with its rights but divorced from
Christ, and one such as today and loyal to
Christ, it would choose the latter.
104—Your reasoning is such that there is no
choice but to accept your conclusions. But
there is still a more powerful argument. Here
it is: Euzkadi is Christian; Euzkadi believes
in God.... 160
Reverend Ibero had earlier encountered difficulties with
the government for allegedly preached in a sermon, in
Pamplona the capital of Navarra, the "exterminio de todos
libera le s." 161 A publication of the Boletin Oflclal del
l 60Evangelista de Ibero (Rev.), Ami Vasco (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1957).
161 Ibid., p. 6,
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°bls Pado > 1910 » indicating that Basque name, would be
acceptable in the Church's registry is further indication
that in their campaign to revive Basque culture the
nationalists were gaining adherents among the clergy. In
1921 a group of Basque priests founded the Jaungoikua-Znl*
Baskuna, devoted to the instruction of Basque. 162
To the Basques, particularly the clergy, socialism and
liberalism had become identified as anti-Christian and,
therefore, anti-Basque. This, of course, was part and
parcel of the Car list Ideology which had characterized
every liberal as anti-Catholic since the Cadiz constitution
of 1812. It should be added that among some segments of the
population of Navarra such ideology still exists. It has
been argued that the Basque clergy saw in the nationalist
movement and in the revival of Basque culture a means to
isolate the Basques from the influence of liberalism:
"Don't teach your sons Castilian, the language of liberalism."! 63
The emergence of socialism among the mine and shipyard
workers of Bilbao, in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, gave rise to a situation which might have enabled
the socialists to control local government (Bilbao) at the
expense of both the nationalists and the established liberal
and conservative groups. This fear on the part of the
162Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil
War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 16.
163guoted in Carr op. cit .. p. 558.
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"establishment" of the Bilbao area was particularly manifest
during the preparations for the general elections for the
Cortes In 1907. There was fear that a split of the vote
between the nationalist candidate, Pedro Anitua, and the
candidate of the "establishment", Fernando Maria de Ybarra,
an industrial tycoon, might give the seat of Bilbao to
the socialist candidate, Pabo lglesias, whom the fueristas
regarded as a rabble rouser. The following quotation from
a letter of a fuerista urging the nationalists to support
Ybarra, illustrates the dismay of some fueristas at the Idea
of having a socialists representing Bilbao in the Cortes:
It has been brought to my attention that
the Party (PNV) has decided to present its own
candidate about whose personality 1 have nothing
but praise. I also fully realize that such a
project is motivated by an excessive zeal to
maintain the purity of our doctrines. But I
must also point out that under the present
circumstances we must make all kinds of
sacrifices in order to prevent sectarianism,
the enemy of our race and laws, the standard-
bearer of the breakers of our social institutions,
the possibility of being elected. 1 consider it
a small sacrifice for the nationalists and the
orthodox fueristas to support Mr. Ybarra. I
believe that it would be a shame for Bilbao and
Vizcaya to elect to the Cortes to the £irst
time, a representative of that party / Socialist..7»
an enemy of all that which is sacred and dear
to us* It is for this reason that 1 appeal to
you and the Party to accept and support the
candidacy of D. Fernando Maria de Ybarra. 164
There were some moderate nationalists who would rather
have seen Ybarra elected than a socialist. And some of them
l^Ybarra Y Berge, op. clt. . pp. 276-277.
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did support Ybarra rather than their own candidate, as a
result of which they were expelled from the Party. Ybarra
was elected.
Antonio Maura's proposal (Maura was Prime Minister)
to the Cortes of 1907 to reform local government, to make
local governments more independent of the central government,
helpedl65 to 8park the revival of fuerista sentiment in the
Basque region. Judging from the behavior of the provincial
deputations, fuerista sentiment was not death as it had
apparently appeared to many people of the region. On
November 28, 1907, representatives from the provincial
deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya met to draft a
proposal which would, if accepted by the government in
Madrid, restore the foral regime of the Basque provinces.
Among other things, the final draft of this proposal asked
for the repeal of the 1876 law, which had finally abolished
the fueros
. and the "absolute restitution of /their_7 old
regime." In order to accomplish this end, "the deputations
of the Basque provinces and of the municipalities should
constitute themselves and function in accord with their
traditional usages and customs. "166 Fuerismo was back in
l^Carr indicates that the reform of local government
had long been an issue in Spanish politics. Between 1882
and 1932, 20 proposals to reform local governraemt were
presented to the Cortes, p. 375. For a discussion of local
government see, H. Puget Le Gouvernment Local en Espagne
(Paris, 1920); A. Posada. La evolucion leglslatlva del
regimen local (Madrid, 1910)
•
166For a copy of this proposal see Ybarra y Berge,
op. cit. . p. 627.
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politics again. Maura while desirous of government reform,
his pet project to eliminate the corrupt system of
.
caclQuMmo * 67 by which elections were manipulated by the
Ministry of the Interior in Madrid, would have nothing to
do with this question. Moreover, he argued, if he ever gave
any support to such proposal, he would bring upon himself the
wrath of the liberals who were not very enthusiastic about
his proposed local government reform since they viewed it
as a tactic by the conservatives to eliminate liberal
electorate strength. He replied that under the circum-
stances the Basques should be content with the status quo
and the preservation of their conclerto economlco .168
Apparently the nationalists did not involve themselves
with this proposal put forth by the fuerlstas whom at this
time they seemed to regard as their erstwhile opponents.
Nevertheless, one might infer that this renewed interest in
fuerismo could not but help the cause of the nationalists
who continually maintained that the Basques lost their
independence in 1839 after the conclusion of the first
Car list War.
During the municipal elections of Bilbao, 1909, the
nationalists captured 8 seats out of a total of 23. They
For a discussion caclaulsmo * see Joaquin Costa,
Ollgarqula y caciouismo (Madrid, 1902).
168ybarra y Berge, op. cit .. p. 285.
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held the largest bloc of votes within the council. Jose
Horn, a nationalist, was appointed mayor of Bilbao. The
growing success of the nationalists, along with the growing
strength of the socialists, led the conservative forces of
the area, most of whom came from the banking and industrial
sectors and who had dominated politics in the area, to
formally organize a conservative party which would combat
both the nationalists and the socialists in electoral
politics. 169 Before the establishment of the conservative
party, there had been some plans to form a Catholic party;
but these plans failed. Leading the efforts to establish a
local wing of the conservative party was Fernando Maria
Ybarra, who became the local chief of the Party on June 30,
1909, when the Party was finally established. This event
was honored with a visit of Antonio Maura, leader of the
Conservatives and also Prime Minister. This was followed
with the formation of a local wing of the Liberal Party
in January of 1910.
Besides the fuerlsta sentiment already alluded to,
another issue which helped to radicalize political life in
the Basque region was the clerical issue introduced into
politics by the Liberals in 1910 under the leadership of
Jose Canals jas. 170 During the Restoration period, the
169 lbid .. pp. 313-319.
a discussion of this issue and the Liberal Party,
see Daniel Lopez (ed.), El Partido Liberal (Madrid, 1912).
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number of religious orders had proliferated in Spain. In
1910 the Liberals mad an issue out of this by introducing
legislation, Ley de Condadn, which would require the
religious orders to register just like any other organizations
and would prevent the further growth of them without the
permission of the government. To the Church and its
supporters, this was a violation of the Concordat and an
impingment on the Church's freedom. On July 10, 1910,
Canalejas suspended diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
This action caused such a fury in the Basque region that,
in the words of Carr, "Basque Catholics threatened civil
war...." 171 Ybarra, a Basque industrialist, sent his
personal secretary to Rome to inquire about what to do
regarding the governments legislation. 172
The Basque nationalists along with other Catholic
groups of the Basque region planned a demonstration in order
to dissuade the government from carrying through the proposed
legislation. The government forbade such a demonstration,
declared Bilbao under martial law, and sent troops to the
area.
The general events surrounding national politics
See also D. Seville Andres, Cana leias (Barcelona, 1956);
and M. Fernandez Almagro, Hlstoria del relnado de D. Alfonso
XIII (Barcelona, 1934).
171Carr, op. cit .. p. 492.
l 72Ybarra y Berge discusses at length the negative
reactions of the Basque industrialists to this law,
pp. 347-348.
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such as the revival of anti-clericalism, with the subsequent
reactions in the Basque region from right-wing groups, plus
the emergence of fyer|,smo
t presented the Party with some
problems. It would have to compete with other groups such
as the Car lists and other Catholic groups. But the Party's
support for the Church, a revered Institution in the Basque
region, and its association with right-wing groups,
unwittingly meant support for the monarchy. But republicani
was one of the Party 1 s main tenets. For a group within the
Party the recent growing confessionalism of the Party and
its attempts to appeal to right-wing groups, was taken
with strong reservations. Consequently, this secularly
oriented minority decided at the end of 1910 to leave the
Party and form a new group with the motto of Aberri eta
Askatasuna (Fatherland and Liberty) and founded a paper
entitled Askatasuna . Its headquarters became known as the
Centro Nacionallsta Republlcano Vasco .* 73 This group which
never acquired too much of a following represented the
Left in Basque nationalism.
The growing appeal of socialism to the mine and
shipyard workers of Bilbao, most of whom were from the
outside of the Basque region, motivated the (PNV) with the
help of the clergy to found a Basque Catholic workers
organization which would be affiliated with the Party.
173Venero, pp. cit .. pp. 340-341.
90
This occurred in 1911 with the formation of the Solldarld«H
de 9brero« Vascos (SOV).!™ Xo thia organijEatlon came a
number of small Catholic labor unions which had existed
in the Basque country for some time. 175 But lt 8eem8 that
the predominant group within this organization was the
white collar workers of Bilbao. Although orignlally Basque
industrialists, with very few exceptions, they did not
support the nationalists whom they regarded as "rebeldes
burgueses"; 176 apparently some industrialists eventually
came to the support of the Basque labor unions which eschewd
the notion of class struggle. Needless to say, for this
posture they became the object of disdain for socialist
and anarchist labor unions. 177 The social philosophy of
the (PNV) was basically a conservative Catholic social
philosophy derived from the encyclicals of Pope Leo Xlll.
The period between 1913 and 1923 was a time of social
and political turmoil in Spain. The political coalition
which had governed Spain since the Restoration in 1876
l 74Eu2ko Langlllen Alkartasuna (Solidaridad de Obreros
Vascos), (Biarritz, 1961).
l 7^Juan N. Garcia-Nieto, El sindicallsmo crlstiano en
p££J2£*» notas sobre su origen v evoluclon hasta 193o.
tBilbad: Universidad de Deusto, Institute de Estudios
Economico-Soclales, 1960). For a list of Catholic labor
organizations in the Basque region at the turn of this
century see, Estadistlca de las Asoclaclones Catollcas de
obreros de Espana en 1 de mavo de 1907 (Madridj Consejo
Macional de las Asociaciones Catollcas, 1907).
l 7oYbarra y Berge, op p clt .. p. 465.
l 77The socialist labor unions labelled them as "amarillos."
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was beginning to disintegrate and seemed unable to deal
with the new political forces making demands on the
political system.178 There were sporadic strikes followed
by social distrubances and, by the end of the decade,
particularly after World War I, persistent government
crises. Regionalism in both Catalonia and the Basque region
became increasingly militant. In the province of Vizcaya,
the nationalists gained control of the provincial deputation.
Following the footsteps of Catalonia which had already been
given a statute to form a Mancommunidad (1913), the (PNV)
just before the provincial elections had issued a manifesto
also asking for a Mancommunidad for the Basque provinces.
Although nationalist sentiment was not as intense in the
other three provinces as it was in Vizcaya, there is no
question that sentiment for some form of Home Rule was
widespread throughout the Basque region. For example, at a
meeting in Vitoria, the capital city of Alava, in July of
1917, the provincial deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and
Vizcaya met to discuss plans to write a proposal to be
submitted to the government to grant local autonomy. The
final version of the proposal asked for complete autonomy,
insofar as the domestic affairs of the provinces were
concerned, but would leave the power to deal with foreign
affairs in the Spanish State. Essentially, some kind of a
178foi. a discussion of this period see Carr, op. clt. .
pp. 489-558.
92
federal relationship. This proposal submitted to the
government on December 17, 1917, was shelved, as several
before, for further consideration. The initiative for this
proposal had come from Vizcaya where the nationalists were
displaying new confidence as the result of their electoral
success in the recent elections.
In the following year during the general elections
for the Cortes, the nationalists elected seven deputies,
four of which were elected in Vizcaya. On October 25, 1918,
the Basque nationalist, deputies, in commemoration of the loss
of the fueros on October 25, 1839, sent a telegram to
President Wilson:
At the anniversary of the abrogation
of the Spanish government of the independence
of the Basque nation, those undersigned deputies
and senators of the Spanish Parliament mindful
of their responsibilities in the name of the
Basque nation, give greetings to the President
of the United States of America who has
established the basis for the future peace of
the world based on the right of every
nationality, small or large, to live in
whatever form it wishes. These bases, which
were accepted by all the belligerent states,
we would like to see promptly applied as
required by the interests of justice and
collective freedom. 179
A similar telegram was sent to Clemenceau. This was not the
first time that the nationalists had tried to get international
attention for their cause. As will be recalled, Arana had
done a similar thing when he sent a telegram to the American
1 79R.epr i.nte<j in Venero, op. cit .. p. 395
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President in 1902 when Cuba was given its independence. And
in 1916 the Basque nationalists had sent delegates to the
Conference des Nationals. in Lausanne. But prior to
1936 it seems that the Basques did not make too much of an
effort to give their cause international recognition. Such
efforts came only after 1939, as a result of the dramatic
events surrounding the Spanish Civil War when they were
defeated along with the Republican forces.
This telegram sent to Wilson and Clemenceau caused
great consternation within the Cortes. Victor Pradera,
a Traditionalist from Navarra who down to 1936 remained one
of the more outspoken defenders of Spanish unity within the
Basque region, launched an attack on the nationalists and
tried to use historical evidence to refute their separatist
claims. As to the question of a Basque ethnicity, Pradera
chided them over the fact that so many of the Basque
nationalists were not of Basque descent:
I have maintained that race is not the
criterion for nationality; but you have persistently
maintained the contrary. Using your own argument,
I ask you: Where is your race? Italians, but no
Basques; Frenchmen, but no Basques; Germans, but
no Basques; and Spaniards who have abandoned their
fathers and mothers. How can you represent the
race whose existence you maintain? 180
180guotecj in Ibid . . Jose Horn, a senator from Vizcaya,
was of German descent; Pedro de Chalbaud, another senator
from Vizcaya, was of French ancestry; and Arturo Campion
from Navarra was of Italian ancestry. "This reflects the
nationalists dilemma that much of the population of the
Basque country, including many ardent nationalists, possessed
shaky geneological claims to Basque descent. This fact
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Following the behavior of their brethern, on December
30, 1918, a meeting of Navarrese mayors, deputies, and
provincial deputies took place in Pamplona, the capital city
of Navarra, in which a proposal for autonomy was approved:
—.«.«i
e
!i'
n8 Navarra, s aspirations for the
restitution of its foral institutions remain asfirm as ever, and in light of the presentgovernment's recognition of the possibility ofgranting autonomy to the various regions, thisAssembly considers it appropriate at this timefor the deputation to bring once again to the
attention of the government Navarra 1 s desire tohave its moral faculties restored by repealing
all laws which contravene them. Without
breaking from Spain, Navarra desires to
retain the special characteristics of its ancientkingdom but adapted to actual conditions and
in harmony with those spheres within the purview
of the power of the Spanish State. 181
As illustrated by this statement, the demands of Navarra
were nothing more than old fuerlsmo in a modified form.
There was nothing radical about this proposal. Underlying
it the political unity of Spain was accepted. This was an
assumption which the nationalists did not accept. As we
shall see later, Navarra followed a different path and
disassociated itself from the other three provinces when a
lends substance to the somewhat jocular criticism that in
order to be a confirmed Basque nationalist one must possess
at least one non-Basque last name or be ignorant of the
Basque language." William A. Douglass and Milton M. da
Silva, "Basque Nationalism," in Oriol Pi Sunyer (ed.),
The Limits of Integration: Ethnicity and Nationalism in
Modern Europe . Research Report No. 9, Department of
Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, October, 1971,
p. 182.
ISlfteprinted in Venero, op. cit .. p. 400.
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statute of autonomy was finally given in October of 1936.
The recent manifestation for local autonomy on the
part of the Basques and Catalonia led the government of
Romanones, in 1919, to appoint an extra-parliamentary
committee to investigate this problem and come up with some
proposal. After some deliberation, this committee presented
a proposal which would grant autonomy to the Basque provinces
withlji the Spanish State. 182 Among the items enumerated in
this proposal, the Basque language would be given official
status and would become a requirement for public employment
in the Basque region. As to military service, a sensitive
issue in the Basque provinces, the Basques would be
obligated to serve in the Spanish military just as any other
Spaniards; but the provinces would have the option of
deciding on the form of recruitment. Consonant with one of
the traditional Basque fueros . Basque servicemen would
be stationed in their provinces except in cases of war.
To the more extreme nationalists, this proposal was not
satisfactory, because it proceeded on the assumption that
the Basques were a mere region of Spain a view which Arana
had rejected.
Apparently there was a group within the party who
had come to the conclusion that under the circumstances the
more realistic thing to do would be to accept the fuerlsta
182por a copy of the proposal see Venero, op. clt ..
pp. 401-404.
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view and speak in terms of regionalism rather than
nationalism. Whether this view was being accepted merely
as a tactic or whether it was sincerely believed, is
difficult to tell although there is evidence that a change
in ideology was taking place. It seems that some members
of the Party were beginning to believe that the cause of
nationalism had not gone very much beyond what it was when
Arana founded the Party in 1894. Consequently, the Party
seemed to be moving to a position close to that of Cambo
in Catalonia, that is, regionalism. This was the conclusion
reached by someone familiar with the activities of the
Party at that time:
The Basque Nationalist Party is losing its
cohesion and aggressiveness. It is becoming
factionalized and coming apart. One of its
factions is espousing a more tolerant view of
Spain and of the Spanish State. At this moment
a few men of good sense are in the process of
writing a manifesto of separation. They declare
themselves to be avid supporters of the Basque
language and the cultural life of the Basque
people, but they are willing to live within
Spain and even some say that they are among
the erstwhile supporters of the king. They
are about to form a fuerista party similar to
the one that existed before. This turn of
events is a return to an ancient cause. 183
The same writer also makes the interesting insight regarding
Basque nationalism by indicating that one of the reasons
for the slow development of Basque nationalism was the fact
that it had not been suppressed enough;
183joaqUin Adan, La obra pogtuma de Joaquin Adan
(Bilbao: Editorial Vizcaina, 1938), p. 102.
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Basque nationalism is the least persecuted
of all nationalisms. It has not been enter-twined with religious struggles and neither hasit been subjected to the sword, such as the Irishcase. The reactions of the public authorities
nad consisted in the mere closure of a few
clubs, censure of a few publications, and a few
shots by the security guards. 184
This shift in attitude was not acceptable to all members
of the Party and to the youth organizations. These
developments led to another schism within the Party; but
this time it was led by the ideological purists under the
leadership of Sabino Arena's brother, Luis de Arana, who
had helped to found the Partldo ftaclonallsta Vasco .185
Since Primo de Riverain disbanded all political organizations
during his dictatorship, not very much is known about the
political activities of both groups during the 1920»s,
although they continued their propaganda campaign at a
different level through cultural organizations.
The social and political disentegratlon which seemed
to have been taking place within Spain was brought to a halt
10
*Ib±d.. p. 103.
185Lui s de Arana Goiri, Formulorio de los prlnclpios
esenciales v baslcos del prlmltivo nacionallsmo vasco .
contenldos en el lema Jaun-Golkua eta Lagi-Zarra ( Bilbao:
Artes Graficas Grijelrao, S.A., 1932.)
186p or a brief discussion of the Union Patrlotica .
Primo de Rivera •s party, see Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to
Movimiento-Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the
Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Samuel P. Huntingdon and
Clement H. Moore (eds.) Authoritarian Politics in Modern
Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 131.
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along with all political activities In 1923. On September 13
of that year General Primo de Rivera led a successful
coup d'etat which brought the regime which had governed
Spain since the Restoration to an end. Subsequently, all
political parties were dissolved along with all the
provincial deputations. The only political organization
allowed to function was the Union Patrfnt|^ founded by the
supporters of Primo de Rivera. Although the Basque
provincial deputations were dissolved, along with the
deputations of the other provinces, he kept the conciertp
ecQn9ff»lco *« « result of which he received the support of
the Basque industrialists.
Paradoxical as it might seem, and judging from the
events of 1931, Basque nationalism seemed to have flourished
under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Although he
forbade the publication of nationalist periodicals and
newspapers, apparently he closed his eyes to their cultural
activities. It was during his regime that the Basque
language was given recognition by the Real Academla Espanola .
Because political manifestations of Basque nationalism were
not allowed, the nationalists concentrated their efforts in
religious and cultural festivities. Theatrical groups such
as Naski travelled throughout the region performing Basque
plays; and Plstkundla . a publishing house devoted exclusively
to Basque publications, was also founded.
I
8? This is a tactic
Venero, op. cit., p. 444.
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which was adopted years later under the Franco regime.
The growth of nationalism In the Basque region proceeded
simultaneously with efforts at cultural revival. As we
recall, Arana himself had started his nationalistic
activities by immersing himself In philological studies.
It must be emphasized, however, that many of those engaged
in the efforts to revive Basque culture and language did
not necessarily share the political objectives of the
nationalists although they collaborated in this endeavour.
Starting with the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the Basque region experienced a romantic movement
which manifested itself in Basque historical studies with
the end result of mythologizing much of Basque history:
The country was experiencing a pseudo-
historic romantic movement which constructed
legendary traditions with supposed heroic
feats of the ancient Basques such as their
rivalry with the Romans but never conquered
by them, the feat of Roncevalles, medieval
horrors, and popular creeds. 188
The Basques were portrayed as a fiercely independent and
democratic people whose history had been one of persistent
struggle to preserve their independence and liberties. But
with the establishment of such scholarly journals as
La Revista Internacional de Estudios Vascos (1907), and
Eus^o-Folk lore (1923), Basque studies were put within a
188Luis Michelena, Historla de la Llteratura Vasca
(Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1960), p. 136. This work
discusses the historical development of Basque literature
both in Spain and France.
100
more rigorous setting.
This romantic movement had its precursor in the person
of Jose Maria Yparraguirre who, in the late 1850»s and early
1860«s, romanticized, in the form of popular songs, the loss
of the Basque fueros.*89 It must be added that this was
done with the support of the provincial deputations which
in the later years of his life gave him a pension.
This interest in the revival of Basque culture was
also shown by the governmental bodies of the region. In
1888, for example, the Piputacion de Vl2caya finally
created a chair of Basque studies, a project which had long
been discussed by Basque academicians. Resurreccion Maria
de Azkue, a doyen of Basque studies, particularly the
language, became the first catedratico . Both Miguel de
Unamuno and Sabino Arana applied for this position.
Judging from the short duration of the periodicals
which were founded during this period, ^0 ^t seems that the
sentiment to revive the language and the culture was not
widespread. Much of this effort and sentiment did not go
beyond academic circles. In contrast to the rise of
I 89yparraguirre wrote the Guernicacao Arbola (The Tree
of Guernica) --this is the tree under which the kings of
Castile used to take the oath to respect the Basque fueros--
which eventually became a national anthem for the Basques.
* 90Revlsta de Vlzcaya (Bilbao, 1885-1889): Revlsta
de las Provinelas Euskeras (Vitoria, 1878-1860); Revlsta
Euskera (Pamplona. 1878-1883); fcuska 1-erria (San Sebastion,
1880-1917).
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nationalism in Catalonia, Basque nationalism was not preceded
by a literary renaissance. And one of the early objectives
of the Party was precisely to do this: to get the Basques
to become more interested in speaking and writing euskera .
The pattern of the rise of Basque nationalism has not
followed very closely the pattern of other nationalist
movements. That is, first there is a cultural revival which
is later followed by political nationalism. 191
The efforts at cultural revival, as opposed to
political nationalism, was pursued by Basques on both sides
of the Spanish-French border. For example, at the Congreso
de Euskeristas Para La Unificacion de la Ortografia . held
on September 16, 1901, in Hendaya, Basques from both sides
of the border participated. Both sides were also present
at the founding of the Federacion de Literature Vasca .
November 8, 1901, to which the Canon of the Cathedral of
Bayonne was elected president and Sabino de Arana vice
president. This collaboration has continued down to the
present. It seems that the French region has produced a
richer literary tradition (in Basque) than the Spanish region. 192
191"ln most cases. • .the national revival began as a
purely cultural movement. •• .Elsewhere, nearly always the
first symptoms of the new age was an eager delving into
national history and philology, the collection of legends
and folk-lore, the compilation of grammars and textbooks."
C.A. iMacartney, National States and Rational Minorities
(London, 1934), p. 94.
192LUi, Michelena, "La Literatura en Lengua Vasca,"
La Gran Enciclopedia Vasca (Bilbao, 1968), p. 10.
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These efforts to revive the culture culminated in
1918 when the deputations of the Basque provinces, with the
help and support of the PNV sponsored the First Congress of
Basque Studies held at Onate. Although nationalists were
present at this congress, the participants consisted of
people of diverse political leanings. 193 ^ congress wa8
honored with the presence of Alfonso XIII who was; named
honorary president of the governing board. From this
congress the Socledad de Sstudlos Vascos and the Academia
de la Lengua Vaaca emerged.
Viewed retrospectively, the Basque culture was too far
gone for a successful resuscitation. In the words of Carr
as late as the 1930' 8—and one might add up to now—Basque
nationalism had "produced no literature even remotely
comparable with that of the Catalan Renaissance. "194 This
is not to mean that there are no literary figures in the
Basque region. On the contrary, the Basque region has
produced much literature; but most of it written in Spanish.
Pio Baroja, has written profusely about the Basques, but all
of it in Spanish. Both Unamuno and Maeztu, titans of the
193 prlmer congreso de Estudlos Vascos . (Bilbao:
Bilbaina de Artes Graficas, 1919). It was one of the main
objectives of this congress to place the study of the Basque
language on a more "scientific" level. A list of 774
persons attending this congress reveals that most of them
were from urban centers and middle class background.
Reading the papers presented at this congress one gets the
impression that the feeling of Basque identity was quite
strong.
l^Carr, op. clt .. p. 556.
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generation of »98, wrote their works in Spanish.
Although Basque nationalism found followers among some
Carllsts and persons from Carlist families—Arana* s family
had supported the Carlist wars«--it was essentially a new
radical political force in the Basque region. As we saw in
our discussion of Carllsmo . it did not advance political
separatism from Spain. It was essentially a conservative
movement trying to preserve the traditional Institutional
arrangements of the Spanish Monarchy and thus, preserve
the traditional Basque local liberties, a phenomenon which
had also occurred in other European countries when
modernization and state centralization got under way. In
contradistinction to Basque nationalism, Carlismo can
properly be called a regional movement which presupposes
the existence of the larger Spanish nation. In a way
the fuerlstas had a double nationalism: one Spanish and
one Basque. 1^5 The fuerlstas , while very much suspicious
of the power of the central government, and also concerned
with the preservation of the Basque language, nevertheless,
objected to the political objectives of the nationalists.
Among representatives of the fuerlsta view, one finds
Victor Pradera, an avid defender of the traditional
195it should be pointed out that many Spaniards make
a distinction between "la patria chica" and "la patrla
grande". The former refers to the region and the latter
to the whole of Spain. But, as many Spaniards say, in many
cases the "patria Chica" is the one that counts.
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prerogatives of the provinces; but who, at the same time,
persistently castigated the political doctrine of the
nationalists and their vitriolic attacks on Spain. To the
Carlists the political unity of Spain was not in question.
All in all there is no question that sentiment for
some degree of autonomy continued to exist in the Basque
region. However, not all such sentiment could be labelled
nationalistic for the reasons discussed above.
CHAPTER IV
BASQUE NATIONALISM AND THE
SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC 1931-1939
With the resignation of General Primo de Rivera on
January 28, 1930, as dictator of Spain, and the subsequent
proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic on April 14
,
1931, a new era in Spanish politics began. This era offered
new possibilities to Basque nationalism since the political
freedom of the new republic would allow the nationalists to
openly proselytize for their cause. Apparently Basque
nationalism had suffered less under the dictatorship of Primo
de Rivera than might have been expected. No sooner had the
Republic been proclaimed than the nationalists immediately
began to mobilize their forces and to discuss the possibility
of demanding a statute of autonomy from the new government
and immediately assumed that the new Republic would be
federal. In order to mobilize their supporters, the
nationalists called for a rally to take place in Guernica
on April 17, 1931. But the new government forbade such a
rally for fear that the Basques might follow the example
of the Catalans who, under the leadership of Francisco
Macia, had proclaimed a Catalan State (April 14) within the
Spanish Republic.
On April 19, 1931, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco
issued a manifesto recognizing and supporting the Republic
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and expressing the aspirations of the Basque municipalities
for the restitution of their traditional liberties. 196 It
was expected that the new regime would be more responsive
to the demands for autonomy than the previous governments,
under the monarchy. But it later became apparent that the
new regime was almost as reluctant as the governments of the
monarchy to hand out statutes of autonomy. Furthermore,
while Article II of the constitution of the Republic made
provisions for regional autonomy, 197 which if applied to
all regions or provinces would lead to a federal republic,
the new republicans were as unwilling as their predecessors
to recognize the Basques as a nation. It must also be
noted that the leadership of the PN"V did not call for
outright independence either but for autonomy within the
Spanish Republic. But one may conjecture that autonomy was
only a step in the direction of eventual political independence.
Jose Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, a young lawyer from
an industrialist family of Bilbao who had been elected mayor
of the town of Guecho during the April 12, 1931, municipal
196For a copy of the text see Venero, op. cit .. p. 478.
197The constitution of the Second Spanish Republic was
promulgated on December 9, 1931. Article II read as follows:
"If one or several contiguous provinces with common
historical, cultural, and economic characteristics agree to
organize as an autonomous region, in order to form a
political and administrative nucleus within the Spanish
State, they shall present their charter according to the
provisions of Article 12." For a collection of Spanish
constitutions see Arnold Verduin (ed.), Manual of Spanish
Constitutions 1808-1931 (Ypsilandi, Michigan: University
of Lithoprinters, 1941).
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elections, assumed leadership of Basque nationalism with the
advent of the Republic. Aguirre had a long record of social
activism and was popularly known as a leading soccer
player in the Basque region. He had founded the Socledad
Eusko-Ma^tesupa (Basque Youth Organization) and was former
president of the influential Acclon Catolica de Vizcaya .198
His religiosity and social work with the Catholic
organizations of the region undoubtedly made him a strategic
candidate to lead Basque nationalism for he probably had
more contacts with the clergy of the region—in the Basque
country very close to the parishoners and respected by them
(in contrast to most of Spain)—than any of the other
leading members of the Party, and thus, maintaining the
Party's identification with the Church.
Under his leadership, the Party initiated an intensive
campaign in order to bring Navarra under the orbit of
Basque nationalism. Several meetings and rallies were
held in Navarra in order to popularize nationalism in that
province. Aguirre chose Navarra as his electoral district
when he campaigned for the constituent Cortes of 1931.
Despite these efforts, Navarra continued to be the home
base of Carlismo . But the fear that the new Cortes might
be composed of a leftist majority which within the context
of Spanish politics would mean an avalanche of anticlerical-ij
198 For a short bibliography on Aguirre see Pedro de
Basaldua, En Defensa de la Verdad (Buenos Airess Editorial
Vasca Ekin, 1956).
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motivated the Carlists to join the nationalists in an
electoral alliance for the coming general elections. In
return the nationalists were able to elicit support for an
autonomy statute.
After these initial agreements, the Society of Basque
Studies was entrusted with the responsibility of writing
up the proposal for Basque autonomy which was later approved
at an assembly of Basque municipalities held in Estella
(the old Carlist capital) on June 16, 1931.199 The carlists
accepted this proposal with less than rampant enthusiasm.
While the nationalists viewed the coming elections for the
Cortes as a plebescite for or against the formation of a
Basque state, the Navarrese looked upon the statute as a
•'Catholic-fuerista coalition for the defense of the high
interests of the Church, full restitution of the fueros .
and the statute which Navarra may approve. "200 as a
concession to the Carlists, an article was included in the
proposed statute stipulating that within the Basque region
relations between Church and State would be governed by a
Concordat to be negotiated by the Basque provinces and the
Vatican, Furthermore, all the educational institutions of
the Basque country would pass under the complete control
l"This statute became known as the Estatuto Genera^
del Estado Vasco . For a copy see Venero. op. cit .. p. 639.
200jO8e Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, Entre la llbertad
v la revolucion 1930-1935 (Bilbao: Verdes, n.d.), p. 92.
109
of the Basque provinces. This aspect of the proposed
statute, which later became a point of contention between
the central government (composed of a republican-socialist
coalition) and the Basques, aroused the anticlerical feelings
of the socialists who felt that "Spain (could) not tolerate
the territory /the Basque countrv7 turning itself into a
Vaticanist Gibraltar ."201
The general elections for the constituent Cortes
(June 16, 1931) produced a republican-socialist majority.
These elections also produced a relative success for the
nationalists. Out of 17 seats in the Basque country, they
captured 13. 202 The other four remaining seats were split
201E1 Socialista . June 30, 1931. It seems that
earlier Indalecio Prieto, the leader of the Socialists of
Bilbao, had indicated that only the Leftists regions would
be given autonomy. See Juan de Iturralde (Padre Juan de
Usabiaga is the real name), £1 catollclsmo v la cruzada de
Franco (Bayonne, France j Editorial Egui-lndarra
,
1956), 1, p. 60.
202Composition of the Constituent Cortes elected June, 1931:
Party Seats
PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party) 105
Esquerra (Catalan Left) 34
Accion Republicena 24
Organi. Regional Gallega Autonoma (Orga) 14
Radical Socialists 50
Republicans on different coalitions 62
Partido Federal 10
Progresistas 8
Intellectuals at the service of the Republic 10
Derecha Republicana 13
Republicano Liberal Democrata 2
Derecha Liberal Republicana 6
Partido Radical 70
Lliga Regional! sta (Catalan Right) 2
Partido Nacionalista Vasco 13
Independents of the Center-Right and Right 13
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between republicans and socialists. These elections also
indicated that the nationalists had displaced the Carlist
influence from both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. Neither one of
these provinces voted for traditionalist candidates. And
in Navarra, Agulrre was elected.
Two days before the opening of the Cortes, the
nationalist-traditionalist group held a rally in the town
of Guernica (the symbol of Basque liberties) where the
nationalists made a pledge to fight for the autonomy of
Euzkadl within the Cortes. Among the deputies elected to
the Cortes was Canon Antonio Pildain from Guipuzcoa who
at this meeting referred to the Basque country as the
"Irelanda de Occidente" and to Aguirre as their 0»Connell.203
Among the first items to be discussed by the constituent
Cortes, which started its first session on July 14, 1931, was
an old and sensitive question in Spanish politics: namely,
the position of the Catholic Church in Spanish society.
When Article 26 of the new constitution came before the floor
Agrarlos 24
Accion Nacional 3
Renovacion Espanola 2
Tradicionalistas (Carlists) 2
Unidentified 3
Total 470
Source: Juan Linz, "The Party System in Spain: Past and
Future", p. 260. Cited in the previous chapter.
203Quoted in Richard A. H. Robinson, The Origins of
of Franco's Spain 1931-1936 (Pittsburg: University of
Pittsburg Press, 1970).
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for debate, the first fury within the new Cortes took
place. According to this Article the Catholic Church would
lose all the privileges that it had enjoyed under the
monarchy. The traditional government budget for the Church
would be eliminated within two years, religious orders would
have to register as any other secular organizations and
would be allowed only as much property as required for their
survival. Furthermore, Church property would be taxed and
the educational activities of the Church would cease.
This issue brought the Basques into the first conflict
with the new government. Because of their intense
opposition to this Article, the Basque deputies were labelled
by their fellow deputies as "cavemen". 20^ In the Basque
region there were some demonstrations against the new
government; and the Basque press, most of which was in
Catholic hands, launched a virulent attack on the government
for which the government suspended most of the newspapers.
The Basque deputies walked out of the Cortes.
The proposed statute for autonomy was finally presented
to the government by a Basque delegation in September 1931.
The religious clause in that document was not acceptable to
the government which appointed a committee to revise it.
The revised statute, ready by January of 1932, omitted the
possibility of a Basque concordat with the Vatican and gave
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the central government greater control In the areas of
public education. 205 ^ traditionalists immediately refused
to accept the revised document which they referred to as
"Godless*1
.
The traditionalist press proceeded to attack
it and offered 5,000 pesetas to any person who could find
the name of God mentioned in it. 206 The gap between the
trcditiona lists and the nationalists was further widened
when the members of the old Integralist Party and the
Car lists met in Pamplona on January 6, 1932, and joined
forces to defend the Church and traditional Spain. As a
result of this meeting, the Comunion Tradlclonallsta Carllsta
emerged which supported restitution of the fueros but
rejected the idea of a single statute for the Basque region
207for that was considered a contra fuero . Nevertheless,
despite their opposition to the statute, at a meeting of
Basque municiplaities held in Kavarra on January 31 to
decide as to whether or not a single statute was acceptable
to all the provinces, a majority of the Navarrese municipalities
2°5xhe article regarding the Concordat with the Vatican
contradicted Article 26 of the Spanish constitution which
read as follows: "All religious denominations shall be
considered associations subject to special laws. The state,
regions, provinces, and municipalities may not maintain,
favour, and subsidize financially, churches or religious
associations and institutions." Verduin, op. cit .. p. 88.
206Aguirre, Entre la llbertad v la revolucion . p. 93;
Iturralde, 1, p. 242.
207 Sant tago Galindo de Herrero, Los Partidos Monarquicos
fla-lo la Segunda Republica . (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1956;,
pp. 129-131.
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decided for a single statute. 208
Meanwhile, the traditionalists continued their campaign
to change Navarrese opinion to vote against the statute.
In order to counteract the propaganda of the traditionalists,
the Navarrese deputation issued a statement on June 6
asking the municipalities to accept the statute and indicating
that there was no reason to fear the loss of the traditional
personality of Navarra.209 The subsequent vote taken on
June 16, 1932, to approve the statute, revealed that the
traditionalists had been able to change the opinion of a
substantial number of municipalities. When the municipalities
gathered in Pamplona to take a vote on the statute, they
encountered such slogans as " Fueros . yes I Estatute, no I"
The leader of the integra lists, Juan de Alazabal, referred
to the nationalists thus: "Oh, if St. Peter the Apostle
were living in these times, what epistles he would write
against certain Catholics. M 21° When a vote was finally
taken, the Navarrese municipalities rejected the statute by
a vote of 123 to 109 while 35 municipalities abstained. It
was approved overwhelmingly by the municipalities of Vizcaya
208^^^ Ignacio del Burgo, Orlgen y Fundamento del
Regimen Forgi de Kavarra (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi,
1968), p. 472. This work gives a very extensive discussion
of the legal relationship between the Spanish State and
Navarra up to the present.
209ibid.
2 l°Quoted in Robinson, op P cit .„ p. 92.
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and Guipuzcoa while only 51 of the municipalities of Aleve
accepted it with 15 abstaining and 11 voting against it. 211
Making a comparison again with Ireland, the nationalist
Manuel Irujo Olio referred to Navarra as their Ulster. 212
Despite the rejection of the statute by the Navarrese,
the nationalists had made substantial inroads into Navarra
which had remained in the periphery of Basque nationalism.
Without the acquiescence of Navarra, some of the municipalities
of Alava began to manifest doubt regarding the acceptance of
a single statute for it was feared that without Navarra
Alava would become a satellite of the two richer industrial
provinces. Consequently, on June 26 a traditionalist Alavese
deputy, Jose L. Oriol y Uriguren, called a meeting of
Alavese mayors to discuss the implications of the statute
and explain the reasons for Alava' s reluctance to accept
it.213 xhe Carlists concentrated their propaganda efforts
on Alava in order to wrest control of that province from
the nationalists. Along with the Monarchists they also
launched a vituperative campaign against the nationalists
and in August of 1932 produced a document revealing a
Nationalist-Communist-Jewish-Masonic plot to destroy the
Catholic Church. 21^ The PNV was able to get the help of
See Table in the Appendix.
212Joaquin Arraras, Hlstorla de la Segunda Republlca
Espanola (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1964), 1, p. 388.
213Quoted in Ibid, , p. 388.
214R0binson, op. clt .. p. 146.
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the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona to indicate that the
document had no foundation. This marked the end of the
coalition between the nationalists and the Navarrese,
although there were substantial supporters of nationalism
within Navarra. Under the circumstances, Aguirre decided
that the association with the traditionalists was more of a
burden than a benefit, and consequently, proceeded to
organize to hold a plebescite with or without Navarra.
When the government approved a statute of autonomy for
Catalonia in September of 1932, the nationalists felt
confident that a Basque statute would soon also be granted.
Since they had lost the support of the traditionalists,
the nationalists now concentrated in maintaining a good
rapport with the government in Madrid. But the political
ideologies and factions within parliament and the Basque
region were such that the nationalists were bound to get
into conflict with the government. If they became too close
to the traditionalists, they would invite the displeasure
of the government in Madrid. On the other hand, if they
became too close to the central government, the traditionalists
would accuse them of supporting a government dedicated to
the destruction of the Catholic Church. Consequently, when
the municipal elections of April of 1933 were held, the
nationalists decided to campaign alone and won twice as
many seats as the other parties.
Meanwhile, another event occurred which once again
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brought the Basque region, along with the PNV, into conflict
with the central government. In May of 1933, the Cortes
passed the Law of Congregations which would implement
Article 26 of the constitution. As a result of this law,
all Church property would be nationalized, although the
Church could continue to make use of it, Catholic secondary
education would cease by October of that year and all
Catholic primary educatiion would cease in the following
December. As might have been expected, this caused
tremendous consternation among Catholic groups. Allegedly
some bishops had threatened to excommunicate those deputies
who voted for the law but were dissuaded from such action
by the papal nuncio, Bishop Tedeschini. 2 *5 The Catholic
deputies published a manifesto, signed by the Basque
deputies, calling "all citizens of good faith who view
with deep sadness the ruin of their country, irresponsibly
managed by foreign powers of the Masonic sects and the
Socialist International. "216 This was followed by a
pastoral letter issued by the Spanish bishops to remind
the faithful that attendance at lay schools was contrary to
canon law. On June 3, Pope Pius XI issued an Encyclical,
Dllectissimi ftobls . asking all the Catholics to oppose the
2l5Qa <br^e i Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil
War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965),
p. 106.
216£1 Debate . June 4, 1933.
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law by "all the legitimate means which Natural Law and
(civil) legislation allow them," and exhorting them to
support Catholic Action (Acclon Catolica) "for the defense
of the Faith and to ward off the dangers which threaten
civil society." Catholics began to organize to boycott
lay schools. 217 Thls put the Bafique natlonallst8 lntQ a
difficult position. Morally and in view of the position of
the Vatican, they had no choice but to oppose the government.
From a political view point they would have alienated large
segments of the Basque population had they not protested
against this legislation. While they could use this issue
to mobilize the Basque population behind them at the same
time they could alienate that very same Cortes majority
from who they would need approval in order to get autonomy.
At any rate, within the Cortes they were in the forefront
amongst those protesting against the Law of Congregations.
According to the Basques, the law not only violated
their consciences, but was also an infringement on Basque
liberties. To them the educational concept of the republican
state, as manifested in the Law of Congregations, was one
of etatisme and therefore "pure facism".218 on this issue
there was solidarity between the traditionalists and the
nationalists. To the nationalists, and the clergy
2l7 Ibld .. July 1, 1933.
218Debates de Seciones de las Cortes Constituventes
(DSCC), March 29, 1933. The Library of Congress has
twenty- five volumes.
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supporting them, the recent religious legislation convinced
them that the need for Basque autonomy was greater than
ever. The uniform applicability of this law throughout
Spain was simply a new form of centralization. 219
Nevertheless, they were willing to work with the government
for some kind of negotiated solution regarding the Basque
provinces. 220 Xhe traditionalists on the other hand were
ready and willing to take up arms against the laic republic.
As a result of the recent religious legislation, some of
the traditionalists were once again willing to collaborate
with the nationalists for the coming general elections
(November 19, 1933) for the Cortes. The traditionalist,
Jose Maria de Urquijo owner of the Gaceta del Norte
r
had
approached the nationalists on this question and promised
them that he would call off the traditionalist propaganda
in A lava and support the efforts for the piebescite on the
condition that the nationalists form a Catholic coalition
with the traditionalists for the coming elections. The
nationalists refused this approach for they feared that it
***It seems that for some members of the Basque clergy
nationalism had become a means to preserve the religiosity
of the Basque country. For example, in 1932 a priest had
written to Aguirre to tell him that there was "no redemption
save nationalism", and another one had written: "You must
not abandon your leadership of the Basque Israel for which
God has appointed you." Iturralde, I, or. clt .. p. 426.
220xhe Basque nationalists were confronted with a
paradoxical situation. Ideologically the PNV belonged on
the Right, but yet it was from the Left that they expected
a statute of autonomy.
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might dilute their support to the advantage of the
traditionalists. Moreover, the results of the municipal
elections of April of that year had made them pretty
confident that they could stand alone. The traditionalists,
subsequently, continued their campaign against the
plebiscite and helped to spread the rumor that it would be
unlawful for a Catholic to vote for a statute given by the
laic republic for this action would be tantamount to
recognizing the legitimacy of an anticlerical government.
Bishop Mateo Mugica of Vitoria was finally asked to decide
on this issue—in 1932 the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona
had been approached on this question but they remained
neutral--and declared that there was no incompatibility
between voting for the statute and protesting against the
Law of Congregations. In order to allay the fears of his
parishoners, Bishop Mugica was one of the first voters to
vote for the statute on November 5, 1933.221 This act,
which could not be interpreted other than a political act,
was highly resented by the Carlists who later, after the
war began in 1936, harrassed him and had him under virtual
house arrest in his episcopal palace.
Despite opposition by the socialists who asked their
voters to abstain and the advice of the traditionalists to
their followers to vote against the statute, and their
221\/enero, op. cit .. p. 533.
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allegations suggesting that the statute would be harmful to
the Basque economy, 222 the results produced a victory for
the nationalists. Out of a total electorate of 489,887
voters, 411,756 approved the statute, 14,196 voted against
it, and 63,935 abstained. Again overwhelming support had
come from Vizcays and Guipuzcoa where the electorate
approved the statute by 88.4 per cent and 89.7 per cent
majorities. In Alava only 46 per cent voted for it, while
11 per cent voted against and 43 per cent abstained. 223
The general elections of November 19, 1933, had
produced a Center-Right majority in the new Cortes. 224
Although the nationalists lost one seat in these elections,
they remained large enough (12) to form a minority within
the Cortes. With a majority in the new Cortes ideologically
close to them, plus the results of the plebiscite, the
nationalists felt confident that the new government would
finally grant the statute of autonomy. It soon became
apparent that the new Cortes in which the CEDA2 25 gr0up had
a majority was not willing to discuss regional autonomy
222Arrara8, II, op. clt .. p. 264.
223rvhite Paper of the Basque Government, (Paris, 1956)
p. 39. See also Arnold Toynbee, "The Spanish Background of
the War in Spain," Survey of International Affairs , Vol. 2,
1937, p. 40.
224see Robinson, op. clt .. p. 149.
225cEDA stands for Confederacion Espanola de Derechas
Autonomas led by Gil Robles.
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but instead wanted to stop the political disintegration of
Spain. The committee appointed by the Cortes to study
the results of the Basque plebiscite proposed another
plebiscite on the grounds that Alava's majority did not
meet the constitutional requirement of a 2/3 majority.
The nationalists opposed the idea of another plebiscite
and interpreted Alava»s abstentions as support for autonomy. 226
But by April of 1934, the committee in charge of the statute
(with a Rightist majority) blocked further action on that
question. For all intents and purposes, the Basque statute
for autonomy was buried in the new Cortes from whom the
nationalists had expected a better reception. Gil Robles,
the leader of CEDA, although willing to grant some kind of
administrative autonomy, viewed political autonomy as out
of the question. 227 As a result of this new turn of
events, the nationalists began to look to the Left and
indicated that they would not support the new government.
In the meantime, political life in Spain was becoming
further radicalized and polarized between Right and Left.
There was great fear and uncertainty as to the political
future of Spain. The Left was disappointed and embittered
over the fact that it had lost its majority. Their
bitterness was reinforced with the actions of the new Cortes.
226DSCC, February 8, 9, 1934.
227J. M. Gil Robles, "The Spanish Republic and Basque
Independence," The Tablet . June 19, 1937, pp. 876-877.
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No sooner had the new Cortes met than the new majority
began to modify and repeal some of the legislation of the
previous Cortes. The Law of Congregations was ignored and
the Church schools continued to operate. Agrarian reform
which had been Initiated under the constituent Cortes came
to a standstill. Agricultural wages were reduced. Some
of the property of the orders which had been confiscated
by the previous government was restored to the Church.
General Sanjurjo, who had plotted to overthrow the Republic
in 1932, was acquitted by the new Cortes. To the Left
these actions made it appear as though a Right-wing coup was
in the offing or that Spain might follow the example of
Germany where the legislature had voted a dictator into
power. Consequently, the Left now began to think in terms
of revolutionary activity. Largo Caballero, the leader of
the Socialist Party who had participated in the previous
government, was being impelled by his followers to think
in terms of revolutionary rather than evolutionary change.
(Caballero had collaborated with Primo de Rivera during the
1920* s). The relative peace which had existed in Spain
between 1931 and 1933 began to give way to violent acts
such as assassinations, demonstrations, and strikes.
Frequent shoot-outs between different political groups were
not uncommon in the streets of major cities. Arrests of
Leftist deputies were also not uncommon on the grounds that
they were collaborating in the strikes and inciting rebellion
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Consequently, the Right, too, began to believe that Spain
was In the throes of a Bolshevik revolution. This fear was
reinforced when in October of 1934 the mine workers of
Asturias rebelled and took over that province. Within a
few days this rebellion was crushed by army units under the
command of Franco.
Although the leadership of the PNV had indicated that
it would not use violence in order to get autonomy, by
1934 some segments within the Party were willing to resort
to violence. One such group was known as the aberrianos
led by Gallestegui, the leader of the Mendjgoltzales .
a mountain-climbing group which was turning itself into
a para-military organization. While the leadership of the
Party kept its affiliate organizations under control, by
1934 they, too, were beginning to manifest a new degree of
militancy towards the governments procrastination regarding
Basque autonomy. During the summer of 1934, the Basques
and the government came into deadlock over the question of
taxation. The government was going to introduce a Law of
Municipalities which would regulate taxation throughout
Spain. If this law were applied to the Basque region, the
local towns 1 taxes ( consumos ) on wines would be abolished
depriving many Basque municipalities of one of their
228f0r a discussion of the issues that confronted the
Second Spanish Republic see Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish
Revolution (New York: W.W. Morton and Co., 1970).
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primary sources of revenue. 229 To the Ba8ques ma wfls a
violation of their traditional privileges regulated by the
concerto economj.co, which, in their view, the government
could not modify or change without their consent.
Legislation regarding taxation would have to be negotiated
between the central government and representatives of the
provincial deputations. The Basques decided to hold elections
in order to elect delegations to go to Madrid to negotiate
with the government on this issue. The government reacted
by forbidding such elections and sent troops to Bilbao,
Vitoria, and San Sebastian to make sure that no elections
would take place. Some towns, however, defied the government
and held elections as originally planned. Subsequently, the
government ordered the arrest of several mayors. Government
troops occupied some town halls and some roads were blocked
to prevent the nationalists from the several provinces from
meeting and planning demonstrations. Even the Basque
parliamentary deputies were harrassed by the police.
The gap between the Basque nationalists and the Right
continued to widen, and the Left, particularly the
Republicans and the Socialists, now began to support the
Basques in order to get their support. Indaleclo Prieto,
the leader of the socialists of Bilbao, who not too long
229Jackson, pp. clt .. p. 141.
230Arrara8> n 9 pp. clt .. p. 389.
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before (1933) had exhorted his followers not to vote for^the
autonomy statute, now became an avid supporter of the Basque
nationalists. At a meeting of the PNV held in San Sebastian
on November 11, 1934, members of Leftist groups were
present and gave their "total support to the autonomist
movement of the Basque municipalities and to the attainment
of the statute as a solution to all problems, if the
nationalists participated in the revolution, deemed
necessary, "231
In return Aguirre declared that In case the Right
tried to impose a dictatorship or to reinstitute the
Monarchy, "the Basque Nationalist Party would oppose those
institutions with all Its strength; and if the occasion
should arise," he said, the Party would take "measures to
meet the circumstances of the moment, "232
The Leftists were not very satisfied with such an
equivocal stand. While Leftist groups seemed ready to take
up arms against the government, the Basque nationalist
leadership would not go beyond committing itself to defend
the existing Republic, The association of the nationalists
with elements of the Left was not welcomed by all members
of the Party, a fact which caused some dlssention.
Consequently, In October of 1934 a group of Alavese
nationalists broke away from the Party and formed the
231 ibld ,. p. 401
232ibld.
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Pcrecha Autonoma v»s,cf
Increasingly the nationalist* seemed to be taking a
position of aloofness from the great Issues disturbing
Spanish politics. In the course of an Interview with the
m. of Madrid on June 13, 1934, Aguirre had declared that
the Basques were "neither with the Left nor the Right;
L they_7 were simply autonomists." And when In the fall
of 1934 Spain was afflicted with a series of strikes,
Aguirre told the government that the Party would not
encourage rebellion "but neither would JTitJ lift a finger
to help the government. 233 The seeming Indifference of the
nationalists as to what was happening within Spain elicited
such hostility from CEDA to the point that Calvo Sotelo
and Aguirre came to blows within the Cortes In October 1934.
From this point onwards the hostility Increased. As of
1934, It had become clear to the nationalists that a statute
of autonomy granted by the Right was out of the question.
In the meantime the CEDA group was trying to gain adherents
within the Basque region by concentrating on the defense of
the concfl.erto economic
o
and helping to spread the rumor
that a statute of autonomy would be disastrous to the Basque
economy. This hostility from the CEDA group had the
attendant result of pushing the PNV further to the Left
from which it expected a better hearing and a political
solution for the Basque provinces.
Robinson, op. cit .. p. 191.
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The continuing shift to the Right by the Cortes majority
led President Alcala-Zamora to call for new elections with
the expectation that a moderate majority would be produced,
a majority which might be able to govern the country and
acceptable to both the Right and the Left. Contrary to
Alcala-Zamora' s expectations, the new elections produced
another extremist majority. The Popular Front, consisting
of Socialists, the Republican Left, the Republican Union,
and the Communists, which was formed for the purpose of
campaigning for these elections, won a majority of the
seats. Out of a total of 453 seats, the Popular Front
controlled 257 seats234_.more tnan wnat ^ t needed in order
to control the Cortes.
Although the PNV had indicated support for the Popular
Front, which in its election campaign had promised autonomy
for the regions, the Party decided to run independently of
both Right and Left. But the PNV lost two seats in Bilbao,
thus ending up with a total of 10 seats.
This new majority produced panic on the Right. The
Cortes of February 1936, following the behaviour of the
Cortes elected in the fall of 1933, began to modify and
repeal some of the acts of the previous government. Among
the first acts of the new government was a decree of general
amnesty setting free those put into prison for political
234
f
or a discussion of the Popular Front elections
see Jackson, op. cit .. pp. 184-195.
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reasons. Approximately 30,000 political prisoners were
*\ <j e
set free. Among these prisoners were a great number of
Socialists and Anarchists who decided to take the law into
their own hands by shooting those whom they thought
responsible for their arrests. In Southwestern Spain the
euphoria produced by the new majority led the peasants to
seize lands and engage in Church burning, not an uncommon
incident in Southern Spain. To the Right these incidents
brought back memories of the Asturias strike of 1934 when
the workers seized the province. According to Hugh Thomas,
"it now seemed /""to the middle cla8S_7 that almost anything,
even a military dictatorship, was preferable to the
continuation of the present political disintegration. "236
Consequently, the army was asked by some leaders of the
Right, among them Gil Robles, to declare martial law.
Franco supposedly approached the Prime Minister, Porte la
Valladares, to ask him to declare a state of emergency
and prevent the Left from assuming power.
The actions of the government against Right-wing generals,
in the form of early retirement or transferals alienated that
very same group which might have been able to keep order in
235jackson, OPf clt .. p. 181.
236Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York:
Harper and Row, 1961), p. 81. For other accounts of the
civil war see Frank Jellinek. The Civil War in Spain
(London: Victor Gallancz, 1938); Franz Borkenau, The
Spanish Cockpit (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
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the Republic. The plot, which had been planned by General
Sanjurjo who was in exile in Portugal; General Mola in
charge of the troops in Pamplona; and Generals Goded,
Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano came to its fruition on
July 18, 1936, when the insurrection, with the support of
Right-wing groups, began. 237 This led to the Spanish Civil
War which lasted until 1939.
Although on July 19 Euzkadj. indicated the support of
the Basque nationalists for the Republic in "la lucha
entre la ciudadania y el fascismo," there was disagreement
amongst the nationalists as to the exact course that the
Basques should follow and the nature of their support for
the Republic. Some were of the opinion that the Basques
should declare their independence while others, such as
Luis Arana, brother of the founder of Basque nationalism,
maintained that the Basques should concentrate on defending
themselves!
The Basque nationalists should not unite
with the Spanish democrats nor with the
dictatorial ones but concentrate in assuming
command of Vizcaya, and in the rest of the
Basque country, in order to maintain peace.
The others should take care of themselves
and the Basques should take care of the Basques. "8
"'Thomas, op. cit .« p. 117.
238Quoted in Venero, op. clt .. p. 574. Throughout
the civil war, the Basques maintained their own army, the
Gudarls . When in September of 1936 Largo Caballero
suggested that the Basque provinces be united with
Santander for military purposes, the Basques refused:
"No tenemos mas remedio que protester energicamente y no
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It seems that the Republican government itself was not very
sure about the loyalty of the basques. Besides the fear
that the Basques might use the occasion to declare themselves
independent, there was also the fear that they might reach
some kind of an arrangement with the insurgents.
In order to make sure that the basques would continue
to support the Republic, in September 1936 Largo Caballero,
then Prime Minister, supposedly offered Aguirre a post in
his cabinet. The basques refused to accept a post in the
Republican government unless they were granted a statute of
autonomy. It is reported that an agreement was reached
whereby Aguirre would become Minister of Public Works in
return for a statute of autonomy. Aguirre allegedly refused
the post on the grounds that he disapproved of Communist
participation in the government. 239 Instead, Manuel de
lrujo, a basque nationalist from Guipuzcoa, became Minister
without portfolio. On October 1, 1936, the beleaguered
Republican government granted the basques autonomy. The
presence of a basque nationalist in the government emphasized
the support of the basques for the Republic.
By the time the statute was granted most of the basque
acceptarla, porque la demarcacion de guerra debe ser
Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava y Navarra (estas dos provincias
las consideramos objecto principal de nuestra conquista),
quedando Santander unido a As curias a qulen el ministro
de guerra espanol crea oportuno." Iturralde, II, p. 196.
239Venero, op. clt., p. 591.
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country had already fallen into Insurgent hands. Navarra,
where General Mo la had planned the insurrection with the
help of the Carllsts, was among the first places to initiate
the rebellion. In Alava the regiment of Vitoria took that
city on July 19 without any great efforts. By September
Guipuzcoa, in which a great deal of fighting took place,
had also fallen to the insurgents. The nationalists
evacuated this area and retreated to Vizcaya where they
fought until June 19, 1937. 240
After the statute of autonomy was granted, a General
Council for the Basque provinces, with representatives from
the three provinces which had approved the statute in the
plebiscite of November 1933, was formed and a Basque
government was formed with Aguirre as President ( lendakarl ).
It was a coalition government consisting of four nationalists,
one member from the Accion Naclonalista Vasca . three
Socialists, one Left Republican, and a Communist. 241 This
government mobilized the population of Vizcaya, kept order
in that province, and conducted the war against the Franco
forces* The Basque Autonomous government hastily improvised
a small array, the Gudarls . which was attended by a Corps of
Almoners consisting of a hundred priests. 242 on November 30
24°For an account of the Civil War in the Basque
provinces see George L. Steer, The Tree of Guernica
(London: Hodder and Staughton Ltd., 1938.)
241Venero, op. clt .. p. 599.
24 ? Le Clerge Basque . Paris 1938. This work gives an
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a Basque offensive was launched to take back Alava. The
Gudar
*r
8 equipped with antiquated artillery bought from the
Soviet Union, were no match for the forces of franco
supported by Italian troops and the German Condor Legion.
The only Basque offensive ended in a defeat. 243 ^ Ba8que
troops retreated back to Vizcaya where they put up a
successful resistance until June 19, 1937, when the Franco
forces overran that province. 244 After the fall of ViZCaya,
the Basque government retreated to the neighboring province
of Santander where it set up its own administration in
Santona and continued to fight until August. When the
account of the Basque clergy during the Civil War and
answers the charges brought against them by the Spanish
hierarchy.
2A3Luis Maria de Lojendio, Operaciones Ml 11tares de la
Guerra de Espana. 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1940), p. 244. See
also Steer, pp. clt . This is probably the best journalistic
account of the Basque provinces during the Civil War.
244on April 26, 1937, the German Air Force bombed the
old 3asque town of Guernica (symbol of Basque liberties)
and machlnegunned the population. This incident was given
extensive International coverage and motivated Picasso to
produce a painting, entitled "Guernica", dramatizing the
destruction of that town. It became a famous painting.
The clergy of the town wrote to the Vatican to describe the
senseless air bombing of the town. After unsuccessful
efforts to see the Pope, the two Basque priests who carried
the letter to Rome were finally given an audience with
Cardinal Pacelli who remarked that "The Church was
persecuted in Barcelona," and "showed them the door."
As a consequence of the bombing of Guernica,
"the Basque Government in exile attempted to bring a case
against Germany at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. The
attempt was unsuccessful, since no events which occurred
before 1939 were taken into account at Nuremberg."
Thomas, op. clt ., p. 420.
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situation had become hopeless, Juan de Axuriaguerra, leader
of the PNV since Aguirre had become president of Euzkadi .
negotiated a Basque surrender on August 22 with the
Italian troops under the command of General Mancini.245
As part of the surrender agreement, the Basques were
promised that they could evacuate the area and leave for
Prance on British ships that were waiting in the harbor of
Santona. On hearing this news, Franco's officers became
furious and immediately sent troops to the area to prevent
the escape of the Basques. Those that were already in the
ships were ordered to disembark and arrested. Aguirre had
already left by plane for Prance.
The support of the Basque clergy of the provinces of
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa for the Basque nationalists and,
consequently, for the Republic raised some moral questions
within the hierarchy of the Spanish Catholic Church. The
clergy of these provinces refused to obey the collective
letter of the Spanish Bishops (July 1, 1937) in which the
Spanish hierarchy explained the reasons for their support
of the insurgent forces, and reprimanded the Basque clergy
1M^«» P* 420. Aguirre has indicated that earlier
in 1937 Mussolini had suggested that the Basques surrender
to the Italian troops and that then a separate peace treaty
would be negotiated between the Basque government and the
Italians with the possibility of making Euzkadi a
protectorate of the Italian government. Aguirre referred
to this as a "picturesque proposal of an Italian
protectorate over the Basques." Jose Antonio de Aguirre y
Lecube, Escape via Berlin (New York: The Macmillan Co.,)
p» 52.
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for not having followed the "word of the Church. "246 The
Basque clergy maintained that its position was morally
sound since they had seen no reason to support a rebellion
against a lawfully instituted government. 247 The fact that
one of the most Catholic areas of Spain supported the
Republic was an embarrassing situation for the hierarchy
which maintained that it was fighting the forces of Bolshevism
As a consequence of their support for Basque nationalism,
members of the Basque clergy were later arrested, some were
shot, and some had to go into exile. 248 Eventually the
Primate of Spain, Cardinal Goma, intervened and asked
Franco to put a stop to these actions. One of the Basque
Bishops, Dr. Mateo Mugica, never signed the collective letter
and defended the position of the Basque clergy as a result
of which he was intimidated and threatened by the Carlists
who referred to him as a "red-separatist" .249 Be f°re the
war was over, he left Spain and went to France into exile.
The lack of prolonged resistance in Alava and the
support for the insurrection in Navarra did not necessarily
mean support for the Franco forces or that these provinces
had all of a sudden become indifferent to the question of
246Thomas, op. cit .. p. 450.
247The theological position^ of the Basques is discussed
in great depth in Iturralde, 11.
24Ssee Le Clerge Basque , pp. 94-107, and Inaki de
Aberrigoyen, Sept Mols and Sept Jours dans l'Espagne de
Franco (paris, 1938).
249jackson, pp. cit .. p. 377.
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local autonomy. On the contrary, once the insurrection
began, the Navarrese immediately started to take steps to
reinstitute their old fueros. The Navarrese were fighting
not to bring back the Alfonsine monarchy the legitimacy of
which they had never accepted nor to put Franco into power
but to reinstitute the monarchy of traditional Spain. 250
And by August of 1936 the deputacion foral of Navarra began
to take steps toward this end. "On August 11, 1936, the
Superior Committee on Education of Navarra, created by
Law 22 in 1828 of the Cortes of the Kingdom was established.
The deputation affirmed that it would pursue its announced
objectives to restore in its entirety the foral regime
insofar as it affected the organization of primary education
in Navarra ."251
This deputation had also formed some ambitious plans
for social and agricultural reform for which the Juntas de
Re forma Agraria v Re forma s Sociales had been created. But
in 1940 these were ordered to be dissolved and the anticipated
250i n a manifesto issued by Carlos Alfonso, June 29,
1934, emphasis was put on the traditional political
organization of Spain. He asked for the "establishment of
the traditional Monarchy with its essential characteristics:
catholic, frugal, federative, hereditary, and legitimate,
and consequently, fundamentally opposed to the liberal,
democratic, parliamentary, centralized, and constitutional
Monarchy. The federative affirmation implies the restoration
of ail the regions with their fueros . liberties, exemptions,
usages, and customs and the guarranty of the pase foral ."
This was a call for the return of the pre-1839 relationship
between the Spanish State and the regions. Quoted in
Galindo Herrero, pp. 240, 241.
251<jel Burgo, op. clt .. p. 475.
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reforms were never carried out. After the war, the
government In Madrid respected only the conclerto .rn.odrn
which had existed since 1876 and would not entertain any
further suggestions to reinstltute the traditional foral
regime: "The outcome of the three years of war and of the
subsequent reorganization of the machinery of the state
did not show any positive results. Only in the sphere of
primary education, thanks to the laborious efforts of the
Superior Committee on Education, did an authentic restitution
of the fueros take place. "252
The fact that the Navarrese fought with the Franco
forces has not made them any less suspicious of the power
of the central government. They have remained ever
suspicious of the power of the Madrid government and continue
to maintain that the law of 1841, by which General Espartero
modified the fueros of Navarra to which they refer as la
lev pacclonada . was a contract between the central government
and the Navarrese which cannot be modified without their
consent. Alava also has retained the concierto economlco . 253
This was a reward for its lack of resistance to the
insurrection. It seems that when the insurrection began
the Basque nationalists in these provinces did not even
252Ibid .. p. 477.
253fQr a discussion of the conclerto economlco with
Alava, see Jose Badia La-Calle, El Conolerto Economlco con
Alava (Bilbao: Editorial Deusto, 1965).
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try to resist for they realized that the odds against them
were so great as to make it a hopeless venture. The regiment
in the city of Vitoria had supported the insurrection and
immediately took the city. In the provinces of Guipuzcoa
and Vizcaya the local regiments had planned also to support
the insurrection but were caught in time and put under
arrest by the committees of local defense.
As the civil war came to an end in the Basque provinces
of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, those provinces were stripped of
their concierto economlco and a great number of Basques
were either imprisoned or shot. Those that could escape
went into exile into France and from there went to Latin
America where they have maintained Basque Centers in Buenos
Aires, Caracas, Santiago, and Mexico City from which they
have carried on an anti-Franco campaign. In the Basque
provinces, particularly in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, all
manifestations of Basque culture were forbidden, including
the speaking of Basque by the clergy at Church services.
The central government "embarked on a deliberate policy of
imposing the Castilian language and banning or ostracizing
the local language outlawing its use in the administration,
education, mass media, translations •• .as well as making
impossible any association that directly would foster the
national sentiment." 2^
254Juan L. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Author!
-
tarian Regime: The Case of Spain", unpublished paper, p. 59.
CHAPTER V
THE RESURGENCE OF THE BASQUE QUESTION
Between 1945 and the early 1950' s, the exiled Basque
government lived with the expectation that the Franco regime
would soon collapse under the pressure of the allied forces
which, they believed, would not tolerate a regime that
had come into power with the help of those regimes which
had just been defeated in the war. In 1945 the political
groups of the Basque region in exile reached an agreement
in Bayonne, France, called El Pacto de Bavonne . This
agreement was to advise the Euzkadi government and coordinate
their struggle against the Franco regime. 255 But, as it
later turned out, the initial ostracism of the Franco regime
by the allied forces, plus Franco's efforts in staying
out of World War II, apparently had the effect of mobilizing
support for Franco256..or ac least silencing much of the
opposition.
International events also seemed to have worked in
favor of the Franco regime. The amity which had developed
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the
^~*-*Euzko Deya (Oflcina Prensa Euzkadi), March/April,
1966, p. 4. Thi 8 is an information bulletin published
by the Basque government in exile.
256por a discussion of the Franco regime see Arthur
P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West . (New York:
Frederick A. Prager,
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war soon turned into enmity with favorable consequences for
Franco. In its search for allies in the diplomatic campaign
to hold back the Soviet Union, strategic considerations
forced the United States to change its earlier position on
the Franco regime. The United States changed its policy
of ostracism to one of soliciting Franco's support in the
cold war struggle. The recognition of the Franco regime
by the United States in 1951 signalled the deathknell to
the Basque nationalists' expectations of returning to Spain.
Spain had now become an ally of the United States, and
indirectly linked to NATO depriving the Basques and other
republican groups in exile the support from the major Western
liberal democracies which they might have otherwise received.
Subsequently, the Basque nationalists in exile had to
reconcile themselves with the fact that the Franco regime
seemed well established and gaining in international
respectability. Nevertheless, they maintained their
propaganda campaign against Franco and have kept in touch
with a small Basque underground. 257
Although after the civil war and up to the late
1950' s the PNV continued to be the main spokesman for Basque
nationalism, several organizations have emerged to challenge
257xhere is some evidence that the PNV has some
underground cadres throughout the provinces of Guipuzcoa and
Vizcaya. The New York Times . May 1, 1967, p. 22. Although
it seems that the PNV receives some financial support from
some wealthy Basques within Spain, this writer has not come
across specific documentation. See Whitaker, pp. 361-362.
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Its leadership during the past decade
. ^ ^
approximately eight organization, which represent various
shades of Basque nationalism. 258
Until the 1960.s, the activities of Basque nationalism,
sponsored primarily by the PNV in exile, did not go very
much beyond the occasional sponsoring of folkloric
festivals; the distribution of nationalist literature within
the Basque region; and the gathering of information
regarding the conditions of the Basques under the Franco
regime. The franco government has not hesitated to suppress
ostensibly cultural and religious activities on the
suspicion that such activities are motivated by nationalistic
considerations and organized by the Basque underground.
The Aberri Epuna, the Basque patriots day, is celebrated on
Easter Sunday. The nationalists in exile in turn have
exploited the reactions of the regime by pointing out that
the government is engaged in "cultural genocide." The
argument of the nationalists has some credence for they can
point out that other regions are allowed to manifest their
cultural peculiarities but only the Basques have been
singled out for suppression.
Overseas, particularly in the United States259 and
258The Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Accion Vasca, ETA,
Frente Nacional Vasco, Partido Comunista de Euzkadi,
Enbata, Accion Social Democratica Vasca and the iMovimiento
de Sacerdotes Vascos. It is the opinion of this writer
that some of these organizations are mere paper or office
organizations.
259 The Basque communities of the United States are
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in some of the Latin American countries, Basque Centers have
been founded with the objective of keeping Basque identity
alive through Basque festivals and publications. In these
organizations both Spanish and French Basques collaborate.
There are two Basque publishing houses in Latin America,
Buenos Aires and Caracas, that publish exclusively nationalist
literature or literature discussing cultural themes of the
Basque country. Some of this literature is then sent to
the PNV organization in Bayonne, France, which is then
smuggled into Spain.
During the 1960»s a new wave of protest and nationalist
activity, corresponding with the increase in the centralizing
of power and the increased international respectability of
the Franco regime, began to manifest itself in the Basque
region in the form of labor strikes, demonstrations by the
clergy, some occasional violent actions such as bomb
explosions and gun battles with the Spanish police.
Although the PNV has given moral support to some of these
activities, they have been planned by groups unaffiliated
with it. The new militant activism has been initiated by
a radical group known as Euzkadi ta Askatasuna . ETA
(Basque Nation and Liberty), which split in 1959 from
Euzko Gastedl . a nationalist youth organization affiliated
with the PNV. ETA, which calls for an "Euzkadi independiente
y socialists " (a socialist and independent Euzkadi),
found mainly in Nevada, Idaho, and California
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apparently spilt from the PNV over the question of the
tactics that should be pursued by the Party. 260 Apparently
the members of ETA had come to the conclusion that the PNV
had become ossified and ineffective in its approach.
Consequently, ETA has adopted a more radical and dramatic
approach. Its occasional handbills indicate that ETA has
adopted some brand of Marxism as its social ideology, in
contrast to the PNV, ETA does not claim to speak just for
the Spanish Basques but for the French Basques as well.
Among its professed goals is the unification of all the
Basques in an eventual European Federation of nations.
There are some indications that the membership of ETA does
not consist exclusively of Spanish Basques, but also includes
French Basques. 26 ! In this respect ETA is quite a departure
from the PNV which is quite conservative and bourgeois in
its social orientation and claims to speak only for the
Spanish Basques.
Due to the secrecy in which this organization works,
its exact membership is not known. But the arrests made
by the Spanish police of alleged members of ETA indicate
that the membership is fairly young, between the ages of 18
and 30 years old. In contrast to the activities of the PNV
,
ETA has not hesitated to resort to violence as a result of
26
^See the interview with ETA members published in the
Paris"Match , August 17, 1968, p. 6.
261zutik . April, 1965. This is an ETA publication.
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which it has received all kinds of attention, particularly
in the latter part of the 1960«s, thus making Basque
nationalism once again one of the more sensitive topics
in Spanish politics. The radical activities of ETA
apparently were not approved by the whole membership for
in 1966 a split occurred giving rise to another group known
as ET/A-Berri (New ETA) favoring a more moderate approach. 262
It seems that it has been the ETA-Zarra, (Old ETA), which
has been responsible for the ; radical forms of activism in
the latter part of the 1960»s. While the PNV still claims
the following and support of broad segments of the Basque
population, ETA during its short period of existence has
emerged as the leading nationalist group, and recently has
done more than the other organizations in bringing to the
attention of the international press the question of Basque
nationalism which had seemed nearly forgotten. ETA»s
activities became so persistent that by the end of the
1960's the government in Madrid launched an Intensive
campaign in order to crush it. 263 The hunt for ETA members
262The Economist . V, 237, (December 12, 1967), p. 35.
263In 1968 Pueblo , the paper of the official labor
unions, began to discuss the question of Basque nationalism
making particular reference to ETA. According to the
articles in Pueblo . ETA members were coming primarily from
urban environments and not from fishing villages or
peasant communities. The whole emphasis of the Pueblo
articles was to show that ETA was an atheist and Marxist
organization and thus, contrary to Basque traditions.
Pueblo . September 27, 1968, p. 6. By 1969 the police were
claiming the "total desmantelamiento de la ETA." Pueblo .
March 25, 1969, p. 9.
144
became particularly Intensive after the aS8aS8lnatlon of the
chief of the secret police of Guipuzcoa, Mellton de
Manzanas, In 1968. According to the ETA publication,
Zutifc. Manzanas was not assassinated b«t executed for his
"crimes" against Basque nationalists. 264
The Trial
The assassination of Meliton Manzanas gave rise to the
most spectacular and dramatic incident surrounding Basque
nationalism since the Civil War. The sixteen members of
ETA suspected of having planned the assassination were
finally put on trial (the military tribunal of Burgos) in
December 1970. On the day before the trial, December 1, 1970,
a group from ETA kidnapped a West German consul, Eugen
Bethel, from San Sebastian and announced that they intended
to keep him as ransom during the course of the trial.
This incident, which focused the attention of the international
press on the sixteen accused ETA members—who otherwise
might not have received as much attention had not this
incident occurred--probably confronted the Franco regime
with one of its biggest crisis since the end of the Civil
War. There were strikes and demonstrations in the Basque
region, particularly in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. A state of
martial law was declared in the province of Guipuzcoa, and
police reinforcements were sent to the area. There was
2642utlk . September 1968.
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dissension within the army leadership and the cabinet over
the course of action that the regime should take. 265
Some senior members of the officer corps resented the fact
that a military tribunal should handle this problem
since, in their view, this would only serve to discredit
the army before the eyes of the public, while others felt
that the regime should show no mercy and adopt a get-tough
policy. This incident, along with the international
publicity that it received, was particularly embarrassing to
the regime which in the latter part of the 1960«s had begun
to emphasize its "liberal" tendencies with an eye to closer
relationships with the Common Market.
Within a few days the international press focused on
Spain and the trial of the Basques. What had begun as a
trial of sixteen ETA members accused of the assassination
of a public official became overnight a trial of basque
nationalism. Since the Civil War, probably no incident
has done more for the cause of Basque nationalism than the
kidnapping of Eugen Beihel. One day before the verdict was
265xhe trial was given extensive coverage in the
New York Times . Le Monde , and ABC (Madrid). Richard Eder
of the New York Times wrote several comprehensive articles
on the Basques in general and on the trial. See The New
York Times . November 28, 1970, p. 3; December 3, 1970, p. 6;
December 6, 1970, p. 3; December 7, 1970, p. 2; December 9,
1970, p. 29; December 12, 1970, p. 12; December 17, 1970, p. 3.
The Christian Science Monitor also gave a fairly good
coverage of the trial in its December 1970 issue. See
particularly the article of Richard Mowrer in the December
?3, 1970, issue, p. 1.
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announced ETA freed Beihel. It had made its point. On
December 28, 1970, the verdict was announced! six of the
accused were given death sentences and the others, amongst
whom there were two priests, were given long periods of
imprisonment. 266 After a cabinet meeting on December 30,
it was decided to commute the death sentences. 267 The
decision was announced on New Year«s Eve when Franco
delivered his message to the nation.
Judging from the news releases from the area, segments of
the population viewed the accused more as martyrs rather
than criminals. While ETA was seen as an extremist
organization and the action regarding consul Seihel was not
condoned, nevertheless, there seemed to be broad support for
the accused. Both the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian
asked for clemency and issued pastoral letters before the
trial began, asking for a trial before a civilian tribunal.
These pastorals angered the regime which, through the
Ministry of Justice, issued a statement accusing the bishops
of "prejudging court decisions which (had) not yet been
made" and of "comparing criminal violence, which is
punishable by law, with the punishment imposed by law. "268
The accused were defended by Basque lawyers, such as
Juan Maria Bandres, some of whom consider themselves Basque
266The New York Times . December 29, 1970, p. 1.
267Ibld .. December 31, 1970, p. 1.
268xhe Spanish Episcopal Conference meeting in Madrid
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nationalists and hold the sentiment that there exists a
Basque nation which has lived under oppression since
1939,269 whue it appear8 that^ 8egment8 q{ ^
population do not approve of ETA's methods, nevertheless,
they do not seem to question its objectives. A Basque
priest from the Basque community of Idaho, although
deploring the "methods and philosophy of ETA" which he
considered against everything that is Basque, added that
"you don't make a revolution with rosaries. "270
The Church
Along with ETA, the Basque lower clergy has also been
in the forefront of protest in the latter part of the
1960»s. They have participated in strikes, demonstrations
and have allegedly given sanctuary to members of ETA pursued
by the Spanish police. By virtue of its position, the
clergy has a greater leeway to act than strictly political
groups. However, the activities of the Basque clergy have
raised some sensitive issues between the government and
the Church which, up until recently, had been one of the
at this time, supported the pastorals of the bishops of
Santander and San Sebastian and also asked for clemency.
ABC (Madrid), December 3, 1970, p. 21. Also Kee sing's
Contemporary Archives . January 23-30, 1971, p. 24406.
269The New York Times . December 15, 1970, p, 6.
270Ibld .. December 20, 1970, p. 18.
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central Institutional pillars of the regime. 271 it must be
emphasized that clergy support for Basque nationalism is an
indirect kind of support. This was also the case during
the 1930«s. Members of the clergy were never formally
affiliated with the PNV, which did not allow membership for
members of the clergy. Consequently, the protests of the
Basque clergy are addressed to what they perceive to be
violations of human rights. But this had not prevented the
civil authorities from arresting some of them, an action
which deliberately violates the Concordat. Under the rules
of the Concordat signed by the Vatican and the Spanish
government, a member of the clergy cannot be arrested
without the permission of his bishop.
The activities of the clergy seem to parallel the
activities of ETA. The clergy began to speak out against
acts of torture committed by the Spanish police against
imprisoned Basque nationalists. On August 3, 1968, the
day after the assassination of Manzanas, the Guardia Civil
surrounded the Benedictine Abbey of Lazcano, Guipuzcoa,
and searched the area, for it was believed that the monks
were giving sanctuary to ETA members. 272
The actions of the lower clergy eventually brought them
27lon the relationship between the Church and the
Franco regime see William Ebenstein, Church and State in
Franco Spain (Princeton: Center of International Studies,
I960).
272
-rhe New York Times . November 4, 1968.
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into conflict with the hierarchy, which did not heed the
c lergy«s demands that it publicly denounce the repressive
actions of torture against ETA political prisoners. In
the eyes of the more radical members of the lower clergy,
the hierarchy was collaborating and compromising with the
regime and ignoring what they consider the injustices done
to the Basque people. Faced with seeming indifference
from their bishop, a group of priests from Bilbao finally
appealed to the Vatican on November 4, 1968. A letter was
sent to Pope Paul VI discussing the political conditions of
the Basque country and the grievances of the Basque people.
After making a case that the Basques were a nation divided
"between two states, without any proper relations between
the two areas, without a proper bases for government,
development and communal living," they then deplored the
fact that the Spanish Church was systematically involved in
the process of Castilianization because it only recognized
Castilian as the offical language of the Church. 273 The
letter was a plea for the recognition of the Basque people
as a distinct ethnic group. Some priests have gone so far
as to call for an "indigenous" Church and a Basque
Episcopal Conference. 274 while the clergy addresses itself
273«a Nuestro B.P. Paulo VI, contodo respecto un
grupo de sacerdotes vascos de Vizcaya." Bilbao, November 4, 1968.
27*On November 11, 1968, 60 priests staged a sit in at
the seminary of Derio and sent a letter to their bishop in
which they accused the Church of being wedded to a "sistema
politico-fascista militarista." Among other things,
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to the violations of human rights, there seems little
question that their immediate interests are the fate of the
Basques as a people. This was made very explicit in a letter
signed by 500 priests and sent to the Spanish Episcopal
Conference in 1969:
The sensitivity of nations and ethnic
groups is such, insofar as their ethnic or
national consciousness is concerned that we
believe it difficult to resolve the problem
without a recognition of their personality and
the rights that belong to them. 275
On May 4, 1969, after considerable pressure from his
clergy, the Bishop of Bilbao, Jose Maria Cirarda, finally
issued a pastoral letter taking note of what was happening
within the Basque region and calling attention to the fact
that the "Concordat had been violated, more than once, in
these events" .276 For some members of the lower clergy,
this pastoral letter was too mild. Subsequently, a group
of exiled priests in France sent Cirarda an open letter
accusing him of lack of moral leadership and of failure to
they criticized the Church for supporting a regime engaged
in "repression dirigida a la dissolucion de la etnia vasca
al aniquilamiento de la cultura del pueblo trabajador
vasco." During 1968 and 1969 the clergy became so active
that some of the newspapers in the North began to refer to
their behavior as "guerrilismo clerical." Hierro . December
20, 1968, p.4.
275Alderdl . March/April, 1969, p. 10. This is a
publication of the PNV.
276«EXhortacion Pastoral " from Jose Maria de Cirarda,
acting Bishop of Bilbao, May 4, 1969.
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recognize the critical political situation existing within
the Basque country. They asked him to resign and withdrew
their obedience to himi "We do not want the Church that
you keep and administer for it is an egoistic and sold
Church, a collaborator with the oppressors of our people.
Indeed, this assertion is scandalous, but it is not
exaggerated nor false." 2 ??
Some people may interpret the actions of the Basque
clergy as part of the larger international phenomenon
regarding the concern for reform within the Catholic Church.
With respect to the behavior of the Basque clergy the evidence
does not seem to allow such an interpretation. In very rare
instances has the issue of Church reform come up; and when
it has come up, it has been in connection with the fact that
the hierarchy has not taken the stand advocated by the
clergy regarding the actions of the regime vis-awis Basque
nationalists. It should also be noted that it has been in
the Basque country and Catalonia, two areas with a history
of sentiment for Home Rule, that segments of the clergy have
publicly taken stands against the regime. In their public
pronouncements, the Basque clergy has not shown so much
concern with the rights of all Spaniards, but with the
rights of the Basques; and in this endeavor,
i
tneY have
received the moral support of their fellow clergymen in
277Letter from a group of Basque priests to the Bishop
of Bilbao, 1969.
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the French Basque country.
Recent events surrounding the Spanish hierarchy and
the place of the Catholic Church within the future regime
of Spain suggest that the Basque clergy might have found a
sympathetic hearing for their cause and that a future regime
of Spain may well give the Basques some degree of official
repognltion. At a meeting of Church dignitaries and
priests held in Madrid on September 17, 1971, several
resolutions were passed which, In this writer 1 s opinion,
and given the traditional position of the Church under the
Franco regime, should be characterized as radical departures
from traditional Church policies. These resolutions asked
for an independent Church, that is, Church dignitaries would
no longer occupy government posts as they do now, such as
representation in the Cortes and in the Council of the
Realm; respect and protection of political rights; and
most significantly, respect and liberty for the ethnic
minorities of Spain. 278 An official body of the Church has
recognized the existence of ethnic minorities within Spain.
Undoubtedly the Basque clergy along with the Catalan clergy
must have had exercised a high degree of pressure in order
to introduce the resolution regarding the status of the
ethnic minorities. Another resolution which was introduced,
but did not pass, asked the Spanish people to forgive the
278ABC, September 16 and September 24, 1971. See also
La CrolxTTParis) September 18, 1971.
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Church's partial stand (the almost unconditional support of
the Franco forces) during the Civil War:
ask f«Sff
qUentl
?
We hUmbly cognize andforgiveness for not having acted as agentsof reconciliation in the midst of a people tornby a civil war fought among brothers.27§ CO
Public Opinion
Since we have no public opinion surveys of the Basque
population regarding the extent and intensity of support for
organized nationalist groups, it is difficult to make fast
generalizations regarding the nature of the support and the
degree of autonomy desired by most of the population. There
is evidence, however, that there exists a body of middle
class opinion which favors some degree of autonomy for the
Basques within the Spanish State. One such group, formed
within the Basque country, is the Accion Social Democratira
Vasca which advocates democratization and decentralization
of the Spanish State with a view toward a European
Federation. 280 According to this group the old exclusivist
form of nationalism is outmoded and out of fashion. At the
same time there seems to be a fairly large body of opinion
within the Basque country which is very sensitive to the
immigration of non-Basques to the Basque region. There is
279Quoted in Euzko Deva . September 20, 1970, p. 3.
^°Jose Domingo Arana, Pueblo Vasco (Bilbao! Editorial
Ercilla-Libras, 1968), p. 167. See also his Centra lismo
Politico y Reglonalismo (Bilbao, 1966).
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fear that through the process of intermarriage the Basque
population may become diluted. Consequently, some Basques
argue that in light of this possibility an effort should be
made to assimilate non-Basques into the Basque community
rather than vice-versa. Some argue that the Basques are
the most European of the Iberian peoples; and, if Spain
wants to change and become more Europeanized, it should
follow the example of the Basques. 281 This is not a new
argument. Decades earlier a Basque writer of centralist
tendencies, Maeztu of the Generation of 1898, had already
made the argument that if Spain wanted to industrailize it
should study the Basques and follow their example. It
seems that the Acclon Democratlca Vasca is willing to
accept the notion of one Spain but with regional and
cultural diversity. Decentralization would be the cure for
many of the social and political problems of Spain. This,
too, is an old argument in Spanish politics.
Although the Carlists are still in existence, and
presumably still have their organization, the Communion
Tradiclonalista which officially does not exist, the lack of
information regarding this group does not permit one to
assess the extent to which it could become a serious
political force in future political changes in Spain.
Despite the fact that the Franco regime allowed Navarra to
281Jorge de Oteiza, Quosque Tandem (Ensayo del
interpretacion estetica del alma vasca.) San Sebastian: Editorial
Aunamendi, 1963.
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ke*P its concjerto economico
,
a reward for Its help during
the Civil War, the Carlists have never been too satisfied
with the Franco regime. Their hopes that Franco might
select a Csrlist pretender to sit on the Spanish throne were
deflated when Franco finally made his decision to select
Juan Carlos as the future King of Spain. It seems difficult
to conceive that the Carlists seriously entertained the
possibility that a Carlist pretender might inherit the
Spanish throne. At any rate, with the Franco regime
approaching its end, the Carlists, too, have begun to show
their dissatisfaction with the Madrid government. At a
Carlist meeting held in Pamplona on December 20, 1968,
Prince Carlos Hugo de Bourbon-Parma appeared. But the
government in Madrid viewed this with some displeasure and
asked him to leave Spain. 282 prince Carlos Hugo is a
French citizen. As a result of this incident, there were
clashes between the police and Carlists in Pamplona.
Groupo de Accion Carlista . a splinter group from the old
Carlist organization, supports Carlos Hugo, but beyond this
not very much is known about its size or its social ideology
or whether or not there is any collaboration with ETA. 283
There was in Kavarra a small nationalist group, Xratxe .
(Movimlento I^acionalista Navarro), but it fused with ETA in 1965
2Q2
^eeS £ng i 8 Contemporary Archives . January 1-11, 1968
p. 23112.
283Le Monde . January 2, 1971.
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At the cultural level there seems to be a growing
Interest In the Basque language and Basque cultural
activities. Apparently through the efforts of ETA some
£kastolas (Basque schools) have sprung up in the Basque
country. But this interest with Basque schools seems to
have broad support. £1 Alcazar reported in 1958 that there
was great interest in the Basque language. 284 ln 1968 an
article published in Hlerro indicated that much more is
written in Basque now than ever before. The article comments
further that "It is about to be realized the beautiful
enterprise of establishing billngualism in the schools.
It should be pointed out, in passing," the article read,
"that there exists almost a hundred schools in Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa, a number which never existed before in the
Basque country. "285 a new literature prize for works in
Basque has also been established: the Premio Nacional de
Literatura Jose Maria Iparraguirre. And in 1967, the
Diputacion de Navarra approved a plan to teach Basque a half
an hour per day in the schools of that province. 286
A recent survey has revealed some significant information
regarding the Basque language. It seems that far more people
speak Basque than had been supposed. For example, it was
284E1 Alcazar . December 17, 1958.
285Hjerro (Bilbao), November 12, 1968.
286 See Dlcclonario de Legislation Administrative v
Flsea 1 de Navarra . I Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1969),
pp. 1118-19.
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found that 82 per cent of the Spanish Basque rural population
speak Basque, while 51 per cent of those of the urban areas
speak It and 19 per cent of those In the big cities. 287 But
only 12 per cent of the whole Basque population can write
In Basque. 288 As indicated by the FOESSA survey, the use
of Basque seems to vary with the amount of education and
urbanization but not the Interest In It. It was pointed
out that the Basque middle class favors the learning of
Basque as a second language. A survey of housewives further
Indicates that AO per cent of them favored (very much)
their children learning Basque while only 31 per cent
believed it to be necessary that their children learn
Basque. 289 This attitude did not seem to vary with class.
Another finding indicates that 71 per cent of the house-
wives preferred the Basque language for their children's
comic book 8 while 30 per cent preferred the use of Basque
on radio and television and 36 per cent for movies. 290
Thus, the result of this survey indicates that there exists
a significant minority with interest in the perpetuation
of the language an interest which should not be taken
287 FOESSA, Informe sociologlco sobre lfl sltuaclon
social de Espana . Directed by Arnando de Miguel, Luroamerlca
,
Fundaclon FOESSA, 1970, p. 1304. I am thankful to Mr.
Pedro Blasco , a fellow In Sociology at Yale for having
brought this source to my attention.
288lbid.
2SQ lbld.. p. 1307
29°lbld.. p. 1276.
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lightly for the future development of Basque nationalism.
If this interest has been able to survive under the Franco
regime, one should expect its continued growth under a
possible more liberal regime after Franco.
The French Basques
Far more significant in recent developments, however,
is the changing attitude of the French Basques. Basque
nationalist aspirations have come primarily from the
Spanish Basques. But recently the French Basques, too,
have begun to manifest nationalist aspirations. On April 15,
1963, a congress of nationalists met in D'ltxassou (in the
French Basque region) to organize a nationalist organization.
£nbata, the organization which emerged out of this congress,
calls for a Basque state in which both Spanish and French
Basques will live, but for the moment it will settle for the
formation of a department consisting exclusively of the
three traditional Basque provinces. 291 in such a department,
Euzkera along with French would have official standing.
Eventually all the Basques would be united under a European
Federation. It is their belief that the future of Europe
does not lie with the large state units but with the break
up of such units and the emergence of a federation based
on ethnic groups. Insofar as the members of Enbata are
fcyA For a discussion of the French Basque movement see
Paul Serant, La France des Minorites (Paris: Edicions
Robert Laffont, 1965), pp. 158-189.
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concerned, France as a political unit does not mean very
much to them. Simon Haran, the Secretary General of Enbata,
expressed this sentiment in the following terms!
I can already see against mee ail those who
refuse the path to independence, or who find
scandalous even to speak about it, even relativeindependence, administrative, and cultural. 1
see them all, all those people, Basque or
foreigners, to emerge in the defense of the
French State. But hexegonal France is a myth.
If you do away with the administration, the
police, the army and the language not much of
France will be left. If you expel from the
Basque country the French or Spanish
administration, police, and the army, what is
there left?292 79
Some mtmbers of Enbata have suggested that a common
market should be established between the French and the
Spanish Basque region since the latter has enough capital
to develop the whole region.
In contrast to the program of the PMV, Enbata seems to
take a more pragmatic approach, and among its grievances one
finds mention of specific economic problems such as lack of
employment and lack of any significant industry. 293 The
Rev. Pierre Larzabal, considered as one of the militant
nationalists of the French Basque region, is of the opinion
that the French government has purposely kept industry out
of this area in order to make it a tourist haven. Consequently,
he feels, the young population of the area will be reduced
292Quoted in ibid., pp. 167-168.
293£nbata (aayonne, France), January, 1964.
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to the status of "servants-waiters, maids, concierges ."294
This area has a long history of emigration. Most of the
Basque sheephearders of the American West have come from
the French Basque country.
Although it seems that in the past the French government
has ignored the Spanish Basques coming into the French
region when pursued by the police, recently it has begun
to show concern with Basque nationalist activities. It has
asked Spanish Basques to stay away from the French Basque
region and has offered them exile but in departments
outside of the Basque region. French Basques have in turn
protested the activities of the French government and
demanded that Spanish Basques be allowed to stay in the
French Basque country. In March of 1970, nine Spanish
Basques went on a hunger strike in the Cathedral of Bayonne
in order to protest the French Governments demands that
they move away from that area. Instead the local clergy
protested and replied that "Basques have a right to live
in the Basque country. "295
As of late, the French Government has also begun to
take notice of the nationalist activities of the French
Basques. Several members of Enbata . along with its
secretary, Simon Haran, were given a month's imprisonment
29^The New York Times . January 11, 1971, p. 8.
295 Ibld .. p.? March 31, 1970.
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In September of 1971 for having organized a celebration for
Aberrl Efiuna.296 The day of Aberri Eeuna i s a practice
which was started by the Spanish Basque nationalists.
Apparently there are no relationships between the PNV and
Enbata; and the PNV seems very reticent toward the latter
organization. There are good political reasons for the
seeming lack of interest of the PNV for Enbata . Any show
of support for Enbata could well mean their expulsion from
Prance
.
Certain themes in European politics seem to favor
nationalism such as that of the Basques. It has become
fashionable these days to speak of regionalism and
decentralization both in France and Spain. 297 At the 69th
convention of the French Radical Party in December of
1970, the Party passed resolution demanding the end of
state centralization and recognition of political and
administrative autonomy for the regions and municipal!ties. 298
The central government would retain the power to deal with
broader European political issues and eventually become part
of a federation known as the United States of Europe.
296Le Monde . September 25, 1971.
297For a discussion of regionalism in France see
Robert La font, La Revolution Regionallste (Paris j Gallimard,
1967); Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity
and Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970),
p. 166; Laurence Gladieux, "Regionalism in France", Public
and International Affairs . I (1967), pp. 135-157.
298 The Kew York Times . December 7, 1970, p. 4.
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In Spain there has also been some discussion of
regionalism and decentralization by public officials.
In an interview given i„ 1966, The Ministro de Gobernacion
discussed his support for decentralization which he felt
was a necessity for the modern state. 299 Even the
the paper of the Spanish labor union s, has given some
attention to the question of regionalism. In an article
entitled, «De la Region a la Patria", it was argued that
Spain would benefit by giving the several regions greater
autonomy. 300 It was the author's opinion that decentralization
would bring about the "patriotizacion de las regiones."
So far, however, regionalism has not become a question of
national policy.
29°Pueblo (Madrid), November 16, 1966, p. 11
30°lMd..
CHAPTER VI
ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE OF BASQUE NATIONALISM:
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
In the preceeding chapters we have discussed the
gradual growth and development of Basque nationalism. In
this chapter we shall try to dissect the various components
of the movement. We shall make an inquiry in the relation-
ship between Basque nationalism and several variables which
are sometimes given as responsible for the rise of ethnic
nationalism. Among these variables we find the following:
(1) the political structure of the state to which the ethnic
minority belongs; (2) the economy of the society at large
and the economy of the region where the ethnic minority
has its home base; and, (3) the degree of assimilation and
social mobilization. What relationships can we detect
between these variables and nationalism? To put it
differently: Are there any detectable variations between
Basque nationalism and the political structure of the
Spanish State, the degree of Basque assimilation, and the
state of the national and regional economies? In addition,
the following question is also pertinent: Is Basque
nationalism essentially a class phenomenon?
Due to the lack of recent sociological studies in
this area, our inferences regarding Basque nationalism and
the variables described above must of necessity be somewhat
inconclusive. A detailed public opinion survey of the
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Basque country would possibly reveal to us a more precise
picture and probably allow us to reach conclusions that the
scope of the present study does not allow. But "in the
absence of reliable survey data," says Donald Horowitz,
one can still draw some inferences "from the timing of
conflicts and the issues of political debate." What are
the salient issues presented by the leaders of ethnic
nationalism and what do they "consider worth fighting for"? 30 *
To be sure, this is a round about way of analysing our
problem, but it is the only available at the moment.
Even though there is no detailed class breakdown of
the support for the Partldo Naclonallsta Vasco (PNV), the
general evidence available, and the writings of people
familiar with the movement, suggest that support for the
Party came primarily from the middle class, the peasant
sector, and the members of the lower clergy. The religious
hierarchy of the Basque region, including those of Basque
descent with very few exceptions has not supported the
political objectives of Basque nationalism. This is not
surprising, particularly under the Franco regime, since
Franco, under the terms of the Concordat, has the power to
veto appointments by the Vatican.
The comments of observers of Basque nationalism and
301Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the
[sew States: Toward a Theory of Conflict", in Robert J.
Jackson and Michael Stein (eds.), Issues in C ompara tive
Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 176.
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the electoral statistics of the Basque region indicate that
broad segments of the Basque population did not support all
the objectives of the PNV. The Party never became the
dominant party of the region. The largest percentage of
the popular vote that it ever received was 46 per cent during
the Cortes elections of 1933. 302 The national (Spanish)
monarchist parties were able to elicit substantial support
throughout the Basque region. Support for the national
monarchist parties, however, should not be interpreted as
acceptance of greater centralization from Madrid, but
rather for the existing status quo, that is, for the
concierto economlco arrangement. It seems that some of the
people who supported the status quo also considered themselves
autonomists but not anti-Spanish as the nationalists did. 303
The support of the middle classes and the peasant
sector must be qualified for support from these groups
varied within the various Basque provinces. Support for
the Party was concentrated primarily in the provinces of
Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. Navarra and Alava were also
autonomists but in the traditional medieval sense. Their
localism did not seem to go beyond their province, whereas
the nationalists wanted to create a cross-local identity
302Juan J. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authori-
tarian Regime: The Case of Spain," unpublished paper, p. 67.
Hereafter quoted as "Opposition under an Authoritarian
Regime."
303Ybarra, op cit .. p. 461.
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within the Basque provinces. While there is a feeling of
Basque identity throughout the Basque region, at the same
time, one also witnesses an extreme local identification
with the traditional provinces and traditional institutions.
For example, it is not uncommon to hear Basques refer to
themselves as the A^aveses, the Navarros, and the Mzkainos.
It could be argued that this attachment to pre-modern or
pre
-nationalist institutions has been an obstacle in the
full development of Basque nationalism.
The history of the area indicates that two processes
of integration or national identification have been at
work. One might graphically represent these two processes
in the following manner:
From the point of identification with the local province,
we witness the process of the rise of Basque nationalism,
and at the same time, a process going into the opposite
direction, that is, Spanish identification. Curiously
enough, it seems that it has been in the same provinces,
Vlzcaya and Guipuzcoa, where these two processes seem to
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have gone the farthest.
The provinces of A lava and Navarra, primarily agricultural
and rural during the 1930«s, did not manifest the same
degree of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism that the other
two provinces did. But due to the fact that we find rural
support for the Party in the provinces of Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa, one might have to conclude that the rural-urban
variable might not have been that decisive in influencing
the degree of support for the Party.
The very rich Basques, on the other hand, seemed to
have supported the center, rather than the PNV. The
position of the Basque very rich, such as industrialists
and millionaires, is probably not unrelated to concrete
policy issues, to their economic position in the Basque
community and in the economy of Spain. "The point is hard
to document," says Linz, "but it seems clear that a large
part of the Bilbao business elite, which created giant
steel mills, other industrial plants, and some of the most
successful industrial and investment banks, remained aloof
from the incipient nationalist movement. "304 it seems that
the Basque rich worked closely with the Madrid government
from which they received protection for their industries
in the form of tariffs and government contracts. For example,
304Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and late
peripheral nationalisms against the State: The case of
Spain." Unpublished paper, p. 115. Hereafter cited as
"Early State-Building."
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the Sociedad Espanola de Conatruccion Naval, founded to
construct ships for the Spanish Navy, was financed with
Basque capital. This group of industrialists apparently
became the nucleus of the parties of the Restoration in
the region in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Some supported the Liberals and some gave their support
for the Conservative s. 305 These ties between the Bilbao
financiers and the Madrid government, says Linz, have
continued after the Civil War. "Leading business men
and a small group of anti-Basque intellectuala of the region
were among the main aupportera of Franco; and a few of them
were even in early, but not permanent, contact with the
founders of Spanish Fascism, some of whom would occupy key
positions under Franco." 306 Linz further notes that there
has been an interchange of personnel between Basque big
industry and government positions. Basque finance and
industry is national in scope rather than regional, thus
another reason why it might view Basque nationalism as a
threat.
The close contact between the Madrid government and
the Basque industrialists began with the Restoration when
it became a policy of the Crown to bestow titles of nobility
on some Basque industrialists* A Basque defender of the
Spanish cause in Vizcaya, makes reference to the Monarchy
305Ybarra, op. clt .. p. 327.
306nEarly state-Building," p. 116.
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in these terms: "It would be unforgivable Ingratitude to
forget the care so many times demonstrated by the king's
assiduous attention to those things that affected Vlzcaya
for which we should make great efforts to eagerly gather
around the throne ."307
It Is not difficult to see how the Basque industrialists
might have perceived Basque nationalism as a threat to
their interests. First of all, the political objectives of
the nationalists in all probability would have had drastic
consequences for Basque industry. The protection, and the
safe market, afforded these industries by the central
government might have been lost. Secondly, the PNV
threatened to displace this group as the center of political
power in the region, particularly in the province of
Vlzcaya. There is some evidence which suggests that the
Basque tycoons, through the system of caclaulsmo . pretty
much controlled election results in some areas, both to the
Cortes and to the local governments. Basque industrialists,
such as Ybarra and Chevarri, were highly involved in
political activities and frequently ran for public office.
The PNV in all probability meant a challenge to this
position. Ybarra indicates that there were bitter feuds
between the PNV and the tycoons of Basque industry. In
the words of a nationalist, this sector of Basque society,
the industrialists, had been "devasquizado", that ic it had
307Ybarra, op. clt .. p. 327.
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become Spanish or Castilianized. And as one might have
expected, It was this sector which was concerned with the
economic implications of Basque nationalism and not unmindful
of the role of the Madrid government in the growth of Basque
industry. Ybarra rejected what he considered the absurdity
of the nationalists by pointing out the benefits of being
tied to Spain: "So much wealth and so many benefits have
accrued as a result of Vizcaya«s relations and ties with
the rest of Spain." 308
The foregoing may allow one to conclude that the
variable of class was not absent in the degree of support
for Basque nationalism. But this conclusion cannot be
carried too far and without qualification for, as we
mentioned above, the PNV received support from various
socio-economic groups: the middle class, the peasants, the
industrial workers and the lower clergy. If one were to
characterize the Party regarding its general orientation
to socio-economic policies, therefore, one might
characterize it as a conservative bourgeois party. Although
Basque nationalism also had a left-wing group, the ANV,
which concerned itself with socio-economic reforms and
class issues, it never became a serious force in the Basque
region. The parties of the Left, particularly the
Socialist Party, with the exception of some urban centers,
such as Bilbao, and in some mining towns, did not elicit
^IMd., p. 471.
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much support from the Basques. It seems that the support
that it received came primarily from non-Basque workers
who had immigrated to the area. The PNV had created its
own labor union, the Solidarldad de Trabaladores Vascos .
The PNV scarcely concerned itself with class issues, but
concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on the question
of political autonomy. 309
In a multi-national state the form of political
organization has at times also been considered an important
variable shaping or determining the rise of ethnic nationali
for manifestation of ethnic nationalism may be interpreted
as reactions to political oppression or to the lack of
representation in the central national institutions ,3 10
The changes in the political structure of the Spanish
State and the rise of Basque nationalism are not unrelated.
This relationship, however, is no more satisfactory as a
sufficient explanatory tool than class analysis. As
discussed in the preceeding chapters, we found that the
rise of the Car list movement (a pre-nationalist movement)
was in part a reaction against the centralizing policies of
the nineteenth century liberals. Up to this point the
309Jesus de Sarria, Ideolosia del Nacionalismo Vasco
(Bilbao: E . Verdes, 1918)7"
310John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, The History of Freedom
and Other Essays (London, 1907); Ernest Barker, National
Character and the Factors in its Formation (London, 1927):
Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (Chicago, 1949).
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relationship between the Basque provinces and the Spanish
State had been by and large devoid of conflict. Basque
nationalism, in a sense, thus grew out of Carlism. Arana,
for example, had come from a Carlist family. It was during
the continuing conflict process between the Spanish State
and the Basque defense of the fueros that the notion of
nationality first began to be used. But Carlism remained
attached to medieval institutions and very parochial in
its political orientation. While the nationalists, too.
made reference to the traditional institutions of the
Basques, their argument stemmed chiefly from the belief
that the Basques were a nationality different from the
Spanish and, consequently, had a right to self-determination.
The argument of the Car lists was essentially legalistic:
namely, that the Spanish State could not unilaterally
abrogate rights and customs of the local communities which
had existed since time immemorial. Their demands consisted
in the restoration of their traditional rights. The
Basque nationalists went a step further by maintaining that
the Basques, by virtue of being a different nationality,
had a right to political independence.
Nowhere does one find evidence that the nationalists
or the Car lists asked for greater participation in the
central national institutions as a compensation for the loss
of their local autonomy. Obviously, this would have been a
remedy had the main issue been one of insuring greater
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political participation for the Basques. Had such demands
been made, one could have interpreted them as acceptance
of the central political institutions, and the assumptions
underlying them. But this was not the case nor was it the
issue. The main concern of the nationalists was to arrest
the assimilation process, which had been proceeding for
centuries, or reverse it, and preserve the Identity of the
Basques as a people. There is a difference between this
position and the demands of an ethnic group which desires
greater participation in the social and political institutioni
of the state to which it belongs. This, by and large, has
been the case of the ethnic minorities, both black and
white, which have immigrated to the United States. Their
willingness to become part of the American society was not
necessarily reciprocated by the existing socio-political
elite. Demands for greater participation may imply a
willingness on the part of the ethnic minority to recognize
the legitimacy of the existing political institutions.
But if the primary concern of a given ethnic group is to
preserve its identity, then the form of government under
which it lives may be of little concern. In the case of
the Basque nationalists, for example, they showed little
concern for the central political institutions which they
considered as a Spanish problem and only relevant to them
to the extent that Basque political objectives could be
advanced.
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In journalistic accounts of Basque nationalism it is
sometimes asserted that the reason for the lack of greater
French 3asque nationalism lies in the fact that they enjoy
greater political freedom than the Spanish Basques. 3H But
a closer look at the problem does not give much credence to
this interpretation. Spanish Basque nationalism emerged
precisely at the time when Spain was governed by a fairly
democratic political system. The regime brought about by
the Restoration (1876-1923) was one of the more democratic
political regimes in Spanish political history. "The
legitimacy of the parties had been recognized, basic civil
llbertles--freedom of association (Law of 1887), of the
press, and so forth—were respected and there was toleration
of wide (but not perfect) freedom for some trade union
movements. "3 12 i n short, Basque nationalism emerged in a
period which gave the PNV open, relatively democratic, and
almost "ideal" political conditions to function and
proselytize followers. Again during the second Spanish
Republic the PNV emerged with great vigor.
The notion that Spanish Basque nationalism has been a
reaction to political oppression may have some credence
3*1 The New York Times
312Juan J. Linz, "The Party System In Spain Past and
Future," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.)
Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free
Pre 88, 1967), p. 202. Linz»s article is an excellent
treatment of the party system under the Restoration.
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with regard to the Franco regime and the regime of Prirao
de Rivera. But again, this interpretation can only be
carried so far. Although Primo de Rivera suppressed the
Basque political organizations—a policy adopted towards
other political organizations throughout Spain—he,
nevertheless, allowed, and even encouraged, the different
regions to manifest their cultural distinctions. But to
Primo de Rivera "regionalism meant folk-lore, country
dancing, regional literature, and home crafts—politically
safe, attractive to tourists, and a proof of diversity in
unity."313
It has been only recently, under the Franco regime,
that severe policies have been adopted toward some of the
Basque provinces: the abrogation of the concierto economico
for the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the prohibition
of publications in euskera . and the use of euskera at
Church services. With these exceptions, we have found no
evidence that the Basques have been selected for any
particular type of discrimination. And recently the regime
has overlooked the increasing use of euskera in publications. 3^
The authoritarianism experienced in the Basque region does
313Carr, op. cit .. p. 568.
3 14 There are now some newspapers in Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa which are printing some columns in euskera . See
El Dlario Vasco of San Sebastian, La Hoi a de Lunes of
Bilbao, and the Dlario de Navarra of Pamplona. See also
Chapter V of this dissertation, p. 156.
176
not seem to be any worse than in the other Spanish regions,
although in the regions with strong regional sentiment,
the government has been more sensitive to cultural
activities for it interprets them as having a political
content.
Traditionally the Spanish Basques have enjoyed greater
autonomy than the French Basques. It was not until the
Franco regime that the Spanish Basque provinces really
began to experience the degree of control that the French
Basques have experienced since 1789. It would indeed be
difficult to attribute the rise of Basque nationalism
simply to the lack of democratic freedoms or to political
oppression.
Moreover, the recent nationalist aspirations of the
French Basques further suggests that the form of political
structure may not be that relevant in helping to explain
the rise of ethnic nationalism in a multi-national state.
Although there were some structural changes brought about
with the advent of the Fifth French Republic, particularly
regarding the organization of the central political
institutions, the traditional administrative structure of
the French state, remained basically the same. Other
cases alPQ suggest that the form of political organization
of a given state and the rise of ethnic nationalism may
have very little relationship. The Scots, the Welsh, and
the French Canadians are cases in point; all of them live
within democratic states.
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It is also sometimes presumed that ethnic discord is
the product of economic grievances resulting from the
politically subordinate position of the ethnic minority.
This assumption is replete in the literature on race
relations. 315 But this explanation must also be taken
with some skepticism, because we find variations in this
area. With respect to the Basques, one of the striking
facts of the Basque region is its relative economic
advancement in comparison to the other provinces and to the
Spanish national economy. This further suggests that
political subordination of an ethnic group need not mean
economic retardation.
The appearance of Basque nationalism coincided with
the Industrial development of the Basque region, particularly
the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In 1877 Spain
produced 1.58 million tons of iron-ore, 1.04 million tons
of which was produced in the province of Vizcaya alone.
By 1900 Spain was producing 21.5 per cent of the world's
output of iron-ore. 316 it had surpassed Italy, France,
and Sweden. Of Spain 1 s 252 iron-ore mines 106 were
^
^Mohammed A. Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of
Regionalism," Asian Survey . IX, December 1969. In his
study of Scottish nationalism John E. Schwartz also puts
emphasis on this variable. For citation see p. 1 of
Chapter I. See also Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan,
Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York;
l$<tf>, pp. 168, l$6-$», 386-65.
3* 6Ronald Chilcote, Spain's Iron and Steel Industry
(Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research, University of
Texas, 1968), pp. 2G-23.
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concentrated in Vlzcaya and over 75 per cent of Spain's
12,000 miners were located in that province. 317 According
to one study, 318 between 1875 and 19Q0> 9f500f000 tong Qf
iron-ore were exported from Spain, thus bringing into the
Basque region an average annual sum of 100 million pesetas
making the Basque country the leading financial center of
Spain. It was with the revenues from the exportation of
iron-ore that Basque capitalists embarked on the industrial
development of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In 1902 the Altos
Homos de Vizcaya, an iron-steel joint stock company with
a capital of 32 million pesetas, was founded. 3 19 Also by
the turn of the century Basque capitalists became pioneers
in the areas of electricity, financing hydroelectric
projects, iron- steel, chemicals, cement and paper industries.
Tolosa, the old capital of Guipuzcoa, became the paper
capital of Spain. San Sebastian had the biggest cement
factory in Spain.
At the end of the nineteenth century great strides
were also made to expand the merchant marine of the region.
According to Jaime Vives, from 1846 to 1902, Bilbao spent
approximately 130 million pesetas buying foreign vessels
317 Ibld .. p. 24.
3 18Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969;, p. 663.
319 lbld .. p. 667.
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so that by the end of the century 39 per cent of the total
merchant marine of Spain was concentrated In Vizcaya.320
Basque entrepreneurial activities were not limited
to the Basque region. In the area of finance the Basque
banks began to spread their activities throughout Spain.
They were particularly active in hydroelectric concerns
and chemical factories. By 1908, 30 per cent of the total
Spanish investments were Basque, thus making the Basque
banks the single most important financial center of
Spain. 32 ! After World War II, says Carr, Basque banks
began "to play a part in the Spanish economy resembling
that of the German banks."322 The Basque influence in the
Spanish economy gave rise to the following saying: "Todo
para Espana y Espana para Euzkadi."323
Although Spain went through a "gold fever" in the
early years of the Restoration, by 1887 the Spanish
economy began to experience a depression. The loss of
the remnants of the Spanish Empire apparently furthered
this downward trend of the economy. But it seems that this
trend was not equally felt throughout Spain. While on the
whole the Spanish economy was going through a period of
320Ibld .. p. 691.
321Carr, op. cit .. p. 435.
322 Ibid .. p. 406.
323Ramon Sierra Bustamente. Euzkadi de Sablno de Arana
(Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1941), p. 248.
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stagnancy, in the Basque region economic growth continued.
The Basque provinces and Catalonia remained the dynamic
centers of the Spanish economy. Illustrative of this
growth is the fact that between 1900 and 1913, the product!
of steel in the Basque region expanded by 263 per cent, and
between 1920 and 1930 by 235 per cent. "<T)his,» says
Carr, "was twice the rate of expension of the world
production 1900-50. "324 The period under Primo de Rivera
was also a relatively prosperous period. This was the age
of the cement industry. And in 1929, "iron and steel
production was twice that of 1917.
"
325
TABLE 2
SPANISH PROVINCES LEADING IN PER CAPITA INCOME, 1967
(in thousand pesetas)
Rank
196? 1967 order % Change
Madrid 36,796 66,545 1 80.85
Vizcaya 38,717 66,052 2 70.60
Guipuzcoa 35,902 65,673 3 82.92
Barcelona 35,288 62,615 4 77.44
Alava 30,503 62,027 5 103.35
Navarra 53,503 6
Spain 24,496 44,481 81.58
Source: Camara Oficial de Industrie de Guipuzcoa, Estructura
economica-lndustrlal de Guipuzcoa y su evoluclon
Madrid, 1970, p. 212.
324Carr, op. clt .. p. 407. 325 Ibid
181
Basque nationalist activities during the 1960»s also
seemed to have been accompanied by a relatively high
economic growth of the Spanish economy. The period between
1957 and 1967 was one of rapid economic expansion. "During
this decade the Spanish economy grew at an annual average
rate of 9 per cent, one of the highest in the Western
326world." The Basque provinces shared in this growth.
With respect to per capita income, in 1967 the province of
Vizcaya occupied second place and Gulpuzcoa third place.
As shown in Table 2, even Navarra, one of the less
TABLE 3
PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME OF THE BASQUE PROVINCES (1967)(in thousand pesetas)
Province
Disposable
I,ncome
Rank
order
Guipuzcoa 57,154 1
Vizcaya 54,545 2
Alava 53,028 3
Barcelona 52,377 4
Madrid 51,623 5
Navarra 47,266 6
Spain 39,789
Source: Banco de Bilbao, Renta Naclonal de tspana
y su distrlbuclon provincial . (Bilbao" 1967)
p. 27
.
326Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of
Modern Spain (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1970), xiii. This work is probably the first systematic
study of economic planning under the Franco regime.
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industrialized province, of Spain, had a per capita income
above the national average of 44,481 pesetas. The per cent
change in the province of Guipuzcoa was higher than the
national average. This is the area which has been the
center of intense nationalist activities during the latter
part of the 1960«s.
While the national increase in the net product was
104.65 per cent between 1962-67, in Guipuzcoa it increased
by 109.63 per cent. Between 1955-67, the revenue in the
Basque provinces Increased by 62.9 per cent while nationally
It Increased by 6.3 per cent. 327
When we look at the distribution of the disposable
income, we also find that the Basque provinces rank higher
than the national average. As indicated by the table, all
of the Basque provinces have a disposable income higher
than the national average. This table suggests that the
Basques may not be unduly burdened with taxes, particularly
when we compare them with the Madrid province which
occupies first rank in terms of per capita income, but In
terms of disposable per capita Income is below all of the
Basque provinces except Navarra.
Although these selected figures do not permit us to
draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the relationship
between ethnic nationalism and economic variables, they
327Camara Official de Industrie de Guipuzcoa. Estructura
egogomlco-|ndu8trlal de Guipuzcoa y su eyolucjon (Madrid,
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permit us to point out that the Basque economy has not been
characterized by stagnancy and that its development has
been superior to that of the national economy, thus giving
the inhabitants of this region a per capita income higher
than the national average. It would be more revealing,
however, if we could find out the changes in the distribution
of income in the area over a long period of time and to see
how economic growth has affected this distribution.
The point to be made is that the economic picture of
the Basque region for the period under discussion gives
little credence to the hypothesis that attributes ethnic
conflict, or ethnic nationalism, to perceptions of economic
deprivation vis-a-vis other groups within the same society
or to competition for economic resources. More importantly,
it should be added, the propaganda of the nationalists
scarcely touches on questions of economic grievances; and
when it does, it is primarily to show that the Basques could
do well by themselves. 32& Basque industrialists were
criticized by the nationalists not because of their wealth,
or because they "exploited" the Basques, but because of their
lack of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism.
If Basque industry and businesses were primarily
owned by non-Basques, furthermore, one might still be able
to make the argument that despite the relative economic
328See Andoni de Soraluze, Rloueza y Economla del
Pais Vasco (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1945;.
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advancement of the Basque region, the Basques perceived
themselves as being exploited by "foreigners." But no such
argument can be made for Basque industry and finance is
owned by Basque capitalists. In addition, Linz has found
that "the **ative Basques rate businessmen more highly
than do the non-native residents of this area." 329
In his study of ethnic conflict in Africa and Asia,
Donald Horowitz noticed a careerist component underlying
the problem: namely, that a large part of the conflict
stemmed from the competition between the members of the
diverse ethnic groups for positions in the national
bureaucracy and in the armed forces. "(T)here is hardly
an ethnically-divided country," he says, "without its
•civil service 1
,
and often those companions, the 'police
issue 1 and the •armed services issue I ".330 jn these
countries, he says, for the educated middle classes these
may be the only lucrative positions available since the
private sector does not offer adequate opportunities to
fulfill one's aspirations.
Without denying the influence of the careerist component
in Basque nationalism, the selected evidence available and
the industrialized nature of the Basque region does not
allow us to emphasize this variable. The evidence available
on the socio-economic background of some of the leaders of
329
"Early State-Building", p. !02.
330Horowitz, op. clt .. p. 173.
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Basque nationalism, suggests that most of them were the
products of an urban environment and that some of them
were economically well-off, did not lack social status
and could have pursued successful careers within the
structure of Spanish society. Sabino de Arana, for example,
the founder of the PKV, came from a fairly wealthy family
from Bilbao which had made its fortune in the shipbuilding
industry. His father owned the Compania Euskalduna.
Arana did not lack social status nor did he experience
economic insecurity. The evidence on his socio-economic
background points to the conclusion that—given the socio-
economic structure of Spanish society at the end of the
nineteenth century—he belonged to a privileged class.
He was educated at a private Jesuit school at Orduna and
from there went to the University of Barcelona to study
law. He was wealthy enough so that he did not have to
worry about employment, thus devoting his time and energies
to the cause of Basque nationalism. 331
Aguirre, who became the leader of the Party during
the 1930»8 and after 1936 president of the Euzkadi
Government, also came from a well-to-do middle class
background. Also educated at a private Jesuit school and
with a law degree from the University of Deusto. He
held an executive position in his family^ business, a
331 see Basaldua op, clt .
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chocolate factory. He had also been involved in social
activities, as leader of Acclon Cairn]K„ and founded a
youth organization, the Eusko-Maj.te«vr« . 332
Manuel de Irujo, another leading personality of Basque
nationalism, held a law degree, was on the board of
directors in one of the paper factories of Tolosa, and
helped to found several paper and hydroelectric enterprises. 333
Telesforo de Monzon, who became a member of the Euzkadi
Government, came from a wealthy and "distinguished family"
of Guipuzcoa.334
Thus the picture that emerges regarding the socio-
economic background of some of the leaders of Basque
nationalism, is not one of bohemian or romantic revolu-
tionaries or alienated intelligentsia, but rather, on the
contrary, one of socially integrated stable family men who
had achieved some degree of social success and who might
even be characterized as members of the "establishment."
They were close to, and participated in, the industrial
and commercial world around them.
The continued development of the economy of the Basque
region has offered the educated Basques opportunities to
fulfill their career aspirations in the private sector
£n Defensa de la Verdad . Buenos Aires: Editorial
Vasca Ekin, 1956, p. 120.
333
A. de Lizarra, Los Vascos y la Republics Espanola
(Buenos Aires: Ekin, 1944), p. 99.
334^guirre, Entre la Libertad y la Revo lucion , p. 503
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rather than in the public bureaucracy. This may give rise
to a curious situation. Xn a society where industrialism
is unevenly distributed, we may find a high percentage of
public officials, such as in the bureaucracy and the
armed forces, coming from the least economically developed
areas of the society. In his study of regional differences
within Spain, Linz, found this pattern. He found "that
Catalans and Basques are underrepresented in the Spanish
top Judiciary and particularly the Supreme Court." But
this underrepresentation, he argues, is not due to any
conscious policy of discrimination but "to the more
rewarding alternatives open to a young lawyer in the
industry or commerce of those regions."335 The law graduates
of Castile, Gallcia or Andalucia do not have as many
alternatives as those of the Basque country and Catalonia.
In his studies of economic development, Albert
Hirschman has also found a similar pattern:
The poorer sections of the country, where
careers in Industry and trade are not promising,
often produce, for this reason, a majority of
the country 1 s successful politicians and
thereby acquire influential spokesmen in the
councils of government. 336
If competition for public employment or careers in the
armed services were issues in the Basque region, one might
find a higher prestige given to these positions. In his
335
"Early State-Building," p. 104.
336Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic
Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 185.
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survey of regional differences regarding occupational
prestige, Linz found that In Industrialized Spain businessmen
were ranked higher than public servants and military men.
"The relative prestige of public eroplayment, or the army,
in the different regions of Spain, w he says, "appear
clearly related to the over and under-recruitment of those
elites in each region."337 In his survey of students'
career preferences he found a high percentage (90 per cent)
of those of San Sebastian, the capital city of Guipuzcoa,
preferlng to «nter a career ln the private 8«ct0r, while
in Ciudad Real, a provincial city, only 39 per cent made
such a preference, 338
Making reference to the linguistic issue which keeps
cropping up in controversies involving ethnic discord,
Horowitz concludes that "without the careerist incentives,
there would be much less leadership for linguistic
causes."33^ In the Basque case, however, it seems to be
difficult to link or relate the linguistic issue with the
careerist component. To begin with roost of the Basques are
fluent in Castlllan. When the PNV emerged, it was extremely
rare to find a person that was not very fluent in Castilian.
As for today, the discussion of this issue in the Basque
country indicates that one no longer finds a person who
337
"Early State Building," p. 95.
338Linz, "The Eight Spalns," p. 304.
339Horowitz, op. clt ,« p. 175.
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speaks only euskera, and apparently only a small percentage
of the Basque population can read and write euskera ,
Linz's survey of regional housewives who had learned first
the regional language shows that the Basque region has the
lowest percentage of those who came into contact first with
the regional language and later learned Castilian.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEWIVES WHO LEARNED FIRST
THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE TO:
Re^^on Understand Speak Read Write
Balearic Islands 85 84 1 2
Galicia 75 76 4 3
Catalonia 54 53 14 13
Valencian Region 48 47 1 mm
Basque country 41 40 10 9
Source: Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late
Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The
Case of Spain." Paper presented at the UNESCO
Conference on Nation-Building
,
Normandie, August
1970, p. 86.
It might not be unreasonable to assume that the
percentage among men probably is not any higher. It is
interesting to notice, however, that although the Basque
country is low in the percentage of those who learned first
to understand and speak the language, it is relatively high
in the percentage of those who learned to read and write.
This might suggest that perhaps the local language is taken
more seriously in this region, with the exception of
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Catalonia, than in the other regions. That the attachment
to the language is probably more sentimental than utilitarian
is suggested by the fact that while 69 per cent of the
housewives of the Basque country would like their children
to learn Basque, only 31 per cent believed it to be
necessary,
TABLE 5
ATTITUDES OF HOUSEWIVES TOWARD THEIR CHILDREN
SPEAKING THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE
Region
Would like
(very much or
fairlv much) %
Believe it
necessary
(very much or
fairlv much) %
.-Difference
Catalonia 97 87 10
Balearic Islands 91 73 16
Valencian Region 78 50 28
Galicia 73 49 24
Basque country 69 31 38
Source: Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late
Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The
Case of Spain. Paper presented at the UNESCO
Conference on Nation- Building. Normandie, August
1970, p. 85.
As the table shows, the Basque region has the lowest
percentage of respondents that would like to have their
children learn Basque, but the greatest percentage difference
between those who felt that learning the regional language
was necessary. In the Basque country knowledge of the
^"These figures have another level of significance
which shall be discussed in the next chapter.
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language Is not associated with the process of social
mobility. One might suppose that If the housewives
perceived the language to be an Important asset for career
purposes, one should have expected a greater percentage to
have responded that It was necessary. By contrast, In
Catalonia, where 87 per cent believed that It was necessary
to learn the local language, knowing the local language
seems to be associated with social mobility. "In Catalonia,
the desire is associated somewhat with a higher social
position, while in the Basque country the attachment to the
vernacular seems to be stronger among the middle classes.
»
34 1
But In all regions Castilian seems to be preferred as the
language to be used in the educational system, although
this preference seems to be less marked in the Basque and
Catalonia regions. The population of those favoring the
local language in secondary education (the bachillerato) is
also lower in the Basque region.
It is difficult to make a case that interest in the
local language in the Basque region is primarily related
to considerations of social mobility. In the first place,
among the leaders of Basque nationalism those Who could
speak the local language were the exception rather than the
rule, which meant that if euskera was made the official
language of the Basque country or a requirement for employment
in the public bureaucracy of the region, they, too, would have
34*"Eariy State-Building," p. 88.
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to learn it. Secondly, the nationalists did not argue for
the exclusive use of the Basque language but for bilingualisra
for the Basque region. In the Basque region it seems that
the linguistic issue is primarily symbolic, and it seems
to be primarily among members of the middle classes and the
upper classes that one finds cultural or academic interest
in the local language.
On the basis of the evidence available, in this chapter
we have indicated that the growth of Basque nationalism has
accompanied the economic growth of the Basque country.
This does not mean, however, that economic deprivation may
not be unrelated to the rise of ethnic nationalism. But
economic variables may work in various ways. One may
witness the case, such as the black population of the
United States which has a lower socio-economic status than
the white population, and give the aspirations for socio-
economic betterment as one of the reasons underlying much
of the recent wave of black nationalism, the assumption
being that once socio-economic betterment has been
achieved black nationalism should subside. On the other
hand we may have a case such as the Basques in which
socio-economic betterment in relation to the society in
which they live may have the effect of reinforcing their
cultural identity. Since the Basque region is economically
more advanced than the rest of Spain, the Basques can point
to this as a source of pride and exhibit feelings of
10-
superiority when referring to the other regions of Spain
and further maintain that the rest of the country is a
burden on them, or that they have to support the rest of
the country. 342 Albert Hirschman, for example, noticed this
in his study of economic development:
The progressive sectors and regions of an
underdeveloped economy are easily overlmpressed
with their own rate of development. At the
same time, they set themselves apart from the
less progressive sectors by creating a picture
of the latter as lazy, bungling, intriguing,
and generally hopeless. There seems to be a
cliquishness about progress when it first
appears that recalls the same phenomenon
among adolescents. 3^3
This does not mean that economic development or lack of
it creates ethnicity, but it may reinforce it.
-^Oliveira describes this attitude on the part of
the Basque nationalists in these terms: "The non-Basque
Spaniards living and working in the Basque Provinces were
regarded with singular disdain by the nationalists, who
rejected them as members of an infearior race, calling
them roaouetos."
r p. 417. In an article in the New York
Times. (December 3, 1968), Richard Eder quoted a similar
view from a young Basque: "We cannot carry Spain in our
backs indefinitely. The Castilians, the Andalusians are
uneducated and primitive and they are not really ready for
democracy. As long as we tied to Spain, we shall have to
endure their dictatorship.", p. 11.
343Hirschman, op. cit .. p. 186.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Basque nationalism, as discussed in this study, is the
product of the unsuccessful efforts at nation-building in
nineteenth century Spain. This is not to imply, however,
that Basque ethnicity is the direct or immediate product of
nineteenth century politics, for Basque identification, as
discussed earlier, had long historical roots. But this
Identification had never coalesced into a nationalist
movement until the latter part of the nineteenth century
when nationalism had come into vogue throughout Europe
and the principle of self-determination had acquired
legitimacy.
Basque nationalism is partly a reaction to the crisis
of political legitimacy that occurred in Spain with the
advent of the nineteenth century. The Cadiz Constitution
of 1812 which envisioned a centralized and secular state
along the lines of the French model introduced conflict
into Spanish society between the adherents of a traditional
decentralized Spain organized around the Church and Throne
and the proponents of the secular state. This conflict was
further exacerbated by the dynastic struggles which occursvd
after the death of Ferdinand VII.
Under the political order envisioned by the 1812
consitiution, the traditional autonomy of the Basque
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provinces would come to an end; and the Basques would
henceforth be submitted to the uniform rule of the Madrid
government. Initially the Basque provinces reacted by
taking up arms in the name of God and their traditional
liberties, the fueros. This led to several violent
conflicts (the Carlist Wars) culminating eventually (1876)
in the almost complete loss of the fueros . The Madrid
government allowed the Basque provinces to retain some
degree of autonomy in their fiscal affairs.
Initially it seems that Carlismo was as much motivated
by the desire to preserve the religious unity of Spain as
by an anti-centralist sentiment, thus giving early Basque
regionalism an almost religious fundamentalism flavor, an
orientation retained by the Partido Kacionallsta Vasco
(PNV) which adopted as its slogan, "God and the Old Laws."
The initial reaction against the loss of the fueros
subsided somewhat under the Restoration (1876-1923) with
segments of the Basque population accepting the new state
of affairs under the conclerto economlco . Carlismo 1 s
appeal was gradually reduced to the province of Navarra
and to a lesser degree in the province of Alava.
From the 1890*8 onwards Basque opposition to the
center, the Madrid government, was divided into three
groups: those who supported the status quo under the
concierto economico . the arrangement under which the
provinces were given some degree of fiscal autonomy, those
who wanted the restitution of the medieval autonomy with a
decentralized monarchy, the Carlists, and a later group,
the nationalists, who claimed that the Basques had a
right to political independence, basing their argument on
the grounds that the Basques were a different ethnic
group or "race". It was the nationalists that the Madrid
government viewed as the greatest challenge and threat
because initially their demands were viewed by the Madrid
government as incompatible with the notion of a Spanish
nation and a Spanish State and presented the possibility
of reviving the Carlist sentiment which seemed to have
remained dormant since 1876.
Basque nationalism was launched in the 1890»s from
an urban platform and led by urban people who made use of
traditional Basque symbols. This was also the time when
the Basque region, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya
and Guipuzcoa, were going through a process of rapid
economic change and industrialization. It has been in
these two provinces that Basque nationalism has received
its greatest support both from segments of the middle
class and the peasantry. Undoubtedly the large influx of
non-Basques coming into the Basque region looking for work
was a factor helping the emergence of Basque nationalism,
for it probably reminded the Basques of their fast
disappearing identity, a phenomenon out of which they
made great capital. Basque nationalism, then, was the
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product of an urban setting, and led by people exposed to,
and acquainted with, the forces of modernization.
Although initially the nationalists did not receive
an enthusiastic reception to their ideas, they gradually
acquired enough support so that by 1936, under the second
Spanish Republic, the Basque provinces were given a
statute of autonomy. The provinces of Alava and Navarra
continued to remain in the periphery of Basque nationalism
and oriented more to their medieval autonomy and instituti
Basque autonomy under the Republic was short-lived.
The Civil War that engulfed Spain between 1936-1939 once
ap.ain brought the Basque provinces into open conflict with
the central government. Those provinces that chose to
fight with the Republic, Vizcaya, and Guipuzcoa, were
stripped of all autonomy and submitted to the direct rule
of Madrid while Navarra and Alava, which remained in
Franco^ camp once the war began, were allowed to retain
their conclerto economlco . The end of the Spanish Civil
War also brought to an end, with the force of arms, the
conflict between the Basques and the central government
which had begun in 1812.
As a result of the Civil War, the PNV had to go into
exile into France, from where it has maintained a small
underground network through which it has tried to keep the
question of Basque autonomy alive. From 1939 to the
early 1960*8 Basque opposition to Madrid was primarily
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manifested by the exiles in Europe and Latin America. But
after the 1960«s we begin to see emergence of a Basque
domestic opposition to the Madrid government manifested
primarily by members of the Basque clergy and a new
nationalist group composed primarily of young people in
their twenties, Euzkadl ta Askatasuna ( ETA) which had
split from the youth wing of the Partido Kacionallsta
y* 8?0 * Thts recent group which has emerged to challenge
the leadership of the PNV has taken a more radical approach
in its activities and is more secular in its political
orientation than the PNV. it claims to adhere to a
socialist ideology and believes that a solution to the
Basque question lies in an independent Euzkadl in which
both Spanish and French Basques shall live. ETA seems to
be a radical departure from traditional Basque nationalism
in that it seems to be strongly concerned with issues of
socio-economic reform and claims to speak for all the
Basques, not just the Spanish Basques, although apparently
most of its membership comes from Spain and most of its
activities have concentrated in Spain. As we recall, the
PNV scarcely gave any attention to class issues and devoted
its attention only to the Spanish Basques.
While it has been ETA which recently has made Basque
nationalism a live issue and apparently their activities
have received some type of local support, as evidenced
by the fact that the local population has not been willing
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to tell the local authorities the whereabouts of ETA
members, it seems that the old PNV still claims the support
of large segments of the Basque middle classes. Apparently
ETA's methods and ideology seem objectionable to broad
segments of the Basque population. In view of the
religiosity of the Basque region, a highly secular
political organization may fall to capture broad support.
If we recall, the Acclon haclonalista v«f^« (ANV), the
Leftist organization of Basque nationalism, never acquired
any significant following. On the other hand, with the
Church's changing attitude towards the Left and its
apparent willingness to engage in dialogue with Leftist
groups, quite possibly a more Leftist oriented Basque
nationalist party could emerge.
What are the future prospects of Basque nationalism
and the prospects for some type of Basque autonomy?
Recent events surrounding the Burgos trial of sixteen ETA
members suggest that the present government of Spain is as
opposed as ever to grant any official recognition to the
ethnically plural nature of Spanish society, that is, to
recognize the fact that the political entity known as
Spain remains for significant members of the Spanish
society a state rather than a nation. The government has
launched a campaign to root out and eliminate ETA as a
political organization.
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The fate of Basque nationalism and autonomy will
largely depend on the nature of the political regime that
will succeed Franco. If . more llbcral regime^ on
representative democracy follows Franco undoubtedly the PNV
will emerge on the political scene and continue to demand
some type of autonomy. A more liberal regime, however, will
be no assurance that Basque autonomy will be forthcoming
for, in the past, opposition to autonomy for the peripheral
regions has been manifested by both liberal and conservative
governments. In Catalonia the issue of local autonomy is
still very much alive. Just recently, a group of Catalans,
known as the Assembly of Catalonia, met secretly to discuss
a strategy of opposition to the government. Among their
demands they asked for the restitution of the Catalan
Statute of autonomy given by the Republic in 1932. 3^
Despite the present government's seemingly inflexible
position on the issue of autonomy for the periphery, there
are some indications that some segments of the Spanish
population may be willing to reach an accommodation with
the Basques and the Catalans. The hierarchy of the
Spanish Church, for example, just recently officially
recognized the ethnic make up of Spanish society and asked
the government respect the personality of the ethnic
minorities of Spain. 3*1 5 At the same time there is evidence
^ The New York Times . November 9, 1971, p. 8
5See note 278, Chapter V.
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that the army and some of the Falangist groups are opposed
to any notion of local autonomy. Their slogan remains:
"Espana, Una y Grande."
Whatever the regime that succeeds Franco, the question
of Basque and Catalan autonomy will continue to be a
pernicious issue in Spanish politics. As Lin* has well
argued, "Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a
nation-state for a large part of the population, and only
a state but not a nation for important minorities."3^6
Nation-building remains to be achieved in Spain despite
four centuries of Castilianization. This example does
not look optimistic for political leaders in some of the
Afro-Asian countries who may have to live with weak
political structures or face political fragmentation as
witnessed in 1971 in the state of Pakistan.
Some Theoretical Implications
Nationalism is a complex subject. As suggested by thi«
study, nationalist sentiment does not affect a whole
population in a uniform pattern, nor does it seem to
manifest itself in a uniform way. The overt manifestations
of nationalist sentiment seem to vary from time to time.
It does not seem to affect a self-differentiating group in
the same manner. While a group of people may perceive
themselves as having a common ethnic identity, it does not
3* 6Linz, "Early State-Building", p. 14.
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necessarily mean that all of them will manifest the same
degree of nationalist sentiment. Some may be content
with some degree of cultural autonomy or respect for the
culture of the group by the society. at large; to this group
the label of cultural nationalists could be applied.
Others may aspire to outright political independence, the
logical conclusion of nationalist sentiment. These
variations in the intensity of nationalist sentiment,
within a given population and over periods of time, make
it difficult to draw across-the-board generalizations on
this subject. Some students of nationalism who have spent
a great part of their lives devoted to this subject remained
puzzled with many aspects of it.
The complexity of this subject and the difficulty in
dissecting it are compounded by the fact that this is an
area in which we are dealing with a peopled feelings and
perceptions regarding themselves as a group, and their
relationships with other self-differentiating groups. As
aptly stated by a student of this subject, it is "the self-
view of one , s group and not the tangible characteristics
that is the essence in determining the existence or
^^One of the more prominent students of this
subject, Carlton Hayes, ends one of his studies by
concluding that "we really do not know what has given vogue
to nationalism in modern times." Carlton J. H. Hayes,
The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York:
Crowell-Collier-Macmillan, 1932), p. 302.
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non-xistance of a nation.''3* 8 Because nationalism t. a
matter of feeling, it is difficult to be perceived by the
observer. "There is an understandable propensity," says
the same writer, "when investigating a case of ethnic
discord, to perceive the struggle in terms of its more
readily discernable features."349 Thus what may be a
manifestation of nationalism will be explained as a
linguistic and/or religious problem, or in terms of
grievances due to economic differentiation, if such
differentiation exists, between the several groups living
within the same state. Consequently, the temptation is to
conclude that if the more readily perceived grievances are
ameliorated or corrected, the problem will disappear or
subside.
But the comparative literature suggests, says Walker
Connor, that nationalist sentiment may persist unabated
irrespective of the fact that the more tangible aspects of
nationalism have virtually disappeared. For example, the
"Irish nation persisted after the virtual disappearance of
Gaelic, despite the pre-1920's slogans to describe Gaelic
and Irish identity as inseparable." "National identity
may survive substantial alterations in language, religion,
348Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-
Destroying?", p. 25. To be published in the forthcoming
Spring (1972) issue of World Politics .
3*9Ibld.
2OA
economic status or any other tangible manlfeatatlona of
ita culture."3^ ln the case of the Ba8ques> the ca8ual
observer of the Basque region may find little tangible
evidence of a Basque identity. The Basque language, for
example, has long ceased to be a normal means of communication
among the Basques. Moreover, the evidence on the back*
ground of the proponents of Basque nationalism indicates
that a substantial number, if not most, were ignorant of
the Basque language or only peripherally acquainted with
it, thus suggesting that the presence or absence of the
local language may have little relationship to the
intensity of nationalist sentiments. This contrasts with
Catalonia where one finds extensive use of the local
language and a rich literary tradition in Catalan. At
the same time students of Catalan nationalism have found
that, while it has had a much broader source of support
than Basque nationalism, it has not been as intensive and
as exclusive as Basque nationalism.35 * Catalan nationalists
have been willing to assimilate non-Catalans into Catalan
society while Basque nationalists have traditionally
refused to consider such ideas.
Relying primarily on the extenslveness of the use
of the local language in order to measure the existence or
350lbld .
351 Linz, "Early State-Building," p. 79.
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non-existence of Basque nationalism, one would have to
conclude that it did not exist, for, a. we saw, euskera 1.
hardly spoken by the basques. A perusal of the Cortes
debates on this issue reveals the extent to which non-
Basque deputies, during the Restoration and the second
Republic, kept maintaining that Basque nationalism, or the
existence of a Basque nation, was untenable in view of the
fact that the Basques could not really show a distinct
culture from that of Spain and that their language hardly
existed, and what existed was broken up in different
dialects. Still on this theme, we have the case of
Galicia (franco's home region) where the local language is
more widely spoken than in the Basque region, and yet
nationalist aspirations hardly exist, although during
the second Spanish Republic there was also some sentiment
for some degree of local autonomy. However, it was never
as extensive as that of Catalonia and the Basque country.
Cultural assimilation of a minority group into a
larger cultural or ethnic group need not mean the loss of
the previous ethnic identity. This phenomenon is borne
out by the studies on assimilation in American society.
In his study of assimilation in American life, Hilton
Gordon^S^ has made some valuable distinctions regarding
the process of assimilation and has devised a model which
•"^Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life
(New York j Oxford University Press, 1964), pp# 66-67.
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clartfle. some of the theoretical shortcoming, raised In
the first chapter of this dissertation. Rather than
discussing assimilation as an either or process, Milton
Gordon breaks it down into seven processes which give rise
to seven different types of assimilation which enable one
to look at assimilation in terms of a continuum starting
with cultural or behavioral assimilation and ending with
civic assimilation. Civic assimilation might be looked
upon as complete assimilation. (See Table 6).
With Milton Gordon's model it now becomes possible to
measure the extent to which ethnically divided societies
are approaching integration or t in Milton Gordon's terms,
civic assimilation. According to the model an ethnic group
may adopt the language and cultural traits of another
group, the host society, and yet retain its ethnic identity,
Although cultural or behavioral assimilation is apt to be
the first type to occur, it does not necessarily mean that
the other types will follow. The far more important type
of assimilation is structural assimilation. This, according
to Gordon, is "the keystone of the arch of assimilation."353
Once structural assimilation has taken place it means that
the range of contacts between members of the ethnic group
and the host society has expanded, such as contacts at
the primary group level. From here martial assimilation
ifcid.., p. 81.
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TABLE
THE ASSIMILATION VARIABLES
Subprocess or
Condition
Type or Stage of
Assimilation
Special
Term
Change of cultural
patterns to those of
the host society
Large-scale entrance
into cliques, clubs,
and institutions of
the host society, on
primary group level
Large-scale
intermarriage
Development of a
sense of peoplehood
based exclusively
on host society
Absence of prejudice
Absence of
discrimination
Absence of value and
power conflict
Cultural or
behavioral
assimilation
Structural
assimilation
Marital
assimi latlon
Identifications 1
assimi lation
Attitude
receptional
assimilation
Behavioral
receptional
assimilation
Civic assimilation
Acculturation
None
Amalgamation
None
None
None
None
Source: Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 71.
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will follow and once this happens inevitably the remaining
types will be achieved. With the achievement of civic
assimilation, the e^ic group has acquired the identity
of the host society.
The model does not imply that the processes of
assimilation will take place in the same fashion ir all
societies that may contain several ethnic groups. The
scope and the speed of these processes may differ from
society to society and will undoubtedly depend on a variety
of circumstances, the most important of which being the
attitudes of the minority group towards the host society.
In the case of the Basques, there ig little question
that cultural or behavioral assimilation has taken place,
but structural assimilation has not proceeded very far.
The failure of structural assimilation, however, is not
due to the refusal of Spanish society, but, on the
contrary, to the refusal of the Basques to acquire a new
identity which would make them indistinguishable from
other Spaniards. Identificational assimilation has not
been achieved. As discussed earlier, one of the primary
objectives of the founders of the PNV was precisely to
stop any further degree of assimilation. And this still
remains as one of the goals of Basque nationalist groups.
In the first chapter of this study, we raised some
of the theoretical issues discussed in the literature of
political development and national integration. Some of
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the.e theoretical issues served as the point of departure,
or backdrop for this study on the question of Basque
nationalism. We wanted to see if Basque nationalism
deviated from, or conformed to, the theoretical postulates
presented in the literature on political development. Now
that we have completed our discussion of the rise and
continued growth of Basque nationalism, a recapitulation
of some of the issues raised earlier seems in order.
The literature on political development, on the role
of communications in the process of national Integration
and on the general process of modernization has emphasized
the end result of "homogenization. It was assumed that
the process of modernization affects all cultures roughly
in the same manner and that it was irreversible and
unilinear. Consequently, states composed of diverse ethnic
groups should eventually become nationally integrated.
Traditional cultures would give way to the onslaught of
modernization. It was further assumed that the changes
associated with the process of modernization were of a
systemic nature, that is, changes in one dimension
implied changes in all the other dimensions of the system.
It was believed that modernity would supplant tradition,
thus the tendency to think in terms of the convergence of
modern societies, since technologically speaking they are
so much alike. As of late some of the writers on
modernization and convergence theory, such as Samuel P.
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Huntington, have reconsidered their earlier position. In
a recent article Huntington recanted his early view on
this subject and instead argued that "contrary to the
common idea that modernization produces homogenlzation
or convergence, it could be said that it may reinforce
the distinctive characteristics of each society and thus,
broaden the differences between societies rather than
narrow them. "354 Our case study also suggests that this
is another possibility as opposed to the notion of
convergence.
The first conclusion that emerges from our study is
that the socio-economic processes associated with social
mobilization which according to Deutsch will force people
to look for "new patterns of group affiliation and new
images of personal identity,"355 did not seem to bring
about the attitudlnal changes conducive to national
integration. Instead the process of modernization that
354Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Changes
Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative
Politics. Vol 3 (April, 1971), p. 298. Earlier, however,
he and Brzezinski had maintained that "...industrialization
and urbanization.
.
.give rise to a common culture found in
all modern societies. The industrial process imposes
uniformities in equipment, skills, techniques, and
organization. Industrial culture is the same in Sverdlovsk
and Detroit. Eventually this culture will produce similar
institutions." See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Power: U.S.A. /U.S.S.R. (New York:
The Viking Press, 1967), p. 10.
355Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard lff« Gable
(©<3s.) Political Development and Social Change (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 205.
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occurred In Spain and in the Basque country seemed to have
had the effect of reinforcing the cultural differentiation
of the Basques.
The thesis behind much of the literature on political
development seems to overlook the point that in some cases
nations had already coalesced and national identity had
become established before the process of modernization
got under way. As examples, one might cite Ireland,
Portugal, Korea, and Japan. This suggests that societies
need not go through the process of industrialization, and
the other concomitant social processes known as modernization
in order to become integrated, that is, to develop a
national identity. In some cases the process of national
integration developed prior to what has come to be known
as modernization.
Two other interesting theoretical points emerge from
our case study. First, it is generally believed that
urbanization and the growth of the market economy also
lead to the growth of secularization— thus one of the
reasons for believing that modernity and tradition cannot
coexist. But our study suggests that this need not be
necessarily the case. Despite the fact that the Basque
356j0hn H. Kautsky, for example, argues that
modernization and secularization go together: "One could
thus define the process of modernization," he says, "as
one of secularization, but it also involves a great number
of other interrelated factors." The Political Consequences
1977),
P.
of Modernization (New York* John Wiley and Sons Inc,
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country Is one of the more industrialized regions of Spain,
at the same time it also remains one of the most religious
regions of the country.35? Other areas of Spain much more
traditional in the organization of their economic life and
much less acquainted with the modern aspects of contemporary
life do not manifest the same degree of religiosity that
one finds in the Basque country.
Second, it is also generally believed that political
parties play the role of integrator in the process of
nation-building, and in the literature on political parties
the notion of integration looms large as one of the
cardinal functions of parties. 358 But the literature on
political parties, however, has used as a model societies,
such as the United States and European societies, which had
already achieved a substantial degree of national
integration. But in ethnically divided societies political
parties may play just the opposite role. Rather than
helping to bring about national integration, political
parties instead seem to capitalize on ethnic differences
and thus may become obstacles in the path of national
integration. We must remember that the European nation-
35?For an index of Basque religiosity see Linz,
"Early State-Building," p. 135.
35&See James S, Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds)
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
Africa (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966);
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), Political
Parties and Political Development (Princeton! Princeton
University Press, 1966).
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states emerged, by and large, under authoritarian political
system, where political parties in the modern sense were
non-existent. For the Afro-Asian states, and for those
European states that did not achieve national integration
before the process of modernization got under way, and
before democracy became a popular ideology, the process
of national integration may. endure for a long time and
may not succeed. Instead we may witness further political
fragmentation*
It seems to this writer that one of the weaknesses
of the literature on political development and national
integration stems from the fact that it has overly stressed
the rational element in human behavior. It has looked
upon man as primarily motivated by economic considerations.
This view is particularly evident in Professor Deutsch»s
work on nationalism. In his work the nation seems to
emerge as a trading company to satisfy the socio-economic
aspirations of its members and thus he underestimates the
possibility that men may act for goals other than socio-
economic gain. To view nationalism as "an effort to
convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for
masses individual to social and economic advancement"
is to view it as no more than an opportunistic movement.
This overlooks the emotional attachment to cultural
359Karl W, Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications
p. 103,
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traditions and group identification. If men were indeed
this rational, and if a nation's existence was dependent
on how well it satisfied the socio-economic aspirations of
its members, we should be able to see the disintegration
of nations as soon as socio-economic conditions worsened.
But there is historical evidence which suggests, however,
that it is precisely at periods of great social stress
and economic deprivation that national leaders have been
able to evoke the most intense degree of nationalism.
Purely from an economic and personal gain point of view,
it is difficult to explain why an American Jew, for example,
gives any aid to the state of Israel, or even identifies
with it. More importantly, the studies on nationalism indicate
that nationalistic leaders hardly ever ask the question
regarding the economic feasibility of the political
units which they wish to govern, e.g., Bangladesh,
Anguilla.360 This seems to be, in fact, among the last
considerations. In the case of the Basques, some of the
leading personalities of Basque nationalism lost much of
their wealth as a result of their involvement with the
movement
.
As suggested by our study, the growth of modernity,
360por a goo<j discussion on the relationship between
economic variables see Walker Connor, "Nation-Destroying
or Nation-Building?"; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to
Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); and Walter Sulzbach,
National Consciousness (Washington, D.C.: American
Council on Public Affairs, 1943).
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with Its underlying process of social mobilization, need
not mean the loss of traditional identities and the quest
for new ones. To be sure, socio-economic changes have
brought about changes in many aspects of traditional
cultures but this does not mean the loss of group identity.
Despite the fact that American society has gone through
great technological changes since the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, this does not mean that Americans
have gradually begun to lose their identity and are
looking for a new one. The same could be said of European
societies. The evidence seems to suggest that ethnic
nationalism and group identity can accomodate itself rather
well to econoraico-technological innovations. Some of our
modern ideologies which have postulated universal outlooks,
as opposed to national or parochial ones, have eventually
become nationalized. Christianity, for example, which
emerged as a universal religion recognizing all men
without any distinctions was eventually appropriated by
nationalism, and in some cases, such as Ireland, even
reinforced nationalism. Paradoxical as it might seem, it
is among segments of the Catholic clergy, exposed to
universal values, that we may also find some of the more
nationalistic people, as illustrated by segments of the
Basque clergy. Nationalism has proved to be more powerful
than religious affiliation. The same has happened to
Marxism; it, too, has become nationalized. It may well
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be, and the evidence available seems to suggest this
direction, that political modernization, as Clifford
Geertz has argued, "does not do away with ethnocentrism,
it merely modernizes it # "36l
Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolutionj
Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the Mew
States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and flew
States (New York* The Free Press, 1963), p. 154 #
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TABLE 7
MUNICIPAL VOTE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
JUNE 19 f 1932
Yes No
Provinces
Munici-
palities
Munici-
palities Abstentions ?9V*l
Alava 52 11 14 77
Guipuzcoa 84 2 3 89
Navarra 109 123 35 267
Vizcay
a
109 1 6 116
Total 354 137 58 549
Source: F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo
Vasco (Paris: n.p., 1956), p. 13.
218
PLEBISCITE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
NOVEMBER 5, 1933
Provinces
No. of
Electors Yes No Abstentions
Vizcaya 267,466 236,564 5,065 0
Guipuzcoa 166,365 149,177 2,436 248
A lava 56,056 26,015 6,695 109
Total 489,887 411,756 14,196 357
Source: F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo
Vasco, (n.p.), (Paris, 1^56), p. T5.
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TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY ANDSELECTED AREAS OF SPAIN BY OCCUPATION (1970)
T-). , M
% of tho POP. % In % inRegions in agri. and fish Industry services
Madrid 5 40 55
Barcelona 5 56 39
Pais Vasco 14 55 31
Extremadura 60 20 20
Galicia 67 15 18
Spain (total) 36 33 31
Source: FOESSA, 1970:172
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TABLE 10
POPULATION OF THE FRENCH BASQUE REGION (1962)
IfcflsrlBst Population Are*
Persons
-.per km2
Labourd 152,000 800 km2 190
Basse-Navarre 85,000 1,284 km2 27
Soule 20,000 785 km2 25
Total 207,000 2,869 72
Sources Zeruko Argla. January 11, 1970.
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BASQUE SPEAKING AREA FROM 16TH TO
20TH CENTURY (SPAIN) •
X. X x A A X x
Basque-speaking Area in the 20th Century
Basque-speakins Area in the 19th Century
Basque-speaking Area from the 16th Century
to the 18th Century
Boundary of the Basque Country of Spain
Spanish-French Border
Source: Julio Caro Baroja, Materia les para v.:
hi.storia..c\-i la Icy.- i:a vasca (Salamanca;
University of Salamanca 1945), p. 255.
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